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Introduction
"Well," says payroll-administration service AIM']'], "(hone
3.2 per cent [bargained wage increase] in thin year tell only
half of the story." According to A PP. th«' i-ffwt ivi- wng«- in-
crease is about twice as much, bet-autM* IIV inddcntiil wnge
increases, [... ] each employer continuously strives at en-
couraging his personnel to stay.
ftofcert Cieftrb. Mdicu, Po/rfrrm<xir/". in /VKC
Worf, ^ Junr /99#. 7Vons/ahon 6y (A
1.1 MOTIVATION
After years of moderate wage increases, Dutch unions and employers' federations
seem to have lost control of wages. Even the unions' representatives express regret
about incidental wage raises, yet a whole lot of employers are forced to raise; wages by
far more than the collectively bargained rates in order to recruit, hold, and motivate
their personnel. The result is a wage gap: the wage that is effectively paid is greater
than the wage level agreed upon in collective bargaining.
At first glance, this wage gap does not raise a problem. Effective-wage increases,
it could be argued, are higher than was bargained just because the labour market
situation and incentive considerations of employers demand it. Obviously, collective
bargaining just failed to settle an efficient wage increase. This view, however, falls
short of an adequate explanation of wage gaps in general. Effective wages being
higher than agreed upon in collective bargaining are not only observed in times of
labour scarcity, but occur in all stages of the business cycled Moreover, if effective
wages are really only determined on the labour market or by single employers and
employees on their own, this view cannot explain why collective bargaining is often
held so fiercely—why it is costly and time consuming, and why strikes and lock-
outs occur—other but by assuming that unions and employer federations are just
promoting an exhibition fight.
' ADP (Automatic Data Processing) is a company specialized in processing the payroll admin-
istration of (Dutch) companies.
* chapter 2.Chapter 1. Introduction
Yet, wage gaps matter. Recent data for Germany^ are provided by Addison,
Kraft, and Wagner (1993), Bellmann and Kohaut (1995), Meyer (1994, 1995) and
Schnabel (1995, 1997). Using different samples, their estimates of the share of firms
that are covered by collective bargaining, but that pay an effective wage higher than
the contract wage, range between 73.0% and 90.2%. The average wage gap paid by
these firms is around 10% of the contract wage, but this relative gap varies widely
over the different industries and skill groups.''
Wage gaps and their development over time, the so called wage drift,^ are a
challenge for both economic policy and theory. Though the mentioned figures are
far from being representative, they show that the wage gap is a phenomenon that
can hardly be ignored in the discussion about wage formation.
The two components of the effective wage—contract wage and wage gap—can
obviously be regarded as the outcomes of two different processes in wage formation
at two different stages. At one stage the contract wage is set. Commonly, it is
considered to be the outcome of collective bargaining between unions and employers'
federations on nation wide, industry wide or just on the individual firm's level. If
collective bargaining matters, then its immediate purpose is obviously to influence
the e/ferttt/e remuneration, mostly for a predetermined time period.
While the determination of contract wages is highly institutionalized in European
economies, this is far less the cast' for the second stage of wage formation, at which
the effective wage is determined. It is reasonable to assume, that the factors that
make effective wages exceed the contract wage, are found on external and internal
labour markets. Wage gaps may be due to deliberate decisions of individual firms,
but it is possible that also issues of bargaining power between management and
employees play a role.
The mere existence of the two stages suggests that none can be neglected. At
each stage of the wage-determination process, the actors should be aware of the
mechanisms and possible outcomes of the other. However, the literature on wage
formation usually ignores this interdependence. Labour-market theory provides a
whole lot of models of wage formation. But apparently, there is a gap between
models focusing on effective wages and those focussing on contract wages.
Among the effective wage models, the textbook neoclassical theory of a com-
petitive labour market is obviously at pain explaining wage gaps. In a world of
complete information, individual rationality and the invisible hand, there is simply
no room for collective bargaining, unions and employers' federations. Many contem-
porary economists find this framework too restrictive, because it overlooks apparent
market imperfections, as for example bargaining power and incomplete information.
The recent years have seen several new theories that abandon -with the exception
•'Unfortunately, corresponding data is not available for the Netherlands.
*Blum (198M, pp. 139-40), looking at firms in the metal industry of a South German bargaining
district in the 1970s, even reports that firms in the sample on average paid a mark-up between
30% and 50%. The individual figures range from 5.9% to as much as 82.9%. For a more detailed
survey of the empirical evidence see chapter 2.
*In most studies, wage drift is defined as the relative change of the wage gap over time, i.e., the
difference between the growth rates of effective wages and contract wages.1.1. Motivation
of rational behaviour—one or more of the basic assumptions of neoclaasical theory,
giving room for a more realistic view on the labour market. Focusing on the effects
of rent-seeking behaviour (e.g. insider-outsider theories), incomplete information
(e.g. efficiency-wage theories) or implicit contracts, these theories underline ttint
bargaining power matters in employment relations. However, they remain theories
of the effective wage.
Contract-wage models, on the other hand, take the existence of bargaining j>ower
for granted, and focus on behaviour of especially the trade unions under the re-
strictions of employers' preferences, and input and output markets. Yet, most of
the related theories assume at least implicitly, that the outcome of bargaining, the
contract wage, will become the effective wage. •>
Theoretical studies that try to fill the gap between effective- and rontract-Wtgl
models are scarce. Moreover, they approach the wage-gap problem from varlolM an-
gles, such that a coherent picture of the phenomenon is st ill missing." The intention
behind this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the factors thai lead to the
occurrence of wage gaps. In order to provide a more coherent account for the phe-
nomenon, it will especially focus on the behaviour and the underlying motivations of
the agents that are involved in the process of wage formation at the level of individ-
ual firms. Therefore, the thesis is centred around two themes, efficiency wages and
bargaining power, as the main—and strongly related—explanatory determinants of
wage gaps.
Bargaining power matters on all stages of the wage-formation process. With
respect to collective bargaining this is obvious. But also on the level of individual
firms bargaining power becomes important if rents are created, for example due to
transaction costs or moral hazard. Then, the need to ensure that employees keep
their part of the contract, forces firms into a, at least implicit, bargain with their
workforce.
The choice for efficiency wages is mainly motivated by their incentive aspect.*
Efficiency-wage theory postulates that it can be rational for firms to pay higher
than market clearing wages. The underlying idea is that there is a positive relation
between a worker's performance and her wage, which firms can exploit in order
to minimize the cost of labour input. This argument alone can provide for an
explanation, why firms (voluntarily) pay a mark-up on the contract wage.
Yet, the firms' ability to manipulate labour supply has even further-reaching
effects. The incentive considerations can imply that wages become largely indepen-
dent from short-term developments on the external labour market. Employees are
then partly shielded from the discipline of the market, and can acquire bargaining
power vis-a-vis the firm. In this way, workers—and unions—can get a stake in the
wage-setting behaviour of firms, forcing wages up even further.
the survey in chapter 3.
^Originally, efficiency-wage theory was hailed for its putative ability to explain involuntary un-
employment without having to rely on exogenously imposed wage rigidities or irrational behaviour.
However, this view has been criticized sharply (see e. g. the discussion in Franz (1994, pp. 302-304)
and Lazear (1995, pp. 70-72)).Chapter 1. Introduction
• ••••..•• 1.2 OUTLINE
Why do firms pay a mark-up on the contract wage, and what are the consequences
for the different stages of wage formation? This thesis approaches the problem from
different directions, focussing on issues of bargaining power and incentive pay.
The chapters 2 and 3 discuss the empirical and theoretical literature on supple-
mentary payments. The purpose of chapter 2 is to provide an empirical background
for the theoretical analyses in the subsequent chapters. It describes the labour re-
lations in the Netherlands and Germany, and discusses empirical studies on the size
and the determinants of wage gaps and their development over time in these two
countries. The chapter pays special attention to the question whether these studies
support our hypothesis that efficiency wages and bargaining power are important
explanatory factors for wage gaps. As will turn out, no definite proof can be given,
but the empirical evidence is at least consistent with our hypothesis.
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical literature on wage gaps. It shows that the
results of different theories with respect to the nature of wage gaps strongly depend
on the assumed labour-market structure. The assumption of a neoclassical labour
market supports the view that, apart from imposing a restriction by their minimum-
wage characteristic, contract, wages do not matter in the formation of effective wages,
at leant not in the long run. In this case, the wage gap is not. a mark-up oa the
contract wage, but just a buffer between effective and contract wage. This approach
is contrasted with models that ascribe wage gaps to labour-market imperfections.
Although the kind of imperfection differs from model to model, it is shown that their
results are all in favour of a mark-up hypothesis of the wage gap. The discussion
in (liiiplii .'? therefore pays special attention to efficiency-wage models and models
of li" al wa^e bargaining, because especially the first part of the following chapters
builds forth on these models.
The remaining chapters can be divided into two parts. Part I (chapters 4 and 5)
focuses on the occurrence and characteristics of wage gaps when effective wages are
determined by both efficiency wages and bargaining. Unlike many other theoretical
studies on wage gaps, the models of this part avoid a<f /ioc assumptions about the
motivations and the behaviour of the parties involved in the wage-formation process.
Instead, special attention is paid to a stringent microeconomic motivation of wage
gaps.
Chapter 4 addresses the problem of bargaining power in local wage bargaining
when linns are bound by a no-shirking condition. Different from collective bargain-
ing, the i>:nti<> to local negotiations on the level of an individual firm are bound
by a peace i -In use, which prohibits industrial actions like strikes and lockouts. This
raises die problem of identifying meaningful threat points of especially the workers.
In chapter 4, the process of local tmrgaining between employees and firm is modelled
explicitly. The model of this chapter compares the outcomes of a noncooperative
bargaining game under different constellations of threat points, in order to qualify*
the diverging results of earlier models of local wage bargaining.
Chapter 5 relaxes the restrictive assumption that unions only bargain over wages.12 Outline
and introduces effort as a second object of negotiations. In contrast to other studies
of bargaining over effort, it is argued that, if firms |>ay efficiency wanes, unions
will in general hesitate to bargain over effective wage and effort level-, ilmvtly, in
order to avoid getting involved in the moral-hazard problem between turn-* and
workers. Rather, unions will try to establish reference levels of wane> ami etl..rt,
which determine the actions a firm can take against workers, while leaving t lie m.>i al-
hazard problem to solve for the firm. The model analyses the resulting consequences
for the wage gap and the behaviour of unions. Moreover, it is argued that the
reference-effort level can help solve the problem of the workers' threat |x>int in local
wage bargaining.
Part II (chapters 6 and 7) focuses on a problem that has not l>een raised yet in
the literature about wage gaps What are the efficiency aspe< is ,,i w.i;,i formation
systems that can lead to wage gaps? It would l>e presumptuous to assume that
different wage-formation processes have evolvcnl for mainly economic reasons, while
neglecting social and political factors. Yet, economic factors might !«• important for
predictions about whether a certain wage-formation system will survive, or whether
it will be outperformed by alternative systems. On this background, the purpose
of this part is to show, that wage-setting systems that provide for a lm>i u > , i ,K>
(the contract wage) combined with the possibility to alter this wage (the v. .
contribute to the efficiency of emujovment relations., mul.t hut. th#. 'yMlit^- w>>....«,L
in wage formation might prefer them to alternative wage-setting systems.
Chapter 6 focuses on the employment relation between a firm and a single em-
ployee. It is shown that if both parties have an interest in a fixed wage rate, e. g. in
order to protect their returns from specific investments, it can nevertheless be effi-
cient to allow for a certain degree of wage flexibility. The underlying reason is that
although a fixed wage avoids hold-up in the employment relation, the parties must
avoid foregoing all returns of the relation if it is threatened by changing exogenous
circumstances. In the chapter a (re)negotiation game is analysed that is able to rec-
oncile the conflicting needs for wage stability on the one hand, and wage flexibility
on the other hand.
A similar framework is used in chapter 7, but now the focus lies on a different
type of investment than in the preceding chapter, and on the impact of asymmetric
information between firm and worker. In the model of chapter 7, the worker's
outside option is endogenized. The worker has the choice between investing effort
in her outside option, or in her work performance in the firm. Comparing the
worker's optimal investment decision under different bargaining environments, it
is concluded that only a system that combines a base wage with a performance-
dependent component can achieve both an efficient investment decision and the
protection of the employment relation from inefficient separation. With respect to
the bargaining environment, this system turns out to be very similar to the two-tier
wage-bargaining systems that are discussed in the chapters 3.5 and 4 of this thesis.
The conclusions (chapter 8) compare the results of different models of this thesis
and provide some suggestions for further research.••-.;; It >CHAPTER 2
Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and
Germany
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for the t lu-oret ical i
in the subsequent chapters. It will show that wage gaps indoinl matter in the prorciw
of wage formation; for a lot of employees they make up for a considerable purl of
their earnings. Second, this chapter surveys empirical studies on the dHrimiiuiuis
of wage drift and wage gaps in the Netherlands and Germany in order to show that
the basic assumption of this thesis is justified, namely that both efficiency wages
and bargaining power are important for understanding why firms raise wages above
the level that is determined by collective bargaining.
The first part of the chapter (section 2.2) provides some definitions that are
useful for the empiric quantification of wage gaps and wage drift. Furthermore, it
discusses common problems in measuring these variables, which can lead to signifi-
cant misrepresentation of their true values in empiric research.
The sections 2.3 and 2.4 then discuss the situations in the Netherlands and
Germany. First, the institutional settings of the labour markets in the two countries
are briefly described in order to clarify the structures of labour relations. The second
parts of these sections then discuss the development and possible determinants of
wage drift, i.e., the development of supplementary payments over time, in the two
countries. The section about Germany also discusses empirical results about wage
gaps, which—different from the wage drift figures—also provide an insight in the
size of supplementary payments.
The empirical part focuses on two problems. The first is the relation between
collectively bargained (or, contract) wages and effective wages, and the nature of
wage gaps. If effective and contract wages are determined by two independent pro-
cesses or if contract wages only follow the development of effective wages, wage gaps
should merely serve as a buffer between the two. In this case, any theory of wage
determination could simply focus on effective wages and consider contract wages
only as minimum wages that sometimes can become binding. If instead the effective
wages are persistently influenced by the contract wages—and not just by their min-
imum wage characteristic—wage gaps become an interesting theoretical problem, as8 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
they will be an independent force in the determination of effective wages.'
The second problem is to identify the factors that determine wage gaps. In the
literature about the phenomenon, roughly three different approaches can be distin-
guished.^ According to the market or "Phillips-curve'* approach, effective wages
are mainly market determined. In this view, firms are forced to pay wages above
contract if the contract wage is too low to clear the labour market. This idea was
originally introduced by Hansen and Rehn (1956), and it was the common expla-
nation for wage drift in the 1950s and 1960s. In this view, contract wages would
indeed only play a minor part in the determination of effective wages.
The bargaining-power approach assumes that wage gaps are due to negotiations
on the level of individual firms. These negotiations can have an explicit character
in the form of bargaining between the management and workers' representatives, or
they can be implicit. In the latter case, either workers' representatives could bargain
about other topics than wages in order to force earnings up in an indirect way,' or
no explicit negotiations take place at all, but the management raises wages just for
fear of a dispute with its employees.
Finally, the efficiency-wage approach attributes wage gaps to the incentive effect
of wages on labour productivity. The argument is that firms can drive up labour
productivity by paying wages above the market-clearing level. As was mentioned
in the first chapter, efficiency wages are an attractive explanation because incentive
pay is a central theme in the management literature about compensation.
In the discussion of the empirical evidence on wage gaps and wage drift it will
become clear that it is virtually impossible to discriminate definitely between the
three approaches. The reason is that data that allow for a direct test of the market-
power and the efficiency-wage approach are missing or even impassible to measure. It
is impossible to measure bargaining power directly, because it is a theoretical ad /ioc
construct, and a direct test on efficiency wages would require individual data on the
wage and the performance of workers, which are not available. Empirical research
therefore has to rely on proxies. But in most cases these cannot be clearly related to
one or the other approach. For instance, as we will see in section 2.4, some studies try
to relate bargaining power to the structure of employment in a firm. The argument
here is that especially women, part-timers and low-skilled blue-collar workers should
have low bargaining power in comparison to high-skilled workers. Yet, this idea
is based on the observation that the former groups are more easily replaceable. If
empirical studies show that the share of these groups has indeed an effect on the
size of wage gaps, it is therefore not clear whether this is not just due to market
forces. With efficiency wages we face a similar problem. A greater wage gap for
skilled workers could t>e due to the fact that the performance of employees fulfilling
more complex tasks cannot be easily monitored, and that firms therefore have to use
wages in order to provide incentives. It could, however, also mean that firms try to
'These two views on the role of the wage gap are sometimes referred to as the "adaptation
hypothesis" (of contract wngnO and the mark-up hypothesis (of the wage gap).
'These three approaches will be discussed in detail in the following chapter 3.
'See chapter 5 of this thesis for such a model.2-2. Definitions and measurement problems
reduce turnover costs because it is costly to replace than wattes. Finally, the reason
could just be that skilled workers are relatively scarce, and that their wage gap just
increases their earnings to the market-clearing level. If empirical studies show tlmt
the employment structure and labour market variables are important <l<t<t mutants
of wage gaps and wage drift, this can consequently not be interpreted a.- support for
the market approach, but such a finding is consistent with all the thr<« appi.i.u h.\s.
The reader should take these difficulties into account when tin- result* of empir-
ical studies are discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Yet. as will !><• shown, there is
sufficient evidence that shows that bargaining power and esjHHially efficiency wages
are important determinants for wage gaps.
2.2 DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
Fbr analysing the divergence between contract wages (usually the wage settled by
collective agreements) and effective wages two concepts, the wage gap and the wtige
drift, are usually used. The wape gop is a static variable measuring the deviation of
the effective wage from the contract wage at a certain point in time. The rih.su/ftfe
u'flye yap p" is the difference between effective wage w and the contract wage u>,
measured in units of money,
g" = u; - u>,
while the ne/ative wage gap g^ indicates by how many per cent the effective wage
exceeds the contract wage:
^ ^
drt/t describes the deviation of changes in the effective wage from the
changes in the contract wage over time. Gerfin (1969, p. 474 f.) describes two
measurements, d° and <f,
= ^-= f ^=1 - l) • 100, (2.2)
of which the first is more commonly used. Both measurements have in common
that the wage drift is equal to zero if effective and contract wage grow by the same
rates. Consequently, a negative wage drift does not imply that the wage gap is
decreasing, but that it is increasing by less than the effective wage. Gerfin (1969,
p. 475 f.) defends this characteristic arguing that if negative drift rates prevail over
many periods, the share of above-contract payments in the wage will become more
and more insignificant, even if the absolute wage gaps do not decrease.''
The empirical research on the wage gap and wage drift has to struggle with a
number of shortcomings of the official wage statistics, especially in the determination
••in order to avoid the problem of negative drift rates while the absolute wage gap is still
increasing, Marquand (1967, p. 8) proposes other drift measurements that describe the absolute or10 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
of tb* contract wage. The reason is that the contract-wage statistics often come in
the form of index numbers based on the average contractual earnings per hour or
per piece. AH a consequence, the official contract-wage statistics omit some relevant
components of the contract wage, which, as these components do well appear in
the effective-wage statistics, commonly leads to an overestimation of the wage gap
and to a bias in measuring the wage drift. Cerfin (1969, p. 477 f.) summarizes the
responsible factors as follows. . • • ••'
1. Variations in factor input, e.g. overhours and short time:
Contract-wage statistics are usually calculated from base wages per hour or
month, given the normal working hours. Moreover, they ignore overtime al-
lowances determined by collective agreements. As the effects of overhours and
short time arc well included in the effective-wage statistics, the measured wage
gap can (wrongly) show a cyclical component, if employers vary labour input
not by chunging the number of employees but by changing the number of hours
worked. As a consequence, wage drift might be underestimated in recessions
and overestimated in booms.
2. Changes in productivity of piece-workers:
Contract-wage statistics usually convert piece rates into hourly wages by using
a norm output per hour. Changes of productivity are therefore not accounted
for in the contract-wage statistics, but they are captured in the statistics of
the effective wage.
3. Supplementary payments determined by collective agreements:
As the contract-wage statistics are based on normal hourly earnings, they
do not. recognize one-off payments as holiday pay, Christmas bonuses, child
benefits, etc., or other supplementary payments as for nightwork, etc.
4. Changes in the composition of the workforce:
Collective agreements usually differ from industry to industry, and each of them
determines the wages of different qualification groups of workers. Because in
the official statistics the average contract, wage is usually calculated by using
fixed weights for the different groups and industries, they do not account for
workers moving from one industry or qualification group to another.
Due to these factors the contract wages reported by the official statistics are
biased downwards.'' Because the effective-wage statistics capture the effects of these
relative increase of the absolute wage gap over time, e.g.,
u> = wf — u>rj *, or u> =
Thaw measurements have in common that the wage drift is negative only if the absolute wage gap
is decreasing over time. However, Marquand's proposal* have not gained general acceptance.
'Strictly speaking, the factors 2 and 4 could lead to a positive or a negative bias. In prac-
tice however, the bias should be positive, because a downward development of productivity or
downgrading of workers are rare.2.3. The situation in the Netherlands 11
factors, the wage gape calculated from official figures are usually too high Whether
the wage-drift figures are also affected depends on how the relative changes of tlie
reported contract wages over time compare to the changes of the real com i u i u .n;ea.
Only if both move in line, the calculated wage drift is equal to the real drill, own if
the calculated wage gap is biased.
These measurement problems lead to the distinction of a gross and a m i • •<>n.vpi
of the wage gap and wage drift. The ne/ wajpr (/ap/dn/J reflects the theoretical
concept of wage gaps/drift and accounts for the four factors incut KUKMI above, 'l'he
^roas uxifle gap/dn/f is not adjusted for these factors. The difference bctwivn t In-
gross and the net figures, which us due to the effects of the four factors, is called
the measurement or metAod ^ap/dn/r.'' It should IH> noted that most of the wage
drift figures that are discussed in the subsequent sections are not cm n > t<<l for the
measurement drift. »•
2.3 THE SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
£.5./ Labour- marJlrr tTMrtruitonj
Dutch unions are organized along industries and w/<an.ir/iauun<7, i.e., for most in-
dustries like manufacture, nutrition, transport, etc., there are two unions, one non-
denominational and one (Protestant) Christian, a distinction that is reflected by the
existence of two different federations of trade unions, the FNV (Federation of Dutch
Unions) and the CNV (Christian National Unions' Federation)/ In 1997, the pro-
portion in membership between CNV and FNV was about 1:3.5. In international
comparison union membership is relatively low: in 1993 only 26.2% of the active
workforce were organized." In order to compensate for the accordingly low mem-
bership contributions, Dutch unions have to rely on contributions from employers."
Moreover, in the last twenty years unions have tried to increase their strength by
concentration. In the past two decades, the formerly independent socialist and the
Catholic federations of trade unions have merged to form the FNV in 1981. Also
within the federations mergers have taken place, the last being the merger of the
Dutch Central Office for Statistics (CBS) emphasizes factor 4 and uses the term "structural
effect".
^The Protestant "Christian" unions were originally founded as countermovement to the socialist
labour movement. The non-denominational unions nowadays encompass unions that have their
origins in the socialist labour movement as well as in the Catholic social movement (both groups
have merged in 1981). Both groups of unions are organized in different union federation)*, but
their attitude has become more and more pragmatic rather than ideological. Next to these two
federations of trade unions there is a third, which organizes senior white-collar workers. See Albeda,
Dercksen, and Tros (1998, chapter 2) for an overview of the different organisations.
*The figures about union membership are taken from Albeda, Dercksen, and Tros (1998, p. 56-
58).
"As a part of the collective agreements these contributions are compulsory. According to Teul-
ings and Hartog (1998, p. 285), "for some unions these contributions make up a sizeable proportion
of the revenues." The same authors report that employers see these contributions as a means
to keep the smaller Christian unions alive in order to prevent a uniting of the union movement
(toe. ctt., p. 293).13 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
unions of the service, the manufacturing, the transportation and food sectors to
FNV Bondgenoten in 1998, uniting about 40% of the members of FNV unions. The
federations of trade unions do not participate in collective bargaining, but they at-
tempt to coordinate and support the bargaining strategies of their member unions.
Nevertheless, the division of the union movement still weakens its bargaining posi-
tion. Employers can, and frequently have, played off one union against the other,
typically a more moderate Christian union against its counterpart of the FNV.
Apart from collective bargaining, labour representatives are also granted a say in
matters of remuneration on the level of individual firms. By law, works councils have
the right to veto a number of management decisions concerning the compensation of
employees, to mention decisions about the pension scheme, profit-sharing arrange-
ments, the employer's contributions to savings schemes, and about wage schemes.
However, the consent of the works council is not needed if the point in question
is already determined by a collective agreement (Albeda, Dercksen, and Tros 1998,
p. 164). Moreover, works councils have the right to make proposals about labour
relations in the firm, on which the management must comment.
The employer federations in the Netherlands, originally organized along similar
lines us the unions, are nowadays much less divided. The employers of a certain
brunch are mostly represented by one branch organization. Most of these organiza-
tions are in turn members of one of the three central employer organizations, LTO
Nederland (agriculture)'", MKB Nederland (medium and small sized companies),
and VNO-NCW (for all types of companies). So in contrast to the union movement,
there is no direct competition between the different organizations. In collective bar-
gaining, Dutch employers are represented by their branch organizations. Only a few
very large companies negotiate directly with the unions. The task of the central
organizations is in general to provide coordination and support to its members.
The third import ant player in the wage formation process is the government. It
provides the legal framework of collective bargaining, and it can intervene in wage
formation by ordinance. During the interbellum the legislator has created means to
extend collective agreements to companies and employees that are not represented
by the bargaining bodies: firms were obliged to extend a collective agreement in
which they participated to all their personnel, and the Minister for Social Affairs
got the right to declare agreements in an industry binding for all firms and employees
of the very industry.
After the war, the Dutch government implemented a complex policy of guided
wages. Advised by the Social Economic Council (SER)", the government formulated
guidelines for the development of wages, which unions and employer federations had
to take into account when negotiating collective agreements at the industry level.
The agreement needed approval by the Board of National Arbitrators (College van
'"in contrast to the other organizations, individual companies or farmers can be member of LTO
Nederland. Moreover, I,TO Ncdcrland is the only central organization that participates in collective
bargaining.
"The members of the SER are appointed representatives of employees, employers, and the
government As an advisory board, the SKK took the place of the Foundation of Labour (STAR),
a body of employers' and trade union federations, in 1950.2.3. The situation in the Netherlands IS
Rijksbemiddelaars). The board decided upon approval, again advised by the SER,
on the grounds of the government's guidelines.'^
From 1959 on, the Dutch government loosened its grip on wage setting, and in
1964 it finally left the control over collective agreement* to the unions and employer
federations. The Wage Law (Loonwet) of 1970 legalized this situation, but it still
gave the government far-reaching opportunities to intervene in wage formation: the
government can freeze wages (article 10), and under certain conditions it can
declare a collective agreement non-binding (article 8). The government used its i inlit
to freeze wage several times until 1981. Moreover, it stimulated nation..1 .u >•. m, uts
between unions and employer federations in order to limit the scope of negotiations
on the industry level. In general, however, the aim of moderating wage increastw
in order to counteract the economic downturn was not achieved. Finally, in 1982,
the government relinquished its right to intervene directly in the process of wage
formation, a step that was legally established in 1986. Yet, the government has
reserved the competence of deciding about the extension of collective agreements to
the whole industry, and it has repeatedly used this competence to put pressure on
the bargaining parties.'''
After the government has withdrawn from an active role in wage formation, the
federations of trade unions and employers kept coordinating the negotiations on
collective agreements through the 1980s. It was not before the last decade that the
bargaining partners in the different industries started to pursue different agendas,
allowing for agreements tailored to the circumstances in the industries. However,
collective bargaining for each industry still takes place on the national level, although
the number of company agreements is increasing.
2.S.2 Wage dri/f
Despite of the long Dutch tradition of government interventions in collective bar-
gaining, empiric research on wage gaps and wage drift is surprisingly scarce. To the
knowledge of the author, microeconomic data on wage gaps is not available. Aggre-
gated data on the development of contract and gross wages, from which the gross
wage drift can be calculated, are published on a regular base by the Dutch Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Moreover, (net) drift data are available for selected time
periods.
Figure 2.1 depicts the development of contract wages and the gross wage drift
in the Netherlands from 1948 to 1999, and table 2.1 summarizes the development
of contract wages, the wage drift and their correlation for selected periods. The
relatively low drift figures up to the mid-1950s suggest that the guided wage policy
also Albeda, Dercksen, and TVos (1998, p. 74 ff.) and van Veen (1997, p. 18 f.) for more
comprehensive description of the guided wage policy.
'^ In general, employers might be more interested in an extension of a collective agreement than
unions. If agreements are extended, employees are not forced to join the union in order to be
covered. Moreover, by extending an agreement to firms which are not member of an employers'
federation, the member firms can gain control over the labour costs of their competitors (Haucap,
Pauly, and Wey 2000).14 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
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Th6/r 5./: Average yearly contract-wage Increases, gross wage drift, and their corre-
lation coefficient in selected periods, the Netherlands. Sources: Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek (1975). van der Zwan (1995), Centraal Bureau
voor de Statistiek (2000), Schulte Nordholt (2001), own calculations.2.3. The situation in the Netherlands
initially succeeded in controlling not only the contract wages, but also the effective
wages—the development of the two do not deviate much. Prom 1<>" to (he end of
the guided wage policy in 1964, however, wage drift was in mvrai;.- much higher.
Despite of the increasing demand for labour the government attempted to keep wagrs
low, and although the government tried to make the system more flexible by using
the development of productivity in certain sectors as a criterion for wage iucrea.se,
firms, especially in the construction industry, began to pay "black wages" (AIIMIIH,
Dercksen. and Tros 1998, p. 76 f.).
During the following period of strong growth, 1964 1973. the government rarely
intervened in collective bargaining. Around 1969/73 the Dutch lalxnir movement
became more radical. Due to the tight labour market, unions gained more influence,
and in addition individual employees started putting pressure on their employers,
even by wildcat strikes (Albeda, Dercksen, and IVos 1998, p. 79), which is reflected
in both high contract-wage increases and considerable drift rates. Ovn i In- uhnlc-
period, however, wage drift is relatively moderate, which is partly dm- !<• ih< I.I. i
that right after 1964 the "black wages" were incorporated in the < nnii.it i u.ir.i ,
which led to a great increase in the contract wage, but to a negative drift (van
Veen 1997, p. 34). In view of the economic crises in the 1970s ami early 1980s,
both contract-wage increases and gross drift moderated over time. In 1982, unions,
employers' federations and the government agreed on pursuing moderate collective
agreements in the future, in order to alleviate the unemployment problem. With no
pressures from the labour market, gross wage drift was low, yet positive, too.
As was argued in section 2.2, net wage drift is typically lower than its gross
counterpart. Especially if the gross figures are negative but close to zero, it could
very well be that the net drift is negative. Net drift figures of the Netherlands are
available for the manufacturing and service sector in the period 1973 1983.''' Figure
2.2 shows net wage drift and contrasts it with the gross patterns.''' Not only does
net drift turn out to be considerably lower than the gross drift, but also their relation
to the contract-wage increases is different. While the correlation coefficient between
contract-wage increases and gross drift is (slightly) positive with /? = 0.0345, it is
negative for contract-wage increases and net drift, ^ = -0.0981. Some authors have
concluded from this negative relation that wage drift in this period, rather than
being driven by contract-wage increases, partially corrected undesired developments
of contract wages.'^ The diverging figures also show that statements about the
relation between wage drift and contract wages that are based on gross drift figures
should therefore be taken with some care.
'"*The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics has also published another time-series of the net drift
for the years 1978-1985 (van der Werf 1987). Unfortunately, its figures are calculated using different
wage data, such that they are not comparable to the previous series in van Reijn (1982) and van
Reijn (1984).
'^The term "net drift" is not entirely correct. The reported net drift figures are derived from the
gross drift ("incidental wage increases"), by correcting for changes in the structure of the workforce
and excluding overtime payments. For the exact calculation methods see for example van Reijn
(1984).
'"See also Driehuis (1975), Lever (1993, chapter 5), van Veen (1997, p. 35).16 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
Monthly contract wag** and mga drift In tha Nathartanda,
manufacturing and aarvica aactor
2.2: The development of contract wages, and the grass and net wage drift
in the manufacturing and service sector in the Netherlands, 1973-1983.
Sources: van Reijn (1982), van Reijn (1984), Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek (2000)
In the description of the development of wages in the Netherlands, we have
mentioned only labour-market pressures as a determinant of wage drift. However,
the core hypothesis of this thesis is that bargaining power and efficiency wages play
a prominent role in the determination of mark-ups on the contract wage. To the
knowledge of the author, the only study that attributes the Dutch drift patterns
to efficiency wages is Lever (1993, chapter 5). His model is based on the fair wage-
hypothesis of Akerlof (1982),'^ but it can easily be interpreted in line with alternative
efficiency-wage theories, as for example the shirking approach, that is used in this
thesis (see chapters 4 and 5). According to the fair wage-hypothesis workers are
willing to provide more effort the better the wage they earn compares to some "fair"
wage. Under the restriction that, the contract wage must not be undercut, firms
determine the profit-maximizing levels of the effective wage and labour demand,
taking the relat ion hot weon effective wage and effort into account. The contract wage
is set by a monopoly union, that maximizes its utility depending on the contract wage
and employment. From the profit-maximizing behaviour of the firm an equation for
wage drift is derived, while the unions problem yields an equation for contract-
wage increases. Lever assumes that the fair wage depends on a weighed average
of some alternative wage and unemployment benefits, with the weights being the
unemployment rate. In the regression equations the (increase of the) alternative wage
"S«e also chapter 3.4 of this thesis, in which a similar model of Schlicht (1992) is discussed.2.4. The situation in Germany 1?
is replaced by the consumer-price index, labour productivity and a trend variable.
Lever used, next to other aggregated data of the Dutch economy, the deNcrihod
net drift data of the manufacturing and service sector to estimate the parameters of
the equations for the contract wage and wage drift. The effect of the labour-market
situation is as one would expect: both the contract wage-increases and wage drift
depend negatively on the change in the rate of unemployment and [xxsitiwly on the
change of the vacancy rate. The result that seems to sup|>ort at least weakly the
efficiency-wage hypothesis concerns the effects of contract-wage increases and wage
drift on each other: while wage drift is fully anticipated in contract-wair mncws -
its coefficient is not significantly different from -1 , an increase in the contract
wage is only partially offset by a correspondingly lower wage drift. According t<> the
estimation results, a one per cent increase in the contract wage only leads to a 0.7 per
cent decrease in wage drift. Although Lever has found a urt<ativi- on relation between
contract-wage increases and wage drift in the period uudt-i < >l >.-.•-! \ ;ti i< >n. ua^c dull
was obviously not only a buffer used by firms to alworb umlesired contract-wage
changes.
2.4 THE SITUATION IN GERMANY
U.^.i German ia6our re/ations
In contrast to the intricate history of Dutch post-war labour relations, the situation
in (West) Germany was much steadier. In order to avoid the factionalism which had
weakened the union movement during the Republic of Weimar, German labour rep-
resentatives strived at the formation of a strong, unified union movement, organized
along industries. In 1949, the DGB (German Trade Union Federation) was founded
as an umbrella organization for the different industry unions, which had formed
up after 1945. However, a comprehensive unification could not be achieved due to
dissents about the political orientation and the particular interests of white-collar
workers and civil servants. In the 1950s, some unionists became dissatisfied by the
DGB's partisanship for the Social Democratic Party, and ultimately founded Chris-
tian unions, which—together with some other smaller unions formed up the CBG
(Christian Trade Union Movement of Germany) in 1959.'" In contrast to the Dutch
situation, the Christian unions are relatively insignificant, and German employers
can seldom play off DGB and CBG unioas against each other. In 1992, the propor-
tion in membership between CBG and DGB unioas was about 1:35 (Franz 1994,
p. 229).^ However, the existence of two large professional trade unions outside
the DGB, the DAG (German Trade Union of Salaried Employees) for white-collar
"*ln contrast to the DGB, which strictly supports the principle of industrial unions, the CBG
also accepts professional associations as members.
"The relation between DGB and CBG unions ranges from cooperation over ignorance to antago-
nism. CBG unionists are often not represented in collective negotiations, sometimes they negotiate
together with their counterparts from the DGB union, and in some cases they are the exclusive
representatives of the employees in collective bargaining. The latter, however, occurs only in niches,
where the representation of DGB unions is low (e.g. handicraft in some rural regions, or negotia-
tions with small and medium sized firms which are not members of an employers' federation).18 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
workers and the UBB (German Federation of Civil Servants) for civil servants, has
contributed to frequent disagreements in the union movement.
Although the degree of organization is still greater than in the Netherlands,
German unions have experienced a decline in membership, too. In 1990, the gross
degree of organization wan about 35% (Franz 1994, p. 231). As a consequence, some
DGB ineiiibnr-unionH have merged in recent years, reducing the number of member
unions from 16 in 1988 to only eight in 2001. The last merger, in 2001, finally
achieved the integration of the DAG in the DGB: the DAG merged with four DGB
unions to form VERDI (Unified Service Trade Union).
The position of the DGB as the dominant federation of trade unions is much
weaker than that of its Dutch counterparts. The DGB represents its member unions
at the government, and in the public, and it coordinates the policies of its member
organization. However, espwially the larger member unions resist against attempts
of tlie DGB to intervene in matters of collective bargaining.
In general, German works councils have similar rights and duties as their Dutch
counterparts. The Law on Regulations Governing Industrial Relations (Betriebsver-
fanHungsgesetz), § 77..1, however, prohibits works councils from negotiating wages
with the management, unless this is explicitly allowed for by a collective agreement.
Yet, according to Teschner (1977, p. 9), this ban is occasionally flouted, especially
when the works councils are in a favourable bargaining position. Moreover, §87.1 of
the same law extends codetermination of works councils to the wage structure and
principles of compensation, and the introduction, change and application of com-
pensation methods. In addition, works councils have far-reaching competences in
matters of personnel and employment.
The organization structure of German employers is two-dimensional. First, em-
ployers me represented by industry-specific organizations, and second, they are rep-
resented by local organizations that represent the employers of different industries
in a certain region or /and. Both types of organization are in turn member of the
central employers' federation BDA (Federation of German Employers). Individual
firms cannot be members. For historical and legal reasons, the BDA does not cover
the employers of the public service and the coal and steel industry. The functions of
the BDA are mainly representative. In matters of collective bargaining its member
organizations act more or less independently.
The decree of centralization in collective bargaining in Germany is—-by its for-
mal aspects considerably lower than in the Netherlands. The negotiations for a
certain industry usually do not take place on the national level, but on the level
of "bargaining regions", which sometimes correspond to the territory of a /and, but
ciui also be considerably smaller. Moreover, there are special company agreements
for very large firms. Yet in practice, there is a considerable degree of coordination
between the different regions and industries. Usually, a year's bargaining round is
opened by negotiations between the unions and employers of the metal-processing
and electrical industry in a certain region.*" The resulting agreement is then used
**Often, the forerunner is the "bargaining region" Nordwurttemberg-Nordbaden in South-West
Germany. ,2.4. The situation in Germany 19
as a benchmark for negotiations in other regions and industries, and their outcomes
will in general not differ much. Accordingly, the German metal-workers' union (IG
Metall), the dominating union in the DGB. does not Iwse its wage claims on the de-
velopment of productivity in the metal-processing industry, but on its development
in the whole economy.
Same as its Dutch counterpart, the German government provides the legal frame-
work for collective bargaining, but it has almost no opportunities to intervene di-
rectly in the process of wage formation. The legal Imses of collective Imtgaining
are the German constitution of 1949 and the Law on Collective Agreements (Ta-
rifvertragsgesetz) of 1949 and 1969. The constitution, article 9..'i, guaranties the
autonomy of collective bargaining by allowing employees and employers to form
coalitions, and to negotiate without interference of the government. The Law on
Collective Agreements, however, gives the government a role in the extension of
collective agreements to non-members of the negotiating union and employer feder-
ation in a certain industry. The Federal Minister for Social Affair- < m extend an
agreement, if the employers txmnd by the agreement employ more than hull of the
employees in the area and industry, for which the agreement has been negotiated,
and if a council consisting of representatives of employers and employees (the so
called TarifausschuB), agrees. The significance of these extensions seems to be low.
Franz (1994, p. 225) reports that out of the about 36,000 collective agreements that
were valid in 1992, only 525 were extended. In 1989, about 4.5 million employees in
West Germany were covered by an extended agreement, but only one million of these
actually benefited from the extension because their employer was not directly bound
by collective agreements. Consequently, the government could not use its compe-
tence to extend agreements to put pressure on the bargaining parties. In spite of
the relatively low numbers of extensions, most workers benefit from collective agree-
ments because firms themselves usually extend the agreements to employees who
are not member of a union, and because many labour contracts explicitly refer to
collective agreements.
Though the government has to respect the autonomy of collective bargaining,
it has repeatedly tried to tie unions and employers into (not binding) agreements
about wage policy and employment. With the Law on Economic Growth and Stabil-
ity (Stabilitatsgesetz) of 1967 the government institutionalized a consultative body
of unions, employers' federations and government, the Concerted Action. However,
especially the unions refused to accept any wage guidelines, and in 1977 the Con-
certed Action was finally dissolved. Two similar initiatives in 1995/96 and in 1999,
the "pacts for labour", had respectively seem to have, the same fate. In all three
cases, the unions initially agreed to moderate their wage claims, but reversed this
policy after a year or two.
Despite its apparently weak position to intervene directly in the process of wage
formation, the German government, as any other government, can still exert an
indirect influence on collective bargaining by shaping the socio-economic framework.
For instance, the generosity of the welfare state and monetary policy will determine
how far especially the unions can shift the burden of "exaggerated" wage increases20 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
on to the whole society.
The development of contract-wage changes and gross wage drift in Germany, 1961-
2000, is depicted in figure 2.3. In general, both the increase of contract wages as well
as the wage drift show a cyclical pattern; during recessions, both seem to be lower
than in other years. Gross drift has been positive in West Germany throughout
the ifMJOs, while in the following three decades it has been fluctuating around zero.
Tin- figure shows no clear relation between contract-wage changes and wage drift,
although it seems that from the mid-1970s on, and especially in the 1980s, there has
been a negative correlation between the two variables. As table 2.2 shows, there was
a positive, yet. weak correlation between the contract-wage increases and gross drift
between MM and 1970, while for the subsequent years the correlation coefficient
was indeed negative. The constantly negative gross drift for the united Germany
in the 1990s ciui partly be explained by a negative measurement drift. After the
reunification boom had ended in 1992, the number of overhours decreased. One
reason for this development was a lower demand for labour, the other, that more
and more collective agreements in the 1990s provided for more flexible working
hours, which allows employers increasing the hours worked without having to pay
overtime allowances (Deutsche Bundesbank 2000). Another reason is the particular
development in East Germany, where many employers left their employers' federation
in order to avoid to be bound by collective agreements.
Monthly contract and affective earning* In Germany, all lectori
2.5: The development of contract wages and the gross wage drift in Germany,
1960 2000. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various volumes), own cal-





























To6/c 5.2: Average yearly contract-wage increases, gross wage drift, and their cor-
relation coefficient in selected periods. Germany. Source: Dcutschc Bun-
desbank (various volumes), own calculations.
The relation between contract and effective wages in Germany was examined in
more detail by Moller (1990). Kleierl (1993), and Schnabel (1995. li>97). Kleierl.
using aggregated quarterly data of contract- and effectivo-wage increases in Wen!
Germany in the period 1961 1992, finds a structural change in their relationship in
the second half of 1970. Before and after, cointegration analyses of both variables
show stable, yet different long-term relations: up to 1970, the contract-wage increases
are influenced by the increases in the effective wage, while in the time after 1970 the
increases in both wages are interdependent (Kleierl 1993, p. 97 ff.). Moller (1990)
and Schnabel (1995, 1997), using different data sets, report similar results for the
latter period.
The influence of effective wages on the contract wage and the positive drift rates
in the 1960s suggest that in this period the collective agreements were merely fol-
lowing the development of the effective wages.^' This behaviour is not yet fully
understood. In the 1960s, it was widely believed that effective wages were driven by
excess demand for labour (Hansen and Rehn 1956). Indeed, Gerfin (1969, p. 488 ff.)
as well as Kleierl (1993, p. 120 f.) find a negative relation between wage drift and
(changes of) the unemployment rate, while their findings about the influence of
productivity increases on the wage drift are mixed. In any case, it is unclear why
the unions should have failed to incorporate the effective-wage increases in the con-
tract wages. Anecdotal evidence illustrates this problem. Gerfin (1969, p. 514 f.),
for example, reports that in the period 1957-1966 the inter-industry differentials of
the effective wages were decreasing by more than the differentials of the contract
wages. Apparently, the German unions were ineffective even in one of their
^'See also chapter 3.3, which discusses this "adaptation hypothesis" on theoretical grounds.
"An additional explanation for the perpetuated positive wage drift, that is given in the literature
of the 1960s, is the distinction between primary and secondary drift (Phelps Brown 1962). Although
this hypothesis was never empirically tested it is of some interest because it can be interpreted as an
early efficiency-wage argument. According to this theory, an initial (primary) wage increase, that
disturbs the relative wage structure, evokes a secondary drift in order to restore the old structure.
(For a more detailed discussion of this hypothesis see chapter 3.4.2 of this thesis.) Secondary drift22 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
One reason for the different behaviour of wage drift after 1970 might be the events
in the late 1960s: in the aftermath of the recession 1966/67 the government tied the
unions in the Concerted Action and committed them to moderating their wage
claims. However, after the economy had recovered the unions failed to adapt their
claims, which assisted by the political unrest of those days led to the wildcat-
"September" strikes in 1969. FVightened to lose the support of their members,
the unions abandoned the policy of wage moderation and began to pursue a more
aggressive wage policy. In the early 1970s, contract wage increased sometimes by
more than 10%. That these increases coincide with the first negative drift rates
might hint at an incorporation of wage gaps in the contract wages.•*•* Although the
increases were considerably lower after the mid-1970s and throughout the subsequent
two decades, the negative correlation between contract-wage increases and wage drift
suggests that the unions have changed their behaviour permanently.'"
The described relation between contract and effective wages in Germany are in
principle consistent with the efficiency-wage hypothesis. If firms pay efficiency wages,
the effective wages will--if at all—depend only indirectly on the contract wages,
unless tin' "•••iiii;ii t wages exceed the efficiency wage. If in the 1960s the contract-
wage iix ir.isrs l;ij."j',<'d behind the effectiv«vwage increases, the unions might indeed
not have been able to raise the contract wage above the efficiency wage. After 1970,
the unions slmwnl a i',reater militancy, and the drift patterns might indicate that the
contract, wagf* exceeded t lie efficiency wages in some years, such that employers were
forced to reduce supplementary payments. This might explain why the drift figures
fluctuate around zero and why the causal relation between contract and efficiency
wages becomes indeterminate.
It should be noted that consistency with the efficiency-wage hypothesis does
not mean that efficiency wages are indeed the reason for the described wage drift
patterns. Without knowledge about the variable "workers' effort", however, any
attempt to test directly for efficiency wages is on principle futile. Indirect tests,
however, are passible. Gahlen and Ramser (1987), for instance, studied the deter-
minants of labour productivity in four different industries in Germany from 1960 to
1982, and found a positive influence of the wage drift and the unemployment rate.
Yet, such results are open to other interpretations. At best they can support, but
they can never be a proof of the efficiency-wage hypothesis. The following section,
discussing studies on the wage gap in Germany, will provide more indications for
efficiency wages and their significance for above-contract payments.
might explain why tho contract wages did not catch up with the effective wages. However, it cannot
explain why t ho contract-wagc increases were influenced by the increases of the effective wage, and
not the other way around.
'^-'Negative drift rates just mean that the wage gap increases by less than the contract wage
However, according to Kleierl (1993, p. 99) the absolute wage gap decreased in the early 1970s.
'•*•* Rather than being due to wage moderation, the lower contract-wage increases after 1974 seem
to be due to the changed monetary policy of the German central bank, which -unwilling to correct
"exaggerated" wage increases by a higher rate of inflation began to announce strict targets for
money supply.2.4. The situation in Germany
Most of the recent theoretical studies on above-contract payments, including the
models discussed in this thesis, deal with wage gaps rather than wage drift. How-
ever, most of the empirical evidence is highly aggregated data altnut wage drift.
Evidence on wage gaps is scarce, because meaningful data can only Iw ascertained
on a disaggregated, in the ideal case individual level. Most evidence is therefore
anecdotal, and only in the past decade serious attempts have been made to till the
gap
The German Federal Agency for Statistics (StatLstisches Bundesamt) stopped
publishing data on earnings structures that allowed a comparison between contract
and effective earnings by 1962. For the lack of alternative material with a similarly
broad coverage, its last data set (StatLstisches Bundesamt 1962) was used for the
subsequent three decades in several studies about wage gaps, as in von dcr Dirkrii
(1964), Robak (1978), KleinhiickeLskoten and Spaetling (1980). and Schnabel (!<i«ro
According to the latter, in 1962 the effective earnings exceeded the conti.n i »..••. •
(including all contractual supplementary payments) in avermr l>\ I I n'; i mmi unl
10.5% (women). He re|>orUs furthermore that the statistics .slmu dial iln iela-
tive wage gaps did not differ much between earnings groups within the industries,
but that they varied a lot between industries: for male workers from 0.9% in the
brown-coal mining industry to 54.3% in the catering trade. He suggests that, these
differences were not related to excess demand for labour, the wage share or labour
productivity. On the other hand, both von der Decken (1964) and Robak (1978,
p. 91 ff.) find a negative relation between the average wage gap in the different
industries and the levels of the collectively bargained wages. Robak (/or. ct<., p. 98)
moreover reports that the wage gaps were positively related to the share of piece-
workers and to the share of employees in large companies.
Teschner (1977), analysing a sample of earnings data from 17 companies in fotir
different industries in 1970, also finds that the wage gaps vary considerably between
the industries. The average relative wage gaps range from 0 % in the tobacco indus-
try, over 16.5% (textile industry) and 19.6% (chemical industry) to 24.2% in the
metal-processing industry. The average gap paid by firms is negatively related to the
regional unemployment rate. They do not seem to be influenced by the employment
structure of the firms, yet skilled and piece-workers enjoy above-average supplement
payments.
The latter result is confirmed by Blum (1983) and Schnabel (1995)." Blum
analyses official earnings statistics and data provided by the employers' federation
of the metal-processing industry in the iand Baden-Wiirttemberg from 1960 to 1979.
For the period 1972-1979 he reports relative wage gaps of 8.9-32.5% for workers paid
hourly rates and 27.7-51.5% for piece-workers (Blum 1983, p. 241). According to
the data he presents, the rank order of earnings groups with respect to their wage
gap is surprisingly stable over time; at least for the period 1968 1979 the wage gaps
are positively related to the skill level. Schnabel (1995) comes to the same result
"Again in Schnabel (1997, chapter 6).24 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
by analysing earnings data from 1993, which were provided by an anonymous West-
German employers' federation. His study also confirms that wage gaps are greater in
large firms, and he did not find a significant influence of the regional unemployment
rate on the size of wage gaps.
In the last decade, two attempts have been made to ascertain disaggregated
earnings data on a more representative basis: the 1989/90 company panel "Pro-
ducing in Baden-Wiirttemberg and Lower Saxony", in 1991 extended to the ianrf
of North Rhino-Westphalia, (henceforth "company panel") and the 1993 "IAB-
Cotnpany Panel" (henceforth "IAB panel"), covering all West Germany. Both panels
rely on interviews of companies. Next to the usual questions about the employment
and earnings structures, the questionnaires also asked about relative wage gaps and
for the motivations behind the wages policies of companies.*' A drawback of both
panels is that they do not allow for a direct comparison between contract wages and
wage ga|>s, as the interviewed firms were only asked to estimate the average relative





























































Taft/e 5.5; Coverage of collective agreements and relative wage gaps in West Ger-
many. Source: Meyer (1995), Bellmann and Kohaut (1995), own calcula-
tions. The relative wage gap (a) is an unweighted average over all firms
covered by a collective agreement, the gap (b) includes only firms that
reported to pay above contract. The figures in italics are calculated by
the author on the basis of the other figures in the table.
relevant figures for the relative wage gaps in the two panels are given in ta-
* description of the company panel see Schmidt (1991, 1992), for the lAB-panel Dostal,
Hadlw, Kuhl, Lahner, I'lrich, Wendler. and Wolfsteiner (1994). The former panel included the
questions whether the management believed in the incentive effect of above-contract wages and
wage differentiation (Meyer 1995), while the latter asked, whether the firms paid seniority wages
(Bellrnann and Kohaut 1995).2.4. The situation in Germany
We 2.3. Apparently, the reported average gaps are similar to those of the last official
statistics about earnings structures from 1962 (sit- al«>\v^ Meyer (199.1) mom>v*«r
concludes on the basis of the company panel, that ,IIM> t h«' inter-industry ditferen-
tials in wage gaps have not changed much since that tinie.^* Another remarkable
result of the panels Ls the relationship Ix'tween the size of a firm and the wage gap.
While the company panel does not allow to draw clear conclusions (Meyer 199.1), the
figures of the IAB panel suggest that, contrary to the common believe. th< i.lative
wage gap Ls decreasing with the firms' size for all but the largest firms (Hcllmann
and Kohaut 1995).
Both panels have been used to examine the determinants of wage giijw: the
company panel by AddLson, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) and Meyer (1994, 199.1),
and the IAB-panel by Bellmann and Kohaut (199.1). Both Meyer, and Bellnwmn
and Kohaut try to discriminate between the possible theoretical explanations for
wage gaps—market forces, efficiency wages and bargaining |>ower . while Addisou,
Kraft, and Wagner are especially interested in the influence of the companies' em-
ployment structure as an indicator of the bargaining jniwer of employes vis-a-vis
the management. Although all studies use different (sub)sainples,** their results are
similar.
Addison, Kraft, and Wagner find that relative wage gaps are negatively related to
the share of women and blue-collar workers in the workforce, but positively related
to the share of skilled workers. Wage gaps are not related to a rent-sharing variable,
and the existence of a works council even has a significantly negative effect. These
results are in essence confirmed by the study of Bellmann ami Kohaut. They did not
test for the effect of the share of skilled workers, but. found an additional negative
effect of the share of part-time workers among the employees. Meyer (199.1) gets
mixed results for the influence of works councils, and also in his study, rent sharing
does not play a significant role.
In the two studies of Meyer and in the study of Bellmann and Kohaut. wage
gaps are positively related to the number of vacancies per employee. These authors
also test for the significance of efficiency wages. Meyer (1994, 199.1) includiw a
dummy in his regression for companies that reported they believe that the payment
above the collectively bargained wage and/or the increase in earnings differentials
have a positive impact on workers" performance. He indeed finds a significantly
positive influence of the dummy on the wage gaps. Bellmann and Kohaut instead
use an indirect approach and include a dummy for companies that increase wages by
seniority, which is commonly seen as an incentive mechanism that, is alternative to
efficiency wages.•*" If efficiency wages are a determinant for wage gaps, they argue,
than seniority wages should have a negative impact on the supplement payments.
^Although this suggests a high degree of stability of wage gaps, it could also be coincidence. At
the end. almost nothing is known about the developments of wage gaps in the thirty year* between
the two observations.
™ Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) use a gubsample of the 1989 company panel, Meyer (1994)
the whole 1989 sample, Meyer (1995) the 1989 sample plus the 1991 sample from North Khine-
Westphalia, and Bellmann and Kohaut (1995) the IAB data for West Germany.
^ e.g. Lazear (1979, 1981).26 Chapter 2. Wage gapw and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
Their findings about the influence of the related dummy are, however, mixed and in
any cam- insignificant.
Meyer'8 (1994) result indicates that efficiency wages play a role in the determi-
nation of wage gaps. The results of the other studies with respect to the influence of
the employment structure and the number of vacancies are at least consistent with
the efficiency-wage hypothesis, but as mentioned in the introduction, they can also
be interpreted as evidence for the alternative hyj>otheses. Schnabel's (1995) find-
ing, that wage gaps axe not significantly influenced by the regional unemployment
rate (we page 24), might support the efficiency-wage and the bargaining approach
against the market approach. Unfortunately, it is not clear, whether his result is
representative.
The reported negative impact of the presence of a works council in a firm on
the wage gap i.s of course most peculiar, as it contradicts any intuition. Meyer
(lOOJi) points out that in the company panel only 13.4% of the firms let the works
council participate actively in the wage-formation process, but this does not explain
its negative impact.'" One possible explanation might be related to Bellmann and
Kohaut's (l!t!tS) finding that wage gaps are higher both in very small and very large
firms. The n';wm for their negative impact could then be that in smaller firms
works councils an- l<-s* frequent, and that they are even absent in very small firms.
Another possible reason is that works councils are more frequent in industries where
unions are strongly represented and where the contract wages are comparably high.
In this respect, it, is to regret that both panels do not allow to relate the wage gaps
to collectively bargained wages.
Larking information about contract wages is a general deficit of the two panels. In
order to compensate, the studies include different regional and industry dummies in
their regressions. In the study of Meyer, the regional dummies show to be significant,
while Bcllinann and Kohaut report significant influences of the industry dummies.
These differences are most likely due to different delimitations of the regions and
industries and the much smaller sample size of the company panel used by Meyer.
Although these dummies will capture the effect of contract wages, they do not allow
identifying the effect of contract wages on the wage gap. Moreover, these dummies
will also conceal the effects of other variables, e. g. the regional unemployment rate,
which arc possible determinants of wage gaps.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
The previous sections have discussed the labour relations and empirical evidence on
wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany. In the institutional as-
pects of wage formation both countries nowadays show remarkable correspondences,
especially as far as the legal competences of the players in the labour market—
unions, employers, government and works councils are concerned. In practice,
however, there are still differences in the way these players act and in their relations.
**The reported 13,4 % is already a surprisingly high number if one takes into account that German
works councils officially haw no say in wage formation.2.5. Conchniong 27
In both countries, the law now guarantee the autonomy of unions ami employers'
federations in collective bargaining. But what is a tradition in (i< im.m\ ln> . \ol\r.l
in the Netherlands only in the past two or three decades. Before, the Dutch gov-
ernment intervened frequently in collective bargaining, and nowadays it sometimes
still uses the right to decide about the extension of a colU-ctive agreement to the
whole industry as a threat to the Iwirgaining parties. In Germany, the extension of
agreements is far less important, and the government, if it wants to influence the
outcome of negotiations, can only rely on moral suasion in general with only littlo
success.
When comparing the union movement in both countries the institutions look
similar, but their significance again is different. In contrast to the (Inman union
movement, which is dominated by the block of DGB unions, the Dutch union move-
ment is still split along ideological backgrounds. Moreover, union membership is
much lower in the Netherlands, and Dutch unions are financially not that well
equiped as their German counterparts. Due to these factors, Dutch unions have
a weaker bargaining position, which should rrrerw pari6tu be reflected by IOWIT
contract-wage increases.""
While the different labour relations might have an impact on collective bargain-
ing, there is no reason to believe that the factors determining wage formation on
the level of individual firms should be much different. On the formal level, the
competences of Dutch and German works councils are similar, and informal aspects
as implicit bargaining power, the labour market and efficiency wages should play a
similar role in both countries. Unfortunately, there is no data about wage gaps in
the Netherlands that would allow a comparison with the German situation.
The two problems that had to be answered by the empirical part of this chapter
were whether wage gaps really matter in wage formation, and what the determinants
of wage gaps are. The survey on studies of wage gaps in Germany perhaps providers
the best insights in these problems. It has shown that wage gaps, depending on
the considered industry and earnings group, can make up for a considerable share
in the earnings of employees. Moreover, wage gaps are no temporary phenomenon;
it seems that the size of and the differentials in wage gaps have been stable over
long periods of time. As to the determinants of wage gaps, the results are not that
clear. At least the results of Meyer (1994, 1995) suggest that efficiency wages are an
important determinant for wage gaps. The effects of other variables, except of the
negative influence of works councils, are at least consistent with the efficiency-wage
and the bargaining hypothesis.
The position of the efficiency-wage and the bargaining hypothesis would be
strenghtened if it could be shown that, as Schnabel (1995) suggests, the regional
unemployment rate has indeed no influence on the size of wage gaps. That the dis-
cussion of wage drift has shown that in both the Netherlands and Germany wage drift
•"it is the ceteris-paribus condition which makes a comparison of the aggregated Dutch and
German figures (see figures 2.1 on page 14 and 2.3 on page 20) futile Not only the inflation raU*
in both countries were different, but also the labour-market situation, the industry structure, and
probably the agendas of the unions.28 Chapter 2. Wage gaps and wage drift in the Netherlands and Germany
depends on c/iangea in the unemployment rate is then no contradiction. The two re-
sults combined the level of unemployment has no effect but its change has—could
instead provide support against the market hypothesis. Such a result would, for
example, be consistent with the insider-outsider theory, which attributes bargaining
power of the employees of a firm vis-a-vis the management to the cost a firm incurs
when replacing an employee.'" The bargaining position of the employees is then
only threatened by a decrease in labour demand, while the level of unemployment
has no influence.
Apait li'iin that, the discussion of studies on wage drift provided only few addi-
tional insights in the nature of wage gaps. For the Netherlands, the study of Lever
must be emphasized, Ix-cause it shows that the Dutch drift patterns are consistent
with an efficiency-wage hy|M)thesis of wage gaps. The German studies on the rela-
tionship between contract, and effective wages have shown, that different from the
situation in the l!)(i()s, the development of the effective wage did not have a causal
effect on the contract wages in the subsequent two decades. That wage drift has
been fluctuating around zero in both countries in the past three decades is in line
with the finding that the size and the structure of wage gaps did not change much
over this time. Obviously, there are persistent forces that drive up the effective wage
nobve me contract wage.
. Solow (1985), Blanrhard ami Summers (1986), and Lindbeck and Snower (1988).2.A. Appendix: List of abbreviations 29
2.A APPENDIX: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CBS Ontraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau of Statistic*)
CNV Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (Christian National Trade Union Federation)
FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (Federation of Dutch 'IVade Union*)
LTO-Nederland Land- en Tuinbouw Nederland (Dutch Employers' Federation of Agri-
culture and Market Gardening)
MKB-Nederland Midden- en Kleinbedrijf Nederland (Dutch Employers' Federation of
Medium and Small Companies)
SER Sociaal-Economische Raad (Social Economic Council)
STAR Stichting van de Arbeid (Foundation of Labour)
VNO-NCW Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen Nederland* Chrtotoujk Werkgwm
bond (Federation of Dutch Companies Dutch Christian Employers' FMwmtion)
£.i4.< Germany
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeber (Federation of German Employers)
CBG Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands (Christian TYade Union Movement of
Germany)
DAG Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft (German Trade Union for Salaried Employe**)
DBB Deutscher Beamtenbund (German Federation of Civil Servants)
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German TVade Union Federation)
IAB Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (Research Institute of the German
Labour Agency)
IG Metall Industriegewerkschaft Metall (Union of the Metal-processing Industry)
VERDI Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (Unified Service TYade Union)• ?:•> •',' ) _•;">>.CHAPTER 3
Theories of the wage gap and wage drift:
A survey
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Unlike other fields of economic research, there is no standard textbook umilrl <>f
the wage gap and wage drift, from which a discussion could depart. The (M ,m ••)
theoretical literature in this field provides the most diverse explanations for wane
gaps, some of them complementary, others competing, but virtually never referring
to each other.
This chapter has two purposes. First, it attempts to structure the approaches
to explain wage gaps/drift by providing a meaningful framework in which the di-
verse ideas can be categorized. Second, it shall motivate the choice to focus on
efficiency-wage arguments and (local) wage bargaining as important explanations
for the occurrence of wage gaps.
The chapter first provides a short overview of the scopes of different theories in
order to place them into context. Then a more detailed survey follows, that is struc-
tured along the underlying mechanisms, institutions, and agents that are assumed
to be responsible for the occurrence of wage gaps. The final section summarizes the
implications of the different theories and relates them to the models provided in this
thesis.
3.2 A SHORT OVERVIEW
Most models of wage formation can be roughly divided along their focus into contract-
and effective-wage models. The scopes of these two strands of theory are depicted in
figure 3.1. Contract-wage models focus on collective bargaining between unions and
employers' federations, while effective-wage models focus on the relation between a
firm and its employees, searching for the factors that determine the (effective) wage
paid by the firm mainly on the labour market and in the power structure of employ-
ees and management in the firm. Usually, the two spheres are kept strictly separate.
Models that focus on the contract wage implicitly assume that the contract wage
will automatically become the effective wage, and contract-wage models search for
the determinants of the effective wage everywhere but in collective bargaining. If the
3132 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
models account for a difference between contract and effective wage, they attempt
to explain the occurrence of wage gaps mainly from their point of view.
Adherents of contract-wage models consider the wage gap to be a mark-up on
the contract wage. They bypass the effective-wage model, assuming that the mark-
up i» mainly determined institutionally.' This view was open to attack because
empirical studies showwl that the influence of economic variables on the wage gap
is significant.'' . .






























Figure 5.i: The scope of contract and effective-wage models.
After Kloinhiickelskoten and Spaetling (1980).
In effective-wage models emphasis is put on the formation of effective wages,
'For example by the degree of centralization and the frequency of bargaining or by effective
warn clause*. See Klcinhuckelskoten and Spaetling (1980, pp. 182 and 184).
Mn most empirical studies, as for example by Gerfin (1969), Gould (1967), Isachsen (1977),
Soderstrom and Uddon-Jondal (1982), Holdcn (1989), and Holdcn (1998), the wage gap is typi-
cally assigned to amongst other determinants variables as indicators of labour demand, labour
productivity, output prices and. closely related to the latter, profits.3.2. A short overview 33
whereas the contract wage commonly enters these models as an exogenous variable.
Beginning with the first serious analysis of wage drift by Hanson and Helm (1956),
effective-wage models dominated the discussion. Hanson and Helm's seminal work
immediately opened the door for further research, but though •' •'• •> time a re-
markably high number of different possible explanations for w - and wage
drift were given—some of them taken up just recently the view took sli.ipr i lint
wage gaps just bring effective (relative) wages into a line with market < 1. i.i mined
wages.' According to this view, the outcome of central wage lui.p.ammn, i> nielevunt
for the effective wage structure: if contract wages incnax l>\ nmie than ell'eetive
wages, the result will be a reduction of the wage gap ' A- l'< likomn and \ iskari
(1994, p. 397), state, wage drift thus nullifies the decisions i,,k. n at the central level
of bargaining. Therefore, any income policy which is dn<< t«•< 1 ,.i stopping tit. i,•.,
of labour costs just by influencing collective wage bargaining is u /nwn (-oiulennieil
to be senseless.''
The common assumption about the role of collective bargaining was that the
bargaining parties were just adopting the situation on the labour market, following
the development of the effective wage as good as possible when setting the ( unlract
wage. According to this adaptation hypothesis, contract wages ran m \. i hi' adjusted
perfectly to effective wages.*" A wage gap is therefore inevitable.
It is not surprising that this so called Phillips-curve approach was prevailing in the
1950s and 1960s, when the labour markets in most Western European countries were
characterized by excess demand for labour. Consequently, this strand of research
has lost much of its attractiveness since the 1970s, when these economies first, faced
persistent, high-level unemployment, which against all expectations did not eliminate
the wage gapsJ Moreover, the observed persistence of the wage gaps was in conflict,
with the theoretical prediction that the gaps should be a short-term phenomenon,
which tend to eliminate their own cause.
Although these arguments are partially refuted by the observation that especially
high skilled workers receive supplement payments, and that institutional obstacles
might prevent the contract wage from fully catching up to the effective wager level,
Phillips-curve like models certainly failed to explain why unions and employers'
federations generally struggle hard in central wage bargaining. Unless this behaviour
is beyond economic reasoning, the contract wage must have an influence in the
determination of the effective wage. Even more, there is no reason why unions and
employers should not influence a// levels of wage formation. However, if this is the
case there should be a mutual dependency between the setting of the contract wage
'Note that "market determined wages" does not necessarily mean competitive wages, though
just this is frequently assumed in the early literature about wage drift.
«See Phelps Brown (1962, pp. 339 and 352) and Pchkonen and Vislcari (1994, p. 397 98).
*Cf. Phelps Brown (1962, p. 339), Gerfin (1969).
"The reasons are that contract wages are bargained on a rather central level and cannot take
the situations of individual firms into account, that the contracts are not differentiated enough, and
that during their period in force there might be pressure to adapt effective payment* (interbargain
drift).
'See also chapter 2.4.3 of this thesis.34 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
on the one hand and the effective wage on the other hand.
Thfwe arguments have been partially taken into account by a number of studies in
the last twenty years. Incorporating new theories of wage setting, such as efficiency
wages, search theories and models of implicit or explicit bargaining, these models still
focus on the formation of effective wages. Nevertheless, they consider the contract
wage as an iui|>ortant explanatory variable.** In bargaining theories of the wage gap,
which have arisen in the late 80s, the effective wage is determined by a two-tier
wage bargaining process. First, central wage bargaining on the contract wage takes
place Iwtween unions and employers federations. S«>cond, on a local level, unions and
employers negotiate on a mark-up on the contract wage. Since unions act on both
levels of wage bargaining, more importance is attached to central wage bargaining.
Then, from an extreme view, "wage drift is just an institutional and fully-anticipated
element of a centralized wage setting system." (Pehkonen and Viskari 1994, p. 397)
Half way between these theories and the Phillips-curve approach there is a num-
IMT of models which attempt to extend or combine existing wage formation theories.
Many authors who consider excess demand for labour as the main reason for the
occurrence of wage ga|>s also mention efficiency-wage arguments even before this
theory was formalized in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, also advocates of the
I'liillips-curve theory introduced aspects of bargaining in their theories.^ A theory
which adequately takes the mutual dependency between contract and effective wage
into account is still to be missed, however.
The following sections present the different theories in more detail. Instead of
taking a historic perspective, an approach is chosen, which avoids the usual simplifi-
catiou that contrasts the "oldish" Phillips-curve theories with "modern" theories and
mostly keeps quiet about various alternative explanations that have already been
given in older works. Instead, the theories are ordered by underlying mechanisms,
institutions and agents which are assumed to be responsible for the occurrence of
wage gaps. It will be shown that the simplistic view that effective-wage models are
generally in favour of the adaptation hypothesis whereas contract-wage models sup-
port the mark-up hypothesis of wage gaps, is not true at all. Doing so, it is chosen
for a rather eclectic approach. In order to avoid to skim superficially over as much
models as possible, selected models which appear to be typical for their class will be
discussal in detail in order to make the underlying mechanisms, which lead to the
occurrence of wage gajxs, clear.
Section 3.3 discusses wage-drift models in which effective wages are market de-
termined on a more or less competitive labour market. First, the basic idea of
the Phillips-curve approach is presented. The model of Holmlund (1986) then shows
which effects this wage setting behaviour might have on the formation of the contract
wage. Kleinhiickclskoten and Spaetling (1980) finally abolish the strong assumption
of a deterministic neoclassical labour market and look at the effects of a contract
"In these models the contract wage has an impart in different ways. For example in the model
of KU-inhuckekkDten and Spaetling (1980) it influences the agents' expectations on a stochastic
labour market, whereas SchKcht (1993) assumes that it influences workers' fairness perception.
"Sot." for example the paper of Lerner and Marquand (1962) on workshop bargaining.3.3. Mariwt determined wages and wage gaps SB
wage providing information about the distribution of effivtive WIUJCS With its prox-
imity to labour-turnover models, their model also provulo a link to section 3.4,
which deals with the implications of efficiency wages for the wage gap. After giv-
ing a concise overview of different efficiency-wage arguments the model of Schlicht
(1992) is described, where the contract wage has an impact on efforts by influencing
workers" perception whether the effective wage is "fair." Section 3.5 provides an
overview of models which ascribe the wage gap to explicit negotiations on a local
level between employers and workers' representatives.
3.3 MARKET DETERMINED WAGES AND WAGE GAPS
5.5./ 77ie P/iii/ipa-curve tAeory—uwje drt/f on a neoci<w.«ca/ /«6otir maHtrt
A striking feature of most of the literature that attributes wage drift mainly to an
excess demand for labour is the complete lack of theoretic modelling. In contrast,
emphasis was put on empirical studies using wage drift initiations which have been
formulated ad /tor. Pehkoneu and Viskari (1994, pp. 398 99) descril>e the common
proceeding as follows:
"First, wage drift is related to the disequilibrium of the labour market,
usually proxied by the aggregate unemployment rate or the vacancy rate.
This relationship, which is occasionally modelled explicitly, forms the ba-
sis of the empirical analysis. Second, the relationship between wage drift
and the disequilibrium in the labour market is augmented by variables
which are assumed to capture other influences on wage drift, including
measures of productivity growth. Third, wage drift and contract-wage
increases, the latter determined by collective agreements, are treated as
independent processes: in general, no explicit relationship between these
two components of wages is postulated, although it is, however, often
argued that the relationship should be an inverse one."
The underlying theory relating wage gaps to the state of the labour market is
rather simple. It can be traced back to Hansen and Rehn (1956, pp. 92 94), who
used a simple neoclassical model of a competitive labour market, depicted in figure
3.2. Labour demand is—in the short run—fixed at no. Given the demand curve.
Do, the labour market is in equilibrium at point ,4 with a wage rate of u;<|. Now
an upward shift of the demand curve to £>i (for example due to an increase in the
product price or productivity) creates an excess demand An for labour at the given
wage rate. In order to bring the market back to equilibrium, the wage rate has to
rise to u>i.
If the contract wage is fixed at the equilibrium wage WQ at the beginning of
a bargaining period, and the labour demand curve shifts upwards from Do to Di
before a new contract wage is bargained, then a wage gap of Au; occurs.
Whether the resulting wage gap remains or even increases if the demand curve





5.2.' The labour market in the neoclassical model with an inelastic supply
curve 5 and a normal-shaped demand curve D. Starting from the full
employment equilibrium -4 an upward shift of the demand curve will
result in a new equilibrium B characterized by a higher wage rate.
After Hansen and Rehn (1956, p. 93).
wage by the next wage negotiations. If the new contract consolidates the increases
of the effective wage totally, wage gaps are just a short-run phenomenon—they lead
to the so called interbargain drift.'" Persistent wage gaps can only occur in case the
contract wage does not catch up with the effective wage.
The assumption of interbargain drift gives rise to the question why the develop-
ment of the effective wage is not anticipated when the contract wage is set. According
to Holmlund (1986), even in the case of rational expectations a wage gap can occur
due to uncertainty about the future state of the economy. In his model" an industry
faces two possible states of a nature -the "good" state occurring with probability p
HIM! the "bad" state with 1 — ;>. Only these probabilities and not the actual state of
the economy are known by the union when determining the contract wage.
The industry's labour demand is given by the linear function
j = Qo - + 2,, 1 = 1,2
where oo and at are positive parameters and 2i > 22 represent the state of the
economy. In the good state a wage gap occurs due to excess demand for labour, and
'"Sw for example C.erfin (1969, p. 502).
'' At this place only n sketched version of the model is presented. In his work Homlund assumes
that workers who do not find employment in the industry are partially absorbed by the public
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the effective wage consists of the contract wage and an extra payment, it'i = tT> + Aw.
For the bad state, however, it is assumed that no excess demand for lalx>ur can occur
and that the effective wage just equals the contract wage. «>j = u).''*
Labour supply is assumed to be fixed at A'. In the good state the wage gnp is
determined such that a fraction A € [0,1] of excess demand at tho contract wage u>
is eliminated: '"*
Atr= — (L,(w)-N) (3.1)
The (central) union is assumed to have full control over the contract wage. It
maximizes the expected income of the workers,''*
• Atw) + (1 — p) (Lati) + (Af — La)a], (3.2)
where a is the unemployment benefit. The utility maximizing contract wage is
(3.3)
The contract wage thus consists of a fixed base rate depending on the unemployment
benefits and the parameter values of the bad state of the industry, and a second part,
that is determined by the probability of the good state and the velocity at which
excess demand is eliminated. Not surprisingly, the contract wage is set the higher
the higher the probability of the good state is. If only little of the excess demand for
labour is eliminated within one period, the contract wage is also set higher, because
the union cannot expect a high extra payment by the drift process. On the other
hand, if A is close to one, the second term vanishes and the contract wage is set on
the level of the base rate. In this case, the union can expect wage drift to raise the
effective wage to the market clearing level.
By equations (3.1) and (3.3) the effective wage is given by
{
u> + A ("fl+n-'v _ ^ ^ the good state ,„ .,
\ <*' / . (3.4)
u> in the bad state
As long as A < 1, the effective wage is in both states increasing with the contract
wage. If however in the good state excess demand for labour is perfectly eliminated,
A = 1, the effective wage does not depend on the contract wage. The wage gap,
the second term in the equation for the good state, shows a negative relation to the
contract wage.
Under the assumption that the economy is in the good state, an expression for
wage drift can be derived from equation (3.4):
Qo - AT + 2i a.
u>i - u; = -A u;, (3.5)
imposes a restriction on the contract wage. Since in the bad state the working force muat
be greater than or equal to labour demand, TV > Lj, it must hold ii> > jp- (QO + z? - /V).
'^That is. effective labour demand is equal to Z-i(u>) = (1 - A)ii(w) + AN.
"Holmlund maximizes the expected utility of the workers. At this place, we assume that u(w) =
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where £ •« J is the growth rate of variable x. The equation shows the expected
inverse relationship between wage drift and an increase in the contract wage.'^
It is worth mentioning that these results hinge on the assumption of a utilitarian
utility function. If the central union did not care about employment,'" the union
could set the contract wage above the equilibrium wage in the good state, thus
accepting unemployment in that case. This possibility is not taken into consideration
in the setting of the utility function, anyway.
Though in most empirical studies a correlation between variations in wage drift
and labour shortage has been found,'* the Phillips-curve thesis has unattractive
theoretical characteristics. It suggests that the relationship between wage drift and
centrally negotiated wage increases should be inverse, such that in the long run
total earnings are not affected by the setting of the contract wage. In Holmlund's
model this argument even holds in the case that wage drift is anticipated in central
negotiations. With the union caring about its possibly unemployed members, the
iiillu<-iM<• of the contract wage on the effective wage is, at least in the good state,
the smaller, the faster excess demand for labour is eliminated, i.e., the closer A is to
unity In (lie extreme case of A = 1, the effective wage is fully determined by the
marki't l< >i < ••-> ('onsequcnt ly, accepting this view would mean to assign only a minor
part to unions in the determination of total earnings.
Furthermore, the Phillips-curve theory implies that wage drift must be a short
term phenomenon, because it tends to eliminate its own cause, excess demand for
labour. Hence, in order to be able to explain the permanent drift observed in most
European countries one would have to assume the labour market to be constantly
in disequilibrium.
5.5.2 77»e contract wage as an tn/ormatton variafc/e on </ie /aftour marJfcet
In the Phillips-curve models, that were described in the last section, the effective
wage was -at least in the long run purely determined by the market forces in a
neoclassical labour market. The contract wage mainly served as a constraint on wage
formation, and only in case it was set higher than the market equilibrium wage, it
determined the effective wage. This relationship can be expressed by
tu = max{to*,u>} , (3.6)
where t«* is the unrestricted market equilibrium wage. Obviously, this relationship
might be important for the wage formation when the assumption of fully informed
'^Thi- drift equation is just given as an illustration. Of course, in the static model that is
presented hero, neither the contract wage nor the effective wage can really grow.
'"It is, for example, argued by Oswald (1985) and Weitzman (1987) that when employees are
laid olf by seniority, the union will not care about employment as long as its median member is not
afraid to bo affected.
'*S<v for example Hanson and Rehn (1956), Gerfin (1969) and Isachsen (1977) and the discussion
in chapter 2 of this thesis. It is interesting to note, however, that in a study of Pehkonen and Viskari
(195*4), who investigated the empirical performance of Phillips-curve and bargaining models of wage
drift on data of the Finnish metal industry, the latter outperformed the first.3-3. Market determined ways and wge gapa 39
agents on the labour market is relaxed. Because the contract wage truncates the
distribution of equilibrium wages, the expected value of the effective wag*'.
depends positively on the contract wage:
dE [i/»|u; > ti>] _ E [U>|UJ > ti>] - ti>
d* " ' ^' /~/(u-*)du.' "
where / (a'*) is the probability density function of the unrestricted equilibrium wage.
Just by this relationship the contract wage influences the average effective wage
positively. Moreover, by influencing the agents' exjHvtations, the contract wage
might persistently affect the formation of effective wages.
Kleiuhiickelskoten and Spaetling (1980) present a model in which waged are deter-
mined by search processes on both sides of the labour market. Workers are search inn
for the job which provides the highest possible labour income, while employers on
the one hand try to fill vacancies, and on the other hand want, to prevent their
employees from starting to search for a new job.
Consider first the problem of a worker who has decided to search for a new job.
For each job offer that the worker receives she will compare the income from taking
this job with the expected income from continuing the search, which depends on
her income during search, the arrival rate and distribution of job offers, and on her
search costs. Her problem is therefore to find an optimal rule for stopping the search;
she has to find a reservation wage which maximizes her expected income."*
Since the expected income will depend on the distribution of wage offers and it is
common knowledge that the contract wage from collective bargaining WJ is the legal
lower boundary of all wage offers, the level of tD will influence the reservation wage
and the effective wage rate via the expectation formation process. Because of this
relationship Kleinhiickelskoten and Spaetling argue that the contract wage might
also influence the distribution of wage offers itself, because firms have to take the
searching behaviour of the workers into account when making a job offer.
The expected value of an acceptable wage offer is therefore given by
(3.7)
where tl> is the reservation wage, and / (if, u>) the probability density function of
the effective wage given the contract wage, with F (in) = /J*' / («;, u>) = 1 and
ifjtel = J~ *'&*) = 0." Because of the minimum wage characteristic of the
'*The described sequential search strategy goes back to McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970).
'''The assumption that workers already know that the firms will optimally adapt their wage offers
to changes of the contract wage is in fact an implicit equilibrium assumption. Workers are aware
of the optimal strategy of the firms, which will be analysed on pages 41 f.40 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
contract wage we can assume that ,
Assume that the worker receives one job offer in each period and that job duration
in given by 2 = const.''"' Neglecting that workers might discount future income, the
expected labour income when accepting a job offer Ls given by
*E(u>,|u>i>»»). (3.8)
If the worker rejects the job offer, she can expect an income of
E (yfl = (* - E («]) E [U/,+B|.||U»,+E|.| > ti] - cE [«] + uE [a], (3.9)
where a is the expected number of further search periods, c are search costs per
|M'rio<l ;inil r is present, income per period during job search.
'I'll*• i \JK i ted income for H |x>riod / is given by
E [»,] = <6, E [yf] 4- (1 - *,) E [y,»], (3.10)
where 0, is the probability that «)< is accepted in period £. Two cases have to be
distinguished:
a / jT/(«'.«')d«> >f«>t>w> , .
I I,,-., /(w,w)dty ifu;»<u>
Assume for simplicity that job offers in different periods are independently and
identically distributed. Furthermore, let s be geometrically distributed with the
probability density function /(s) = <£(1 - <£)"" and expected value E [s] = ^. If
tit > <#> expected search duration decreases when the contract wage increases:
<0 (3.12)
u>t>t», | ff= /• r«j, ii>t)
If in contrast t&j < tw, the effect is indeterminate:
— |0 (3.13)
Kleinhiickelskotcn mid SpmHling argue that these two cases might represent different
phases of the business cycle. If in a beginning economic downturn relatively high
contract wages are negotiated, they might exceed the reservation wage of searching
workers. Furthermore, employers might not be willing to raise their wage offers.
•"'The subsequent equation (3.9) however suggests that i is better interpreted as the worker's
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In this case, the distribution of effective wages us indepoiuiont of tli<> mntrtirt w»ig»»
and the left-hand side of equation (3.13) is strict 1\ poMim- an m.-i.•.».•.«• m tin-
contract wage will increase the duration of job search. If in contrast relatively low
contract wages are negotiated in economic upturns, the distribution of job offers
might change, and search time will decrease according to equation (3.12).
Confining to the case where the reservation wage Is higher than the contract
wage, equation (3.10) can be written as
E(y»J = z / u;/ (tw, u>) du>
*•
+ [(* - E [•]) E [wi+EMki+E|.j > u>] + (v - c) E [71]
x I /(u;, w)du;.
./o
The optimal search strategy determines the reservation wage such that
maximized. The first order condition of this maximization problem is
*«>t « E [yJ'J . (3.14)
The income from accepting the job offer has to be equal to the expected income
from rejecting the offer. Rearranging and expanding equation (3.14) yields
">< = —- (u - c) + (1 ^i ) E [U>I+E[.]K+E[.| >
2 \ 2 /
for the reservation wage. It depends positively on the contract wage:^'
#u>» u - c - E [u;<-LF.uilttf<4-F.i»i >
1 _ Eifl^ ^ [W(+E[,]kt+EM > U>t+E|»l]
However, against the background of the two cases discussed above, this effect will
be smaller in an economic downturn than in an upturn.
Having analysed the behaviour of the labour supply side, we now turn to labour
demand. In order to avoid costly labour turnover, firms will try to prevent their
employees from quitting. Therefore an employer has to set the effective wage t> for
already employed such that it is not exceeded by the reservation wage, which is the
Note that
Consequently the second term of the equation above will only be positive if the contract wage in
influences future contract wages positively.42 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
expected income from searching:"
v, > u>, = —!£! (v - c) + f 1 p J E [wt+Ei.jIwr+EW > t^+E[.]]
Minimizing labour costs, the firm will optimally set the effective wage such that this
relation is fulfilled with sign of equality. Then
E [a]
U = E [U/ K || > U)|]J C _£| i
Consequently, an increaHe of the contract wage has a positive effect on the effective
wage for employees:
cz 0E [a] ^
Furthermore, the firm has to fill vacancies. Because there is no Walrasian auc-
tionrar in the lat>our market, a representative firm has to make a wage offer that
optimally weighs the costs of a vacancy with the costs ami benefits of a rilled job.
Given the searching behaviour of the workers and taking into account the distri-
bution of reservation wages and the arrival rate of applicants, expected profits are
given by
E M = pg (E [L,] + E [L-2]) - u> (E [L,] + E [L2]) - c*\
where /> Ls the product price, #(•) the short term revenue function, c^ fixed cost,
ami E[Li] and E [L2] the expected number of newly hired workers and incumbent
workers. Furthermore it is assumed that incumbents and newly hired workers receive
the same wage. Because of the search behaviour of the workers an employer knows
that he can expect to fill a vacancy the sooner the higher the wage offer he makes.
The optimal strategy of the firm will consist of a wage offer u;, which maximizes
expected profits. Hence,
Because of the search behaviour of the workers we have"
>0. s = 1,2.
• this argument it does not matter whether «- is indeed the present wage or unemployment
benefits.
•'•'Assume that the firm currently employs tn workers. If the arrival rate of searching workers
is Foisson distributed with expected value ji(«B), M'(*) > 0. •«* *1 == /* /• (*,*)«!*. -gi^- >
0, ^ < 0, when' /' is the probability density function of the reservation wages over all not
incumbent workers, and n is the probability that an applying worker accepts the job offer u>,
then the expected number of hiring* is E[Lij = jir, = ji(tt')/„"' /l (»,*)«•«•'. Let the probability
of •cccptaiicc be relatively more reactive to changes of the contract wage than the arrival rate.3.3. Market determined wages and wage gmpa 43
Differentiating equation (3.15) yields ;.:*
The firm will raise its wage offer when the contract wage increases. This reflects the
fact that a firm which wants to attract or keep labour, mast take into account not
only the absolute level of iUs wage offer, but the relative level with res|x«ct to the
contract wage. The reason is that firms know that workers expect wage offers to
increase when the contract wage goes up.
From equation (3.15) a wage drift equation ran !><• calculated, too. In order
to keep the analysis manageable, the following simplifications are made: The rev-
enue function be linear, 9(E|Li] + E|La]) := 0(E(Li) + E(La]), where 0 is lalnmr
productivity, and the reservation wage of both groups of workers have the same
rectangular distribution with probability density
Then equation (3.15) becomes
u; = p0 - tu + u/" <* u> = - (p0 + «/•') .
Taking logarithms, differentiating with respect to time and rearranging yields the
wage drift equation
it) —
where x := f is the relative growth rate of r over time, and J'^.r € [5,1] because
of the minimum wage character of the contract wage. Though the effective wage
0,
L11 du dri uTi / du u> 9TI u> \ „
—- = TI "T" +M"^— = ^^ I -r- — + "S^r — 1 < 0, li) du) vti^ tii \ dtu u dw Tj /
The expected number of incumbent workers who accept (i.e., they will not quit) the wage offer w
can be calculated analogously by E [L2] = mT2 = m /Jf /2 (ui, tD) dii , where /a is the probability
density function of reservation wages over the incumbent workers. Hence,44 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
depend** positively on the contract wage, wage drift is negatively correlated with the
contract wage. It increases however, when the product price or labour productivity-
go up.
5.5.5 /Irfapfarton t/er#w maHfc-up /jj/pof/ieses o/ waye dni/t
Although the wage drift pattern the model of KleinhiickeLskoten and Spaetling (1980)
predictH in in line with the Phillips-curve models, the underlying relationship between
contract and effective wage is different. Whereas the Phillips-curve theory predicts
that l>oth wages are independent in the long run, the contract wage peraistenr/y
drives effective earnings here. This is remarkable because in both models effective
wages are market determined. Obviously, the different results are based on the
assumptions about how prices are found on the market. In both models, firms
have to compete for workers in order to fill vacancies. However, as long as there is
complete information about all relevant variables, the contract wage can influence
effective wage* only by its legal minimum wage characteristic. It neither affects the
structural variables which determine labour demand and supply nor the behaviour
of the agents. Unless the contract wage exceeds the equilibrium wage, the wage gap
is just the difference between the two wage levels.
In contrast, in an environment of incomplete information, the contract wage
will influence the market outcome if it provides information about the other side of
the market. Though it leaves the structural variables of the market unaffected, it
influences the agents' behaviour. Due to the expectation formation of the workers
the linns have to compete for labour by paying a mark-up on the contract wage.
Apparently, it is not even important whether the information the contract wage
provides is true; if for example the contract wage was not the legal lower boundary
of all effective earnings but the workers only believed it was, the outcome would
still be the same in the model of Kleinhiickclskoten and Spaetling. Assuming that
effective wages are market determined consequently does not per se support the view
that wage drift nullifies the decisions taken at the central level of wage bargaining,
as the adherents of the Phillips-curve theory claim.
It has been argued that the empirical distinction between adapt at ional and mark-
up patterns of wage drift coincides with the theoretical distinction between theories
of market determined and institutionally determined effective wages.''" The latter
focuses on the contract wage. The wage gap is just seen as a function of institution-
ally rather than economically determined variables. In view of the models described
in this and the following sections this strict identification of empiricism and theory
proves to be untenable. Instead of focusing on either contract or effective wage for-
mation and attempting to explain the differences between these two variables, it is
more promising to look at the mutual dependency of both wage levels—whether and
how thev influence each other.
example by Kleinhiickelskotcn and Spaetling (1980) themselves, Deutachmann and
Schmiede (1983) and less explicitly by Pehkonen and Viskari (1994) and other authors.3.4. Efficiency-wage theories and wage drift
3.4 EFFICIENCY-WAGE THEORIES AND WAGE DRIFT
A/odefo o/ e/fictmcy ivagu and (Ac tn/Juencc o/ (Ac contract
Efficiency-wage theories are based on the idea that the quality of a good can depend
on its price. Especially when there is uncertainty alxmt the good's quality, prices
can have either incentive or selection effects. In this case, however, economic prin-
ciples as the "Law of Supply and Demand" or the "Law of the Single Price" do not
necessarily hold anymore.^'' Demand curves might not IM> downward sloping, and
market demand and supply might be interdependent. ,
The fact that productivity (the "quality") of lalxmr may dejM'iid on its remuner-
ation has long been recognized by economists.*' Attempts to formalize the relation-
ship are not older than forty years, though. These efficiency-wage theories establish
a positive relationship between the wage rate and the productivity of labour, leading
to a {/-shaped cost function of effective lal>our input, which is minimized ut the HU




Figure 5.5: Wage-productivity curve and cost per effective unit of labour in
efficiency-wage models. The efficiency wage Ls denoted by to*.
^'See Stiglitz (1987) for a survey of this kind of models and their implications.
*® Alfred Marshall (1920), for example, noted, that "[...] highly paid labour is generally efficient
and therefore not dear labour; [...]" And Adam Smith (1776) stated that "A plentiful subsistence
increases the bodily strength of the labourer and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition
and ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty animates him to exert that strength to the utmost."46 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
The most important explanations for why the wage rate might affect labour
productivity can be structured as follows.•"
1. ^u<n<iorja/ aryiimcri^ (e.g. Mirrlees 1975, Stiglitz 1976):
This argument is put forward with respect to least developed countries. With
subsistence wages labour productivity is low. A wage increase improves the
workers' standard of living (and especially the nutritional and health situation)
which in turn might increase productivity.
2. S/urJfcujy (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984):
Shirking models bn.sc on the moral hazard problem that occurs when firms
tir<- unable to monitor effort jH'rfectly. Firms can motivate their workers to
,, provide a diwired effort level by raising wages above the market clearing level,
which creates queues for their jobs, and (at the same time) by threatening
workers to fire them in case they are detected shirking. Both measures create
a rent of being employed, which, if it is sufficiently high to outweigh the rent
due to moral hazard, prevents workers from shirking. In this way, a positive
relationship between effort and wage rate is established.
The shirking approach is taken up in the chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Chap-
ter 4 combines the shirking model with local wage bargaining, while chapter 5
focuses on the outcome of a shirking model in which a union has say over the
punishment of a shirker.
:{. Labour (unioucr (e.g. Salop 1979, Schlicht 1978, Stiglitz 1974):
These models provide a similar explanation as the shirking models. If firms
are not able to pass the costs of hiring and schooling on the workers, they will
have an interest to reduce the quit rate of employees. Paying a higher wage
thnu the outside option makes handing in their notice costly for employees,
thus making them more reluctant to quit.
4. 5octo/o0tca/ aryumertfs (e.g. Akerlof (1982, 1984)):
The sociological models base on a notion of fairness. The underlying assump-
tion is that if workers have the impression to be treated (more than) fairly,
their job satisfaction is high and they are willing to exert. Whether a worker
believes to be treated fairly might depend on the working rules, her wage rate,
or her wage in relation to other comparable employees or to the firm's profits.
Especially the last throe arguments have the potential to explain the occurrence of a
wage gap. A wage gap will always occur if the contract wage is set below the efficiency
wage, Invauso in this case the contract wage is suboptimal for firms. This argument
is perfectly in line with the adaptation hypothesis, as long as labour productivity
does not depend on the contract wage. If however a link between productivity and
also Katz (1986) and StigliU (1987).3.4. Efficiency-wage theories and wage drift 47
the contract wage can be established, the contract wage can become a driving force
behind the effective wage, which would support the mark-up !i\[>othe*iis.
Of the models discussed so far. the model of kleinhuckclskoten and Spaetling
(1980) can be interpreted in this direction, because the contract wage influences
labour turnover.
In order to provide an example of how the link between contract and efftvtiw
wage could look like in a "real" efficiency-wage model, we outsider tin- model of
Schlicht (1992), that adapts on the sociological argument. Schlicht's i<l< > i tint
workers have a perception of a fair wage level «•/, which depends on tin • •<•
wage tun and the contract wage fixed by collective bargaining ii>. The avci ,<•
influences the notion of a fair wage since workers compare their earnings with (IIONC
of other comparable workers. With respect to the contract wage Schlicht armies that
it affects "fairness considerations too. since an increase in the standard wage (i.e., t he
contract or tariff wage; the author] will create an entitlement to wage innvns, -, ,md
such entitlements influence fairness perceptions (..)•"""* Through this mechanism i lie
contract wage can have a strong impact on the effective wage within the cfliciency-
wage theory*. This might explain the fact that collective wage bargaining generally
is a struggle, even though employers normally pay a considerable mark-up on the
contract wage.
The fair wage is assumed to be a concave function in its two arguments:
Workers' effort depends on the degree of generosity of the firm, 7 := J*L, which
is defined as the ratio of the wage rate u; effectively paid by the firm and the fair
wage u>/:^
e:=e(7), e' (7) > 0, e"(7) < 0
The firm's profit function is given by
where /?(•) is the concave revenue function and L is employment. The firm maxi-
mizes its profits with respect to employment and the relative wage rate under the
restriction that the effective wage rate must not be below the contract wage. The
first order conditions are
ei?' = u),
e'/?' = tu/ V u; = u>.
*®See Schlicht (1992, p. 440).
^Schlicht (1992) makes even stricter assumptions about the fair wage and the effort function. In
his paper, <p is a linear homogenous function in its arguments and lim-,—.oc £ (7) = 1- However, for
the argumentation here, these assumptions are not necessary at all. On the contrary it will turn
out that assuming linear homogeneity of the fair wage will have a strong effect on the predicted
wage drift pattern.48 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
Consequently, the profit maximizing wage u>* is either equal to the efficiency wage
given by the Solow condition,
or, if the contract wage is greater, it is equal to the contract wage, u>* = u).
Under the aHsumption that nil firtiLs and workers are identical, the optimal effec-
tive wages iniiHt be the same in till firms, U>Q = u;*. Then the relative average wage
gap can l>e calculated from equation (3.16) by
^o _ J a> ?7vy " ' ^ * . (3.17)
u> [ 1 else
1-Vom the equations (3.17) and (3.16) a wage drift equation can be derived for
the ca.se that 7* > 1 (i.e. U>Q > u>/):
where ± := | denotes the growth rate of i. The wage drift is positive if
i. _|_ i. il > 1 /\
that is if the elasticities of the fair wage with respect to the average effective wage
and to the contract wage sum up to more than one, with the former elasticity being
less than one.""' If these conditions are fulfilled wage drift tends to be higher the
more reactive the fair wage is with respect to its arguments. The higher the fair
wage is, the higher must be the effective wage the firm sets in order to maintain the
optimal degree of generosity. If, however, the elasticity of the fair wage is greater
than one, linns can in aggregate not catch up with an overall increase in effective
wages. Raising the effective wage as a reaction to an increase in the average effective
wage increases average effective wages even more and would make the fair wage go
up over-proportionally. The degree of generosity would become even lower, leading
to upward pressure on the effective wage again.
5.^.2 /Vimaru and .secondary drt/t and t/»c sfafctiify o/ t/ie reiattt/e u>a^e structure
As stated before, in the "older" literature the occurrence of a wage gap was above
all attributed to an excess demand for labour. However, additional arguments have
3"Note that wags drift is equal to aero if Schlicht's assumption holds that the fair wage is linear
homogeneous in its arguments.3.4. Efficiency-wage theories and wage drift
been put forward which can be interpreted in the view of efficiency-wage theories.
This was on the one hand an attempt to explain the permanence of t tit* phenomenon
and its occurrence also in situations of increasing unemployment." On the other
hand it gave grounds for the supposition that "drift proceeds from whatever level
negotiations set [...], at a rate that is largely independent of that level."'*''
In a number of studies a distinction is made Itetween /triniurj/ and scroiii/ory
wage dri/f."*"' The argument is hased on the observation that for different uroii|>s
of employees different remuneration systems are implemented. Primary drift occurs
when the effective wage of only a part of the worker*, is affected .mil thereby the
relative wage structure to other groups of emplu\••.-.•> i> alien.! I Ins infill cause
dissatisfaction of the other employees, if the new wage hierarchy is not considered to
be "fair" anymore. As a consequence, pressure is put mi I lie manai'.einent to restore
the former relative wage structure by increasing the e!fecii\e wage also of the other
groups of workers secondary drift occurs.
Several explanations have been given for primary drift .** First, technical program
and an increasing capital intensity tend to raise lnlxnir productivity. From this es-
pecially employees in the manufacturing industry and above all piece-workers might
In'nefit. Second, the management might consider the negotiated relative wage struc-
ture unsuitable for the special needs of the firm. Since the contract wage from
collective bargaining cannot be legally undercut, a change in relative wages can only
be achieved by increasing the effective wage of some groups of employees. This ar-
gument might be of some importance for countries with centralized wage bargaining
systems. Finally, there might be excess demand for a special qualification of workers
leading to a wage increase for this group."'
The mechanisms behind secondary drift, however, are not made clear in the
literature. Gerfin just mentions a "need for correction" of the disturbed wage? hier-
archy,"'® whereas other authors as Phelps Brown (1962) and Lerner and Marquand
(1962) explain it as a result of negotiations on the firm level which are initiated by
workers who are dissatisfied by the relative wage structure. Indeed, secondary drift
can be explained by an "envy" argument in terms of efficiency wages. As was argued
in the previous subsection, employees who have the impression to be treated fairly
are willing to exert. In turn, firms must be afraid that workers lower their effort if
they are discontented.
Gerfin and Phelps Brown report that secondary drift on the firm level can initiate
3'See for example Gerfin (1969, p. 502 f).
™Phelps Brown (1962, p. 339). Gerfin (1969), however, points out that there is a positive relation
between wage drift and the degree of centralization in wage bargaining.
"See for example Phelps Brown (1962), Gerfin (1969), and—lew explicit—Lerner and Marquand
(1962).
^See for example Gerfin (1969, pp. 504-506).
'''''The reasoning behind this argument is based on the increased market value of the qualification.
On the one hand firms then have to offer higher wages in order to recruit these workers. Un the
other hand also an efficiency-wage argument could play a role. With a rising market wage, the
outside option of the employed workers increases. This might induce them to quit their job, unleaa
their wage is adapted. So firms will increase the wage in order to reduce costly labour turnover.
^Gerfin (1969, p. 504).50 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
further drift in other firms or even other branches if it disturbs the interfirm wage
structure.'* Furthermore, if central wage negotiations attempt to alter the "normal"
wage hierarchy (within or between firms) the described mechanism will tend to
restore the old structure."**
3.5 MODELS OF LOCAL AND CENTRAL WAGE BARGAINING
5.5.i 77ie fcasic /rameti/orit
In most countries) where the contract wage is negotiated on a nation- or industry-
wide level, a second round of bargaining takes place on the level of the individual
firms after the contract wage has been set.'" In these second level negotiations
local unions or the local representatives of the central union bargain with the firm's
management about .supplements on the contract wage- thus on the wage gap.
llnlden (l')HH) analyses such a wage setting system in three stages. First, the
contract wage is set unilaterally by the union. Afterwards the firm determines em-
ployment, and in the last stage the local union bargains with the firm's management
about the wage gap. The model is solved by backward induction.
Uolh the union and the firm are risk neutral. They are fully informed about the
other party's objective function. The union's utility is equal to the effective wage,
u = ID, whereas the firm maximizes its profits, TT = •/?(£) — wi/, where /?(•) is the
(concave) revenue function of the firm, L is employment, and «; the effective wage
rate. Since industrial actions are not allowed during local wage bargaining, workers
can threaten the firm only by work to rule. The firm on the other hand has to pay
at least the contract, wage. Its profits during local wage bargaining are then given
by
»«•'" = oil (L)-tDL, Q6]0,l[,
where a is the factor by which revenues decrease due to work to rule.
Local wage bargaining is modelled as an asymmetric Nash bargaining game. The
effective wage t/; is found by
w = argmax (n- - 7^'*) (w - u>)'~* ,
with # and 1 - 0 being the relative bargaining power of the firm and the work-
ers respectively. The profit-utility pairs corresponding to all feasible outcomes are
depicted, in figure 3.4. The first order condition implies
. (3.18)
•"See Gcrfin (1969, p. 506), and Phelps Brown (1962, pp. 349-350).
•**See for example Soderstrom and Udden-Jondal (1982), who describe this effect for Sweden,
where unions used to pursue an egalitarian wage policy.
**Such wage formation systems are. for example, referred to by Calmfors (1990, pp. 51-52)
for the Scandinavian countries and by FVanz (1994, p. 281). It should be noted, however, that
explicit negotiations about the wage rate between management and works councils are illegal in
other countries, e g. Germany On the other hand, this does not preclude negotiations about extra
payments on an informal and discretionary level.3.5. Models of local and central wage bargaining
Hence, the firm has to pay a mark-up on the contract wage, wliich depends on the
workers' bargaining power, the decrease in revenues in conflict and on employment.
5.^: Profit-utility pairs corresponding to all feasible outcomes in the Hnlden
model for a given employment level. The possible outcomes an- indkuted
by the bold part of the line.
The firm anticipates the outcome of local wage bargaining when setting employ-
ment. Maximizing its profits after all negotiations are finished,
?r = it (L) - u;L = [1 -(1 -0)(1 -Q)]it(L)-ti)L,
with respect to employment yields the first order condition
(3.19)
Now u; > it' (L), and therefore
because /t(L) is a concave function. Hence, the marginal cost of labour is smaller
than the effective wage rate u;. As a result of bargaining, revenue per worker is
shared between the employer and the union.
Both employment and the bargained effective wage depend on the contract wage
tD. The total differential of equation (3.19) is given by
dL 1
)]fl"(L) *^
and differentiating equation (3.18) we get52 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
Hie model thus implies a positive relationship between effective and contract wage.
Moreover, the two equation** above imply
Furflirimnre, it m interesting to evaluate the effect that bargaining power has
on the < Hi .live wage and employment. As can be seen from equation (3.18), if the
firm has full bargaining power, 0=1, the effective wage equals the contract wage.
In general, we get from the equations (3.18) and (3.19):
d£ „(l-q)iB ^p
Hence, ft greater bargaining power of the firm tends to lower the effective wage and
to increase employment."'




It is greater than zero if the total elasticity of the effective wage with respect to the
contract wage is greater than one, or if
Since /?'(£) < ^7^ wage drift is more likely to be positive the less the curvature
of the revenue function is at L. The size of drift furthermore depends negatively on
the parameters n and 0.
•"Mn view of it* interpretation as the inverse of workers' ability to work to rule, also a could be
n function of bargaining power, a = a (0), a' > 0. Then the effects of 0 on the effective wage and
employment would bo
—
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3.5.2 £$ici<"nry tvages in modris o//oro/ and rrri/ra/ cWirgairiint/ " •
Muysken and van Veen (1996) and de Gijsel (1996) extended Holden's framework
by including efficiency wages. In both modeLs effort is an increasing function in the
effective wage:
e = e (tr), e' (tu) > 0
It enters production as a productivity factor, i.e., the firm's profits are given by
ir = /? (eL) — wL. Workers utility is again equal to the effective wage, u = u>.
If there Ls a delay in local wage bargaining ("disagreement") workers' effort is
given by e''". The assumption about the disagreement effort is the main difference
between the modeLs of Muysken and van Veen on the one hand and de Gijsel on
the other hand. While the former assume that the same effort function prevails
in agreement as well as in disagreement, «"**'" = e(u>). the latter assumes that tin-
workers can deviate from this level as a threat in order to express t heir dissat isfact ion.
To which extent the workers can deviate depends on their bargaining power, r"*" •»
£(0), r' < 0.'" The firm has to pay at least the contract wage in a delay, it;'"" « |D.
Its disagreement profit is then given by
«*"• = fi (e<""L) - u)L.
The effective wage is found by solving
tu = argmax (ft(e(iu) L) - u>L - 7r^'") (ui - u))'~ s.t. u; > u;*. (3.20)
In figure 3.5 the profit-utility pairs of all feasible outcomes of this bargaining game
are depicted. In view of the reverse U-shape of the related curve two cases have to
be distinguished: first, if the contract wage is greater than the profit maximizing
wage, w > u;*, the contract wage is the lower boundary of the possible outcomes of
bargaining. Second, if iu* > iD, this lower boundary is given by the profit maximizing
wage.'*'* Because of the nonlinearities in equation (3.20) it is impossible to find a
general solution. Therefore, only the extreme cases where either the union or the
firm have full bargaining power are examined. Consider first the cast; where the
firm has full bargaining power, 0 = 1. In this case, the firm can set the effective
wage unilaterally under the restriction that the effective wage mast not be below
the contract wage. The maximization problem thus becomes
, - TT°'" s.t. w > u>.
FYom the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we get
= 1 V tUF = tZ», (3.21)
•"Another passible assumption about the disagreement effort ia e*"* = const, (aee also chapter 4
of this thesis).
"This distinction reflects Nash's axiom that the bargaining outcome has to be Parcto efficient.
See Nash (1950). In order to make this argument clear, assume that the bargaining outcome is
tu < m*. Then a wage rate ui can be found with u> > u>, jr (tZ>) = w (u>) and u (u>) > u (u>). Hence,
tv is not efficient.54 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
where t«p denotes the outcome of local wage "bargaining" in this case, in which the
firm has full bargaining j>ower. Anticipating this outcome, the firm sets employ-
ment in order to maximize profits after all negotiations are finished. The related
maximization problem is
max ft (e (wr) L) - U/F£,
with the first order condition
Combining the equations (3.21) and (3.22) yields
if = 1 V e (tZ>) ft' (e (tZ>) LF) = tZ>.
Hence, either the Solow condition is fulfilled and the firm pays the efficiency wage,
Wf •• w*, or the contract wage is greater than the efficiency wage and the firm just
/\%vu flip rontrort u>«jn HI,,. — t/> TV»P rplntpH pm_plnvmpnt 1PVP)« r«n hp
using equation (3.22). The outcome can be summarized by
{
u>* for tZ) < u>*
u) for tZ) > tt)* '
£) for tD < u;'
'| j for ti) > «;*
It is obvious that in this situation the contract wage does not have any influence
on the effective wage nor on employment, unless it exceeds the efficiency wage.
Consequently, if tZ) > tw* no wage gap will occur. In this case, the contract wage
influences the employment level negatively:
<*«' [e (iD)]' ft" (c (tD) LF) e(u>) *
Note that these results are independent of the disagreement profit 7^'". Therefore,
the different assumptions about the effort level do not have any influence on this
scenario.
Now consider the case where the workers have full bargaining power, 0 = 0. The
workers' maximization problem is'*"'
maxtr s.t. JT > TT**'*.
would be more correct to write the maximization problem as max.. tr — u> s.t. * > if**". The
problems are equivalent, though, since if u' is maximized, then also u' — u' is maximiaed.3.5. Models of local and central wage bargaining
Figure 5.5: Profit-utility pairs corresponding to all feasible outcomes in the models
of Muysken and van Veen, and de Gijsel for a given employment level
tt'"'" Ls the profit maximizing wage for this employment level. The pos-
sible outcomes are indicated by the hold part of the line.




which has two zeros because of the shape of the revenue function. The higher wage
that satisfies this equation will optimally be chosen by the workers as the effective
wage ww :
(3.24) ^ [/? (e («;) L) -
Taking this wage setting behaviour of the workers for given, the firm solves
max 7? (e'*'"L) - u)L
to find the employment level.'*'' The first order condition is
— (liit r>/ / .din r \ /o oc\
In this scenario, the effective wage and employment are influenced by the contract
wage. Consider the case of Muysken and van Veen in which the disagreement effort
'"Actually the firm solves max/, fl(e(u»w)//) — uinl. But since it anticipates that the workers
will set the effective wage such that *r = ir**'", maximizing 7r is equivalent to maximizing JT''"\ The
original problem is solved by u>w' = e («"»v) W (e (<"»') tvy).56 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
depends on the wage paid during a delay in negotiations, i.e., e**'" = e(u>). Then
iB te a solution of equation (3.23). Differentiating equation (3.25) we get
du)
which has positive sign if
»1« W •» « I *»* f «•• i »* \ ™* # ** nr f »* * *»* f ** rv * _ rt^ \
Because of the shape of the revenue function the right hand side of the inequality
above is greater than one. Therefore, a necessary but still not sufficient condition
fr"" ^fi?H,-'i" r(n-) *•" ^** positive is that u> < w*. If the contract wage is low enough,
employment might be increasing with the effective wage.'"' If it is equal to the profit
maximizing wage u>* or above this level, it is decreasing, though.'*" For the sketch
of ii graph of the employment function which has the described characteristics see
figure .').(>.
The relationship between effective wage and contractual wage can be derived
from the equations (3.24) and (3.25):
***> (3.27)
The analysis of different constellations of ti) and u>w shows that the effective wage is
a decreasing function of the contract wage if the latter is below the efficiency wage.
If the contract wage is equal to or greater than the efficiency wage, then the effective
wage is equal to the contract wage. The graph of ii»w is depicted in figure 3.6. A
graphical interpolation using the employment function depicted in the same figure
yields equivalent results.
' 'This possible behaviour is due to the specific assumption about the disagreement effort. If the
workers have full bargaining power the total derivative of the disagreement effort with respect to
the contract wage is in this case given by
•«•'»«(«£>) dw
which has positive sign if the contract wage is less than the profit maximizing wage ir*. An increase
in the contract wage might then lead to a decrease in the effective wage, such that labour demand
Kcieti up. The implications of this behaviour will be discussed later on.
'"'Note that the derivative of employment with respect to the effective wage has the same shape
as ' , iy- in the model of Muyskcn and van Veen. Hence, we have
e(t!>)Liv) -«(ti>)e'(u>)f,wft"(e3.5. Models of local and central wage bargaining 57
Also a wage drift equation for the model of Muysken and van Veen can bo
calculated from the equations (3.24) and (3.25):
ti) / _ f' (tr) u^v -
— u>
ti) /
Under the assumption of de Gijsel (1996), that the disagreement effort does not
depend on the contract wage but on the relative lutrgaininK power of tlie* workers,
the results differ. Because we have confined to the case where the workers have full
bargaining power, we can set c*"" := c = const. In this case, the equations (3.20)
and (3.27) change to
dti>
1
— > 1 dtD i .
because the effective wage must not be below the profit maximizing wage. In contrast
to the model of Muysken and van Veen but similar to the results of Holden, there
is a strictly inverse relationship between employment and the contract wage, and
the effective wage will increase when the contract wage goes up. Typical graphs
of employment and effective wage in relation to the contract wage are depicted in
figure 3.6. The wage drift equation is
* : 1
1-3 wiv
Wage drift as the measure of relative changes in the effective wage compared to
relative changes in the contract wage is independent of the disagreement effort.
Note that this does not hold for the absolute level of the effective wage, though.
The disagreement effort e'*'" was considered to be an exogenous variable in the
model of de Gijsel. In view of its influence on the threat points and the bargain-
ing outcome it can—same as the exponent 0—be interpreted as an expression of
bargaining power. In contrast to the model of Muysken and van Veen, the labour
demand and the effective-wage function are in fact a family of functions with the
disagreement effort e^" = e as a parameter. Differentiating (3.25) we get
de ti>=con*t.
which has positive sign if the marginal revenue of labour Ls not decreasing in effort,
^"*") > 0. In this case, employment is the higher the less workers can reduce58 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey















Figure Jf.tf: Einploynient and effective wage in the models of Muysken and van Veen
(1996) and do Gijsel (1996). The effective wage curve for the latter
model is derived by a graphical interpolation.3.5. Models of local and central wage bargaining 50
their effort level if there is a delay in local wage bargaining. The rt>lat ionship lietween




Coasequently. the effective wage will be the higher the lower the effort level is in a
delay of bargaining.^
5.5.5 77irai< points and fcaryainirt^ power in /oca/ uwjr ftnrycmum/
In view of the previous subsections the different results of the twrgaining mod-
els of wage drift seem to be due to the underlying assumptions about the threat
points, rather than the question whether efficiency wages matter after an agreement
is achieved. The problem of motivating reasonable assumptions about the threat
points therefore deserves some attention. In general, two different interpretations
are given:'"'
1. The threat points reflect the outside option or a status quo, i. e., a reservation
utility or profit the agents can secure when abandoning the attempt to reach
an agreement.
2. They represent the utility or profit to the agents in the course of a dispute, for
example during a delay of bargaining.
For the described models of local wage bargaining the latter interpretation aj>-
pears relevant. In disagreement the firm pays the contract wage ii; as the lowest
possible wage rate. The assumptions about profits in dispute, however, an; dif-
ferent. Holden and de Gijsel allow for workers deviating from their normal effort
(function), thus reducing revenues. The same effect occurs in the model of Muy.skon
and van Veen, but they assume that one and the same effort function holds in agree-
ment as well as in disagreement. Reduced effort is therefore induced by the firm
itself. Consequently, the workers' threat is in fact no threat at all. A simple thought
experiment reduces the underlying assumption to absurdum: if in an environment as
described by Muysken and van Veen the firm decided to pay the profit maximizing
wage u»"P' during the dispute, the whole bargaining problem would degenerate and
the pure efficiency wage u/* would be the only possible outcome.'*® Therefore, paying
principle two cases have to be distinguished. The denominator of the fraction in equation
(3.30) is the (simplified) first derivative of normal profits, jr = ft (e (u>w) Liv) ~" '"W^Wi with
respect to the effective wage for a given employment level Liv. If effective earnings arc higher
than the profit maximizing wage, this derivative is negative and effective wages depend positively
on the disagreement effort. If however the effective wage U below the profit maximizing wage It
is increasing with e. This case cannot occur, though, because it implies an inefficient bargaining
outcome.
•**See for example Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and Binmore (1987).
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a lower wage rate in disagreement i« not a credible threat, since it is not optimal for
the firm.
Though never stated explicitly, also the first interpretation of the threat points as
outaide option plays a role in these models, namely if one of the agents has full bar-
gaining |M)W«T. In this case, she cannot get the other agent to agree to any arbitrary
demand. Instead, any bargaining outcome has to secure both agents a minimum
income which prevents them from taking up the best alternative elsewhere. Hence,
if firms generally pay efficiency wages workers can earn at least u>* everywhere, since
other bargaining outcomes are not efficient.'"" On the other hand non-cooperative
bargaining th«*>ry shows however, that under reasonable assumptions these "exit
points" do not have an influence on the bargaining outcome but setting a minimum
constraint.'"'
Still another problem is the lack of an explanation of bargaining power in local
negotiations. Non-cooperative bargaining theory proposes that the asymmetric Nash
bargaining approach can either be ju.stiKc*«i by assuming different discount rates or by
assuming different beliefs about the probability that the negotiations will break down
without having led to an agreement. Either assumptions will in turn have an effect
on the choice of the threat points, too.''* However, it seems reasonable to assume
that also other factors play an important, role in the determination of bargaining
power. Next, to legal factors and the structure of negotiations, confidence between the
bargaining partners and other long term aspects might have an important influence.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In view of the variety of explanations for the occurrence of wage gaps it seems that
economic theory is still far from being able to explain the phenomenon. While the
different, assumptions about the engine of drift could be considered as complemen-
tary rather than alternative approaches, the results concerning the predicted drift
patterns show fundamental differences.
With respect to their results, models of wage drift can be ordered into two main
groups—models which support the adaptation hypothesis and models in favour of
the mark-up hypothesis.
The former models are characterized by a reduced form of the following type:
the effective wage is a function of a vector of variables m := (mi, m2,..., m,,), but
not of the contract wage tin u; = u> (m). Wage drift is then given by
u;
is negative for all u> ^ w"P' unless the workers have full bargaining power, 0 = 0.
*" Allowing for unemployment, the outside option would be less than, but still be proportional to
the (average) efficiency wage.
»'See Snaked and Sutton (1984).
*' Binmore (1987).3.6. Conclusions 61
The development of the effective wage does not depend on the contract WIUM- D«»-
pending on the underlying wage formation argument m can, for example, l><- a w> tor
of demand and supply parameters as in Phillips-curve models in the long run, or of
behavioural parameters as in efficiency-wage models where the effort function does
not depend on the contract wage. Consequently, the wage gap is just the calculatory
residual between the two wage levels. These theori«*s therefore fail to explain why
unions and employers' federations attach great im|>ortancc to collective bargaining.
At best, the contract wage hinders the effective wage from attaining its equilibrium
level immediately.'*' However, from a long-run |>crspective this argument should
be void. If the contract wage has indeed no significant influence on effective earn-
ings, it might be doubted whether the wage-drift phenomenon deserves any scientific
interest anyway.
The mark-up hypothesis is therefore more promising. In the reduced form of the
related models the effective wage also depends on the contract wags, IB • u>(m; «>)•
The resulting wage drift equation,
n r. / a
u; - u; = > — . i
does not necessarily imply that wage drift is positive in these models, as the elasticity
of the effective wage with respect to the contract wage might be less than one.
However, as long as ^ is positive, the effective wage is driven by the contract wage
and firms are forced to pay a mark-up. Models with this characteristic are the
search model of Kleinhiickelskoten and Spaetling (1980), the efficiency-wage model
of Schlicht (1992) and the models of Holden (1988, 1989, 1998), Muysken and vim
Veen (1996) and de Gijsel (1996). Though sharing the same reduced form, they an;
distinguished by the assumed engine of wage drift. In terms of their reduced form,
the models' wage function iu(m;u)) and their vector m are different.
In the model of Kleinhiickelskoten and Spaetling, drift is due to incomplete in-
formation of workers and firms about the other side of the labour market. Being the
legal minimum wage, the contract wage truncates the distribution of wage offers.
In this way, it provides information that influences the reservation wage of work-
ers, which in turn will have to be taken into account by the firms. As a result, an
increase in the contract wage will induce an increase in effective wages. As it explic-
itly models the wage formation process on the labour market, this approach might
be seen as a counterfactual agaiast the Phillips-curve theory. Although wages are
"if effective wages do not adapt immediately to their equilibrium level, the wage equation
becomes
u> = it> + A (u>* — ti>),
where w* = u>* (m) is the equilibrium wage and A € [0,1] the adaptation velocity. In such an
environment wage drift is—at least in the short run—equal to
. ^U du;* m, . u>* .
u> - in = A > — m, - A —1»,
*—' dm* to tu
i— i
which is for example equivalent to the drift equation (3.5) on page 37.82 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
market determined, the contract wage matters. It must not be overlooked, however,
that the scope of search models is rather limited. Originally aiming at the anal-
ysis of frictional unemployment, they certainly cannot provide t/ie theory of wage
formation.
In the efficiency-wage model of Schlicht, the contract wage enters the effective-
wage function via the fairness perception (or equivalently. envy) of workers. The
higher a worker's earnings are in comparison with the wage that other comparable
workers receive, and in comparison with the contract wage, the more the worker is
willing to exert. To put it the other way around: an increase in the contract wage
creates a claim to increase the effective wage. If the firm does not give in, workers
are dissatisfied and decrease their effort level. With different groups of workers, once
(he effective wage for one group increases, the fairness argument can cause a wage
gap in the other groii|>s. On the one hand this theory of primary and secondary
drift is able to explain the observed persistence of relative wage structures. On the
other hand it provides one possible explanation for the persistence of wage drift
itself somndiirv drift can spread t.o other firms and other sectors of the economy
ami lin.ilK i' .lire i i lie initiating groups.
Next to I he faiiiH |" i< options, other efficiency-wage arguments could be em-
ployed. In the model ol Ciahlen and Ramser (1987) effort Ls assumed to depend on
the effective wage, the contract wage and the unemployment rate. This is a rather
general approach that is in line with several efficiency-wage arguments. •"*"' On the
one hand their study shows that the Efficiency-wage theory can be a powerful and
flexible instrument for the analysis of the drift phenomenon. On the other hand this
flexibility might easily turn into arbitrariness in economic theorizing.
Finally, in models of central and local bargaining, workers' representatives and
the management of a firm explicitly negotiate a wage gap. In this way, unions can
exert influence on a// levels of the wage setting procedure.
An overview of the different strands of theory is given in table 3.1. Concerning
the described outcomes it should be noted that most of the studies are models of
the wage gap rather than wage drift. In a dynamic environment, the relationship
and Ramser themselves, p. 130, mention the adverse selection, the shirking and the
labour-turnover problem. The main difference to the model of Schlicht (1992) is their assumption
that the contract wage influences effort in two ways: first, it has a direct negative effect on effort
by its impact on the workers' outside option or by creating entitlements to effective-wage increases.
Second, it might have a negative effect on unemployment, which in turn influences effort positively
by reducing the outside option. The effective-wage function is derived as
u> = u><p(l — u), 0' > 0
(Gahlen and Ramser 1987, p. 135), where u is the unemployment rate which depends on a vector of
variableti x and the contract wage, such that ^ > 0. The impact of the contract wage on effective
earnings, jf*-; = ^ — ^' $j* u>, is positive if its direct effect on effort overweighs the indirect effect.
The related wage drift txmation is
d* u /^ 8ui,. du u> A
du <> \^J &r, u 0u> u y3.6. Conclusions
between contract and effective wage might change significantly. The effects of long
term labour relations, repeated negotiations, learning, etc. are beyond the scope of
static models. Moreover, most studies focus on I ho impact of the contract wage
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In the long run wage drift
nullinca the outcome of
collective bargaining. The
Contract wage follow* de-
* valopment of the offortlva
Wage (adaptation hypot h-
<wi«) In the uliort run it
inight inHiH'iici' the effn'-
live waRr
A mark.up, which might
changi- over the bualnoM
cycle, In paid over the con-
tract wage. The contract
wage driven effective earn-
ings pemiHti-ntly.
If the effort or itx argu-
mentN are a function of
the contract wage a mark-
up 18 paid which in turn
might depend on the con-
tract wage.
FirniH pay a mark-up de-
pending on the ili.striliu-
tion of bargaining power
and the throat pointH.
To6/e 5.i: Theories of the wage gap and wage drift and their characteristics.
As we have argued before, a meaningful theory of the wage gap and wage drift
should focus on the mark-up hypothesis, if only for the reason that it in common
wisdom that the contract wage matters. Of the theories discussed in this chapter, the
efficiency-wage models and models of local wage bargaining seem to have the greatest
potential to provide an explanation for the occurrence of wage gaps. Both stories
are appealing because they are backed by everyday observations of the behaviour of
firms and unions. An integrative approach therefore seems to be promising.
However, the discussion has also shown that the models have their weak points.
Chapter 4 is related to one problem of local wage bargaining, namely that the
outcomes of the related models are very sensitive to the assumptions about the
union's threat points. Local wage bargaining models also fail to explain why firms64 Chapter 3. Theories of the wage gap and wage drift: a survey
do not strongly resist a second round of bargaining that obviously can only reduce
their profits. The answer that unions enforce these negotiations by reducing workers'
effort and blackmailing the firms only shifts the problem to another level. The second
part of thin thesis (chapters 6 and 7) deals with this problem by showing that a two-
tier wage setting system can enhance the efficiency of employment relations.
All the models developed in thin book use some kind of efficiency-wage argument.
In order to avoid the problem of formulating arbitrary assumptions about how the
contract wage enters the effort function, all but chapter 6 explicitly derive the effort
function. Especially chapters 4 and 5 are based explicitly on the shirking model.
This choice in not motivated by the conviction that fairness considerations, as in
tlir- model of Schlicht (1092), are necessarily wrong, but by the fact that shirking
models do not only provide a convincing story for an economist trained to believe
in l ;ii i> >n.il agents, but also oj>en a convenient way to explain the influence of unions
on effort, as is shown in chapter 5.Part I
Bargaining in efficiency wage
models
65JI!The following two chapters 4 and 5 analyse bargaining situations between (Wai)
unions and firms when efficiency wages are paid. In both chapters it is assumed that
firms take the incentive problem into account by paying efficiency wages. Chapter 4
focuses on the problem that has already been touched on in chapter .1: what de-
termines the distribution of bargaining power in local wage bargaining, and what
are the consequences of different assumptions nlxnit the bargaining game for I lie
outcome?
Chapter 5 abandons the assumption that unions only bargain over wages, but
introduces effort as a second object of negotiations. However, unions do not l>ni unin
directly over effective wages and effort levels, but over a contract wage and a iHinnre
effort level that determine the shape of the no-shirking condition. Though chapter 5
provides an explanation for the occurrence of a wage gap that stands on its own, iu
reference effort level can also help to solve the problem of the determination of the
workers' threat point in local wage bargaining.
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Threat points in local wage bargaining when firms
pay efficiency wages'
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In a lot of European countries wages are determined by a two-tiered bargaining
process. First, nation- or industrywide negotiations HIKHII the contract waged take
place. Afterwards, on the individual firm level, workers or their representatives and
the management bargain, explicitly or implicitly, about a mark-up on thin contract
wage—the wage gap.
This chapter focuses on local wage bargaining, the second stage of the two-tier
negotiations, and discusses the problem how rents are shared between a firm and its
employees in the process of bargaining.
Necessarily, wage bargaining on the local level must obey different rules than
collective bargaining. The main reason is that collective agreements usually provide
for a peace clause, which prohibits strikes and lockouts during the contract period.
The bargaining parties have to find other measures to put pressure on their respective
opponent. For theoretical models of local wage bargaining this leads to the question
which assumptions about the parties' threat points are appropriate. There is a
consensus in the literature that the firm's threat point is given by the contract wage
from the collective agreement, simply because the contract wage serves as a legal
minimum wage. However, the assumptions about the workers' threat point diverge
greatly. ^ Moene (1988) and Holden (1988) assume that workers can cut back their
effort to a certain extent and work to rule during a clash, while Muysken and van
Veen (1996) criticize just this "exogeneity of disagreement". Instead, they use an
efficiency-wage argument, assuming that one and the same no-shirking condition
applies during negotiations and after an agreement has been reached. In this case, a
reduced effort is the result of the firm's cutting back wages to the contractual level.
Finally, de Gijsel (1996). though taking on the efficiency wage argument, argues that
during a clash over the effective wage the effort function may shift to a lower level,
reflecting—as in Holden's model—workers' dissatisfaction with a disagreement. The
'An earlier version of this chapter, de Gijsel and Olthoff (1998) has been published in Haaiinger
and Stonner-Venkatarama (1998), v4jpecl» o/ tAe £>»tnfctjrton o/ /ru»m«, pp. 441-465.
''See also the discussion in chapter 3.
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extent of deviation from the normal effort level Ls considered to be a sign of the
workers' bargaining power.
The discussion of the different models in chapter 3 has shown that the outcome of
bargaining turns out to be highly sensitive to the models' different assumptions about
the threat jKjints, which are, next to the degree of impatience, the only variables
in which bargaining power finds an expression in these models. Furthermore, only
little attention is paid to the bargaining structure.
In order to fill this apparent gap, this chapter focuses explicitly on the bargaining
process, while allowing for different constellations of threat points. The basic idea is
that bargaining power influences the outcome of negotiations in different ways. On
th> one hand, it finds its expression in the disagreement payoffs of the bargaining
paihtM Like in the models of Holden and de Gijsel, it Ls assumed that the firm
has to pay the contract, wage, whereas the workers can vary their effort while there
is a disagreement. On the other hand, the distribution of bargaining power also
influences t he process of bargaining itself. The model of this chapter uses a non-
cooperative Hubinstein-like bargaining model'* in which Nature chooses the opponent
who has the right to make a wage prc>i>osal up to a certain probability which reflects
that opponent's activity in the negotiations.
This set-up has two advantages. First, it will be shown, that this probability has
a strong impact on the outcome of bargaining. The more often a party can propose
a wage, the higher its payoff will be when an agreement is reached."* Second, by
assuming that the right to make a wage proposal depends on a certain probability,
the problem of the last mover advantage is avoided, which otherwise occurs in finite-
horizon Rubinstein bargaining models.''
The chapter is organized as follows. In the following section 4.2 the payoff func-
tions of the workers and the firm are derived using an efficiency-wage argument. Sec-
tion 4.3 introduces the structure of the bargaining game and discusses the outcome
of bargaining for different constellations of the contract wage, the profit maximizing
wage and the disagreement payoffs. Finally, the conclusion compares these results
with those of Holden (1988), Muysken and van Veen (1996) and de Gijsel (1996).
4.2 THE PAYOFF FUNCTION OF THE FIRM AND THE WORKERS
^.i.l I7»e no-.s/uHktnp condition
In tliis section the payoffs of the firm and its workers are derived using an efficiency-
wago argument. It is assumed that the relationship between wage and effort which is
calculated in the following holds in a situation of agreement about the wage. Notice,
Rubinstein (1982).
*Tb Illustrate this, assume that one opponent can make all proposals during the bargain. Hence,
the passive party can only accept or reject them. Then the optimal strategy for the active party
is to propose a wage which on the one hand is acceptable for its opponent, but on the other hand
maximises its own payoff.
*S«* Hoel (1987).4.2. The payoff function of the firm and the workers 71
that for a situation of disagreement different payoff functions are assumed.
will be derived in section 4.3.1.
Assume that all workers are identical, so that we can restrict our analysis to a
representative worker. When she is employed her utility in a givi n pen.ul i> i-.iven by
the difference between the effective wage u' she earns and the rllmt i lUinuiuUil by
her employer. In the case she is not employed she receives some payment «, which
we assume to be constant. Let furthermore ir, r,a € R,{.
Each worker begins her life being employed and maximizes her utility over an
indefinitely long lifetime by deciding whether to be a shirker, which means to work
with an effort lower than f, or not to shirk and, hence, to supply r. In contrast to
the literature about efficiency wages*' we thus assume that an employer considers
shirking not to imply an effort of zero but any effort which is lower than the one
the employer demands. However, it is clear that also in this case it. is optimal for
a worker who once has decided to shirk only to offer an effort of zero. Using this
assumption we can now derive the maximal effort related to a given wage rate the
employer can demand from her workers without making them shirk.
When a worker is caught as a shirker, she will lx> fired and receive the (net)
payment a henceforth, which can be an unemployment benefit or an expected wage
in other firms. Hence, in a period of employment a non-shirking worker has a utility
of it' — e, whereas in a period when she is employed but shirks, her utility equals tu,
and finally in a period of unemployment it equals a.
Let <5 be the worker's time preference factor and p the probability that a shirker
is caught in one subperiod. Then, the present value of the expected life-time utility
of a non-shirking worker is
E[t/*] = f>(™-e) = fff (4-1)
and
E[tfr] = £>[(! ~ (1 -P)*)a + (1 -p)'H = j4f + i ™~° , (4.2)
is the corresponding value for a shirking worker.*
A worker will decide not to shirk if this grants her at least not less utility,
E [f//v] > E [I/s]- This implies for the given wage rate
L «) = 7(i» - «)• (4.3)
Hence, the highest feasible effort an employer can demand from hLs workers without
making them shirk is e = 7(u; - a), where j_^ has been substituted by 7.
^Compare for example Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
"in the last equation it is implicitly assumed that a worker, in the same (mib)period she is
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Inserting this relationship into the utility function for one subperiod of a non-
shirking worker gives
« = (1 ~7)w + 7«- (4.4)
This meant* that the workers' utility in agreement is an increasing function in the
wage rate. Therefore, workers will, in order to maximize their utility, strive for an
effective wage as high as possible.
^.2.2 77»e proMem o/ tfie /inn
Once efficiency wages are introduced, there is no simple monotonically decreasing
relationship l>etween wages and profit anymore. We normalize the price of the firm's
output to one, and assume that the firm produces with labour as the only variable
production factor using a Col>b-Douglas technology. Then, profits in one (sub)period
nrr given by the difference Iwtween total revenues and labour costs
IT = /I (eZ,)" - u>L, (4.5)
where /t is a factor representing total factor productivity, L is the (fixed) number of
workers,'* and a € (0, I] is the production elasticity of labour. Substituting (4.3) with
sign of equality into the profit function (4.5), the latter also reduces to a function
only in nv, as long as L is assumed to be fixed:
7T = A [-yL (w - a)]" - u;L (4.6)
In contrast to the objective function of the workers, there is no simple monotonic
relationship between the effective wage and the profit here. The profit function (4.6)
is first, increasing in »», has a maximum at some wage u;*, and is decreasing for wages
higher than this. The profit, maximizing wage u;" is
^.. (4.7)
The related profit is
7
Unfortunately, the functional form of the profit function (4.6) does not allow to
solve explicit ly for t he bargaining outcome in the following section. Because just the
t>argaiuing game is at the very centre of the model, two linear approximations TT will
be used instead, having the zeros (u>o,0) and (wj},0) ,u>jj > ^o **"* *he maximum
(tu*,ff*) with 7T in common:
I *•• """'U. for ii» .f HI*
(4.8)
"We c«n call the product <•/. the effective amount of labour. As Z. is fixed, labour input is
variable only because effort r can be changed.4.3. Local wage bargaining
Note that because of the concavity of IT. its approximation ir underaetimatea the
true values except for the three points mentioned above. Nevertheless, the basic
characteristics of the original profit function are preserved. For an illustration see
figure 4.1.
The profit function 7r and its approximation Jr.
4.3 LOCAL WAGE BARGAINING
77ie structure
Consider the time span [0,1] between two subsequent central wage negotiations. At
time /i = 0 a contract wage u) is negotiated on a central level by firms' and workers'
representatives and it will be accepted by all firms and workers as a minimum wage
during [0,1]. At /i = 1 central bargaining on u) starts again.
Assume that after the contract wage has been negotiated, an individual firm
and its workers can immediately enter into bargaining about the effective wage.
Negotiations take place at most at T + 1 points in time during the interval [0,1],
depending on whether an agreement is reached or not. The points in time at which
negotiations take place are assumed to be equally spread over [0,1]. When the firm
and its workers meet at f € [0, T] there is a probability 0 respectively 1—0 that the
firm or the workers will make a wage proposal. It is plausible that a bargaining party
will take the initiative if she has bargaining power: in this case she knows that there
is a chance that the other party will have to accept her wage proposal. Therefore,
the probabilities 0 and 1 — 0 can be interpreted as a measure of the opponents'74 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
bargaining power.
When negotiation* on the effective wage start immediately after the contract
wage has Iwen bargained (i.e., at /i = t = 0), it may happen that both parties
achieve an agreement right away, without even entering a round of bargaining. In
thin case the firm will pay either the contract wage ti) or the profit maximizing wage
w*, depending on which of these wage rates is higher:"
w = max{tZ), u/*}
The wage u; will be paid throughout the period until central bargaining starts again.
If, however, the workers or the firm do not agree upon this wage rate, one of the
parties can initiate negotiations by making another proposal. If this Ls rejected at
/ (I m-KntiatioiiM will 1M- interrupted until f = 1. During the period of disagreement
the firm has to pay a wage rate u/"" which equals the contract wage:
u/"" = u)
Workers on the other hand have the opportunity to deviate from their normal effort
(compart* inequality (4.3)) in a situation of disagreement within certain limits.'" The
effort level during negotiations is denoted by p"'"*. Next to that, both the firm and
the workers encounter some constant bargaining costs c^ respectively c^ per point
in time of disagreement. These can for instance represent the costs of discussing the
other party's wage proposal, organizing and calling meetings, etc. Then in one point
in time the disagreement payoffs of the firm and the workers can be written as
TT'"" = i4(e'""L)" - «>'""£ " c*\ (4.9)
„•"• = «,««• - e<"» - c*. (4.10)
Now consider an arbitrarily chosen time f € [0, T] and assume that at all preced-
ing times t he proposals have been rejected so that bargaining continues and both the
firm and the workers have earned up to now their disagreement payoffs TT^" and u^'*
given in equations (4.9) respectively (4.10). In f either the firm (with probability 0)
or the workers (with probability 1-0) may propose a new effective wage u;f respec-
tively w^\ If the other bargaining party accepts, the negotiations will end, and the
proposal will be the valid wage for the remaining time [f, T] in which the firm and the
workers will earn the related payoffs JT («'[ ) , u (uf) respectively TT (U^) , « (u^ )•
n\i.-i>n «ln (lie tirm docs not choose for the lowest possible wage is the efficiency-wage
it A> lom; .!.- u>* > u> the firm will pay voluntarily the profit maximizing wage. If ii> > u>*
it Irns to p.i\ ill. luilf wage because it is the minimum wage agreed upon in central bargaining.
' \,'t, ili.it .111.• i the central bargaining has ended, in most countries no industrial actions
an .«llo\\«-.l ll.w.v.T. normally the effort level is only fixed implicitly. During a disagreement
woi kri - mix u i i k li'vs intensively for instance work to rule—in order to express their impatience,
dissal isliu I ion or IM-I to put pressure on the firm. This can hardly be interpreted as a contradiction
to the effort function III-IIMH) in -i-t tixn 4.2, because in the case considered here, a deviation from the
"normal" etfoit l.\. 1 i- not tin- division of an individual worker (as was the decision about shirking)
hut of tin- colWvt ivt of workers An alternative interpretation—in line with the shirking argument—
is that dissatisfaction about the clash increases the disutility of effort during a disagreement.4.3. Local wage bargaining 75
If however the proposal is rejected, the negotiations are interrupted; firm and worker
receive their disagreement payoff in time (, and a new round of bargaining is entered
in time i + 1. The structure of this local wage bargaining game is also depict«xl in
figure 4.2.
-.("Si
Fixing the tariff wage i£> in central bargaining
If u> is rejected, then first proposal in local bargaining
( = 1 - - If w^ or U>Q^ is rejected, then second proposal
T - 1 - - If u'f j or tuj? g is rejected, then new wage proposal
T - - If w£_j or Wpl j is rejected, then new wage proposal
-1- New central wage bargaining
Figure ^.£: The time structure of the bargaining game
In order to preclude any misconceptions it should be noted that the assumption
of perfect information implies that firm and workers will typically have no intend
in an unnecessary prolongation of the negotiations. In any time t in which negoti-
ations take place, both parties will compare their possible agreement payoffs with
the expected payoff of enduring another time of disagreement and possibly achieving
a more favourable result in the future. Because a disagreement is costly they will
attempt to reach a mutually acceptable agreement as soon as possible. As will be
shown in the following subsection the equilibrium solution of the bargaining game
described above is the first wage proposal, be it by the firm or by the workers. This
proposal is accepted as the effective wage henceforth. So actually negotiations do
not take place in times < > 0 at all. However, in order to be able to calculate the
optimal initial wage proposal the bargaining parties have to know how to act in
every contingency that mi^/it arise. That is, they have to go through ai/ points in
time £ 6 [0, T] in their mind, playing the bargaining game virtually."
"See also Binmore (1987) who states that in this kind of bargaining models only "harmless"76 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
The next subsections discuss the outcome of bargaining for different constella-
tions of the disagreement payoff of the workers u''"*, the contract wage iD and the
profit maximizing wage u>*. As it will turn out, only for the first scenario to be
considered a general solution for all values of 0 can be given. For the other scenarios
the analysis has to be confined to the extreme cases that one of the opponents has
the "full bargaining power", so that 0 equals either zero or one.
Since the profit maximizing wage w* is dominating all wage levels smaller than
w*, wo can confine the discussion to the case that all wage proposals will be in the
area [i/>\ i/tf], which is on the decreasing part of the profit function.'^ Thus, even
in the case of the contract wage being below the efficiency wage, only this area is
relevant for bargaining.
^.5.2 Scenario /: u**" > mai{u(ti)) ,u(u>*)}
The disagreement payoffs of the bargaining parties can be interpreted as their threat
points. As can bo seen in figure 4.3, with the parameter constellation u''" >
max {u (IT) , u(u»*)} to be considered here, these threat points determine the bound-




Combinations of profit and utility in scenario 1. The bold area on the
graph of the profit function depicts the possible outcomes of local wage
bargaining when the proposals are only restricted by the disagreement
payoffs and «*''* > max {u (ir) ,u («•*)}. Then a wage gap occurs irre-
spectively of the outcome of local bargaining. In order to illustrate the
parameter constellation profits are expressed in terms of workers' utility
At each point in time f € [0, T] either the firm or the workers can make a wage
proposal with the probabilities mentioned above. If this proposal is accepted by the
assumptions have to hold for thr existence of unique subgame-perfoct equilibria.
'''I.e.. this part of the profit function is the Pareto frontier.4.3. Local wage bargaining TT
other party, it will be the valid effective wage u> for the following periods until the
central bargaining starts again. The related payoffs are given by the equations (4.4)
and (4.6) in the previous section.
In principle, the initial (and acceptable) wage proposal—i.e., the equilibrium
solution of this game -can be found by backward induction, considering all wage
offers and demands in each point in time. However, in order to keep things simple,
a different but nevertheless equivalent method is used here.
Consider an arbitrarily chosen time f € [0. T - 1] and assume that all prior
proposals have been rejected so that bargaining takes place in this point in time and
both the firm and the workers have up to now earned their disagreement payoffs TT'""
and u'*'" given in equations (4.9) and (4.10) respectively."
Now the firm, if rejecting a proposal ti>^' made by the workers and entering
another period of disagreement, expects future payoffs to have a present value of
E[M ..... ^
1 — (5 ifo — w*
with <S being the discount rate for both, workers and the firm. In contrast, if the
firm accepts the workers' proposal u^ the present value of the its profit equals
1 -




The same reasoning also holds for the workers. By rejecting the firm's proposal
''Recall that in equilibrium no negotiations will occur at points in time ( > 0 because the firm
or the workers will make acceptable wage proposals already at ( = 0. However, we need to know
the sequence of wage proposals firm and worker would make at any time r 6 [1, T) in order to be
able to solve for the proposals at t = 0.78 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
u/f the present value of their expected future utilities equals . .,•.,; .-<;
The present value of the utility resulting from the firm's offer is . .•••••;
T , _ xT-i+1
Again, thl» hM to be greater than or equal to the expected utility when rejecting
the pro|>o8al:
T=<+1
The two equations (4.11) and (4.12) form a system of indifference equations with
variable coefficients,
whore for convenience * = " ,*~^° and * = (l - ^ J IUQ + ^r-«>* have been set.'*
The general solutions are'''
(4.14)
'*• i» equiO to the wage that makes the workers' utility after an agreement has been reached
<H|iial to their disagreement utility, and <i> is equal to the wage that makes the firm's agreement
profit txjual to its disagreement profit. Consequently, • is the greatest possible wage and • the
lowvst possible wage firm mut workers can ever agree upon. Notice that • is always greater than
the contract wage ti>: due to the bargaining cost and the workers' ability to lower their effort
during disagreement, the disagreement profit cannot be greater than the agreement profit at the
contract wage, *•"• < »(»&) «a #(%&) = »r' J!if_\". • Because • is decreasing in »«•" it follows that
( ) -3 + ^-* > (»- *^H + *£*• = *•
'""•For the derivation of the solution see the appendix of this chapter on page 87 ff.43. Local wage bargaining
with ur* and u^ being the proposals the firm respectively the workers would make
in the last point in time 7' if they can take the initiative. As was already stated,
with the parameter constellation considered here, these last wage proposals are just
bound by the threat point.v A^uine that the ttarRiiin reached 7". then the linn will
have to propose some wage u^- which causes the workers to lx> at least iiuiilfereiit
between accepting it or continuing the disagreement until the next cent ml wage
negotiations begin. Hence,
a» wf = " j'_~ ^° 5 •• (4.15)
A similar argument'" holds for the workers' proposal, resulting in'*
(
1
1 )u$ + u;' = *. (4.1fi)
* / f*
Inserting (4.15) and (4.16) into the general solutions (4.13) and (4.14) for u;£ and
u;^, i.e., for the first wage proposals made by the firm respectively the workers in
time £ = 0 after having declared the disagreement, we get
»), (4.17)
(4.18)
Hence, the initial wage proposals are a weighted average of the wages $ and <t,
that are related to the threat points.'" The higher the bargaining power of one of
"'In order to show that this argument really implies the firm's optimal wago proposal, consider
the following game for time T:
1. The firm proposes some wage Wj?, which can be higher, lew or equal to u>, from equation
(4.15).
2. The workers decide about accepting this proposal or rejecting it.
3. If the workers decide to accept, the payoffs are u (Wf) and TT (W£), otherwise u'"" and ir<"«.
Solving for the outcome of this game by backward induction will lead to ID.J. from equation (4.15).
A corresponding argument holds for the workers' last proposal.
'' Note that because of the concavity of the profit function JT'*'" is actually related to two different
wages, unless jr**'" = jr*. The workers will, however, decide for the higher wage rate in order to
maximize their payoffs.
'"Note that the proposals of the firm and the workers do not converge, even if the number T
of potential bargaining times approaches infinity. As a consequence, there is a kind of first mover
advantage. Yet, the expected value of the first wage proposals is an average of 4> and * weighted
by the probability 0:
Note, that this is exactly the outcome of the corresponding Nash bargaining game. However, for
the scenarios 2 and 3 (subsections 4.4 and 4.5) the results will differ.80 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
the parties, the closer its initial wage proposal is to the disagreement payoff of its
opponent. A party with full bargaining power is able to push its opponent on its
reservation, i.e., its disagreement payoff. If the workers have full bargaining power,
0 = 0, their initial proposal will be
(
—din \ _di»
In the cast! the firm has full bargaining power, 0 = 1, it will propose
this is the lowest possible effective wage in this scenario, it can be concluded
thai tlirrc will IM> a wagr gap irrespectively of the outcome of bargaining, unless the
firm has lull bargaining power, 0=1, and the disagreement utility is exactly equal
to the (agreement) utility at the contract wage, u^'" = (1 - 7)u> - 7a = ti> — e(u;).
In tins ciiv. the workers' bargaining costs would exactly offset the utility gain from
supplying le.s.s effort, during a disagreement.
In general, the wage gap is influenced by the disagreement payoffs. The higher
the disagreement payoff of the workers and the lower that of the firm, the greater
will be the bargained wage and consequently the wage gap. Because ,),"!H.., ^,'ji. > 0
'"'d j^rfe. Tpfc < 0,'" the firm will strive to pay a wage as low as possible and the
workers will strive to work as less as possible during a disagreement.
^..9.3 Scenario 2: u(u>) > mar{ti''",u(u>*)}
Compared to the first scenario the case to be considered here is complicated, because
now the level of the contract wage is decisive for the outcome of bargaining, too.*"
Since the contract wage is accepted by both opponents to be the minimum wage, it
is the lower boundary of all wage proposals (compare figure 4.4).
As a consequence, the workers' payoff related to the lowest possible wage offer of
the firm deviates from her disagreement payoff, and it is impossible to solve for the
outcome of bargaining in general terms. To show this, consider first the last point
iu time 7'. The firm, if it is its turn to make a proposal, has to offer at least
whereas the workers would propose
_dis
' - " » •> ^
>» Recall that*. !!^12,# = (1 - ^) u,a + ^l*u-and u^» = u,^»-e<""-cW, A
*'Note, that because of the monotonicity of the workers' utility function this scenario holds for






Combinations of profit and utility in scenario 2. The lx>l<i urea on I In*
graph of the profit function depicts the possible outcomes of local wage
bargaining when the proposals are restricted by the contract wage w>
and the disagreement payoff of the firm 7r''"*. In this scenario, whether
a wage gap occurs or not depends only on the bargaining power of the
opponents.
(compare (4.16)). In T - 1 the firm has to propose a wage making the workers
indifferent between accepting or rejecting it. It follows
"f-1 > (4.19)
Note, that Q is "acceptable" for the workers since they cannot expect to improve
by rejecting it. However, if w > Q it is not "legal", because the contract wage is
the minimum wage rate. Depending on whether the contract wage is greater or less
than the right-hand side of inequality (4.19) the wage proposal of the firm will be
? if Q > u>
i) else
This ambiguity of the firm's wage proposal can also occur in points in time t < T— 1.
It is more likely in periods close to T and the greater the difference between the
di._
contract wage u; and * = j ? is.
For this reason, we can only derive the outcomes of bargaining for the cases in
which the opponents have full bargaining power. A solution for values of 0 other
than 0 or 1 can only be found numerically.
Consider first the firm. If 0 = 1 it will make a proposal in each point in time
until an agreement is reached. Since their disagreement payoff is lower than the82 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
utility related to the contract wage, the workers cannot improve by rejecting a firm's
proposal. This can be seen by inequality (4.19), which Ls satisfied by u;f _, = ti) when
0=1. The same holds for all other points in time. Therefore, in < = 0 the firm will
make a proposal
u;£(0 = 1) = ti>, (4.20)
which will IM> accepted by the workers.
In contrast, the outcome for 0 = 0, when the workers have full bargaining power,
ifl the same as in scenario 1, because they do not face any legal restrictions on their
wage proposals. Thus, the worker proposes a wage that makes the firm's profit equal
to its disagreement profit,'"
1-—J «,? + —«;• 1-—J «,? + —«;•>«;. (4.21)
We can conclude that a wage gap will occur unless the firm has full bargaining
power, 0 -- 1. However, the difference U'tw«-en the contract and the bargained wage
will be smaller than in scenario 1 if the firm can propose wf = u) in points in time
t e [r, 7'] for r > 0.
^.5.^ Scenario 5: u («;*)> maz{u''",u(t/))}
Formally this scenario is identical with scenario 2. Consider the proposal the firm
would make at the last point in time 7\ Although it does not need to suggest more
than the contract wage or * = " ,_~^" in order to be accepted, it will propose the
higher wage »>* in order to maximize its profits. Now a similar reasoning as in the
previous subsection holds for the firm's proposals. There may be points in time
t € [r, r],r > 0 in which u/f = u;* is acceptable for the workers. Furthermore, if
the firm has full bargaining power, 0=1, the wage to be agreed upon is the profit
maximizing wage Htjj = !«>*.'•"
However, in tins scenario a wage gap will occur in any case due to the underlying
assumption about the parameter constellation, u(tt;*) > max {«•*'",u(u>)}, as can
be seen in figure 4.5.
"Since in scenario 1 the outcome of our model and the corresponding Nash bargaining game
were equivalent (compare footnote 18), one could think that this also may be the case here. In
fact, maximizing the Nash maximand O = (w(u>) - *""") (u(u>) - u(ti>))'~* over ID leads tom =
0u> + (1 - #)•, which is a weighted average of the first wage proposals (4.20) and (4.21). However,
with those it was assumed that the firm respectively the workers have full bargaining power. Second,
the outcome of the Nash bargaining game is differentiable in 0, whereas we concluded that the
outcome of our bargaining game in this scenario is not.
•"Of course the outcome for the workers having full bargaining power is again equal to that in
scenario 1:43. Local bargaining
Figure ^.5: Combinations of profit and utility in scenario 3. The tnild area on the
graph of the profit function depicts the {Mxwible outcomes of local wage
bargaining when the proposals are restricted by the profit maximizing
wage tu* and the disagreement payoff of the firm 7r'''\ In this case a
wage gap always occurs.
^.5.5 The decision about
Having solved for the outcome of a possible bargain, it will now be shown that local
wage bargaining will occur under virtually any circumstances.
Recall that without local bargaining the firm would voluntarily pay u) = max {«>, «/*}
(see section 4.3.1). Both the firm and the workers will agree upon this wage, if they
do not expect to be better off by rejecting it and entering a disagreement. In fact,
the results of the preceding subsections suggest that only the workers can have an
interest in local wage bargaining, while the firm's profits will be reduced if it is
forced to pay a mark-up on the contract wage. Nevertheless, also the firm might call
for local wage bargaining in order to prevent the workers from gaining a first-mover
advantage in the negotiations.
In spite of the assumption that the right to make a wage proposal in some point in
time is assigned by certain probabilities, it Ls reasonable to assume that this rule does
not apply for the initial round of bargaining. Instead, assume that when only one
party asks for bargaining, it can force negotiations by imposing disagreement costs
on its opponent (and on itself), and that it has the right to make the initial proposal
tt'o respectively w^. If both parties ask for bargaining the right to make a proposal
is stochastic as before. Then the parties compare the present value of their payoffs
from tl' with the expected payoffs from the bargained wage, #TT (U;^ ) + (1 - 0)7r (u>*)
Since in any case ti> is the lower boundary for the outcome of local bargaining,
the workers will always have an incentive to ask for local wage negotiations unless
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The firm on the other hand cannot be better off if it comes to negotiations.
Nevertheless, it knows that if only the workers claim for negotiations, they will have
a first-mover advantage by making the first proposal and thereby determining the
effective; wage.''' If however also the firm claims for bargaining, it will have the
right to make a proposal with probability 0 and can expect a lower wage than when
leaving the initiative to the workers alone. Hence, when the firm knows that the
workers will claim for negotiations, its best strategy is to do so, too.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has shown that a wage gap occurs as a result of local wage negotiations
for almost all possible parameter constellations under consideration. Only in case the
firm has full bargaining power and, at the same moment, does not voluntarily pay a
wage higher than the contract wage from collective bargaining in order to maximize
its profits, the effective wage will equal the contract wage. However, under these
presumably exceptional circumstances no local wage bargaining will take place at
nil, wince neither I lie worlfiTx nor tli«> firm rnn ovp«>ft In }w hotter off hy nngotinting
The results of this chapter are related to those of Holden (1988), Muysken and van
Veen (1 996) and de Gijsel (1996). As it was already stated in the introduction, a basic
characteristic of those models is that their to some respect highly different results are
mainly due to their assumptions especially about the disagreement payoffs, whereas
only little attention is being paid to bargaining power and its effect on the structure
of bargaining.
As it is shown in this chapter, their results can be derived as special solutions
of a local wage bargaining game in which the firm faces a shirking problem and
knows that its workforce will work to rule in the case of an unresolved wage conflict.
Given the specific bargaining structure the different results depend essentially on the
relation between the workers' net utility of the exogenously given contract wage, the
technologically determined efficiency wage and the workers' disagreement utility.
Holden (1988) does not include efficiency wages in his model.^ Hence, neglecting
the existence of a profit maximizing wage his profit function is strictly decreasing in
the wage rate. As the lower boundary of the outcome of bargaining is given by the
tarilF wage ti\ his model is best reflected by scenario 2 of the model of this chapter,
though hero the assumption that underlies the profit function is different. Indeed,
Holden\s result about the occurrence of a wage gap is the same as in scenario 2:
there will be a wage gap unless the firm has full bargaining power.
Muvskou and van Veen (1996). considering the exogenously given effort level
in disagreement as "a drawback of the Moene/Holden type of models", assume a
functional relationship between the wage rate and the effort that holds in agreement
™ Recall that the first wage proposal UNI will be the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game
if both parties are acting rationally (are also section 4.3.1), and that the first wage proposal of the
firm will always be lower than that of the workers.
"However, effort docs play a role, because he assumes that in disagreement workers can choose
a lower offort than normal.4.4. Conclusions 88
as well as in a disagreement situation.*'' The essence of this assumption is that
bargaining is not costly: the payoffs of firm and workers during a disagreement are
not reduced by a lower effort or other bargaining cost. A wage gap can therefore
only occur if it leads to a Pareto-improvement. Consequently, two cases can lie
distinguished in their model. The first, with the profit maximizing wage being
higher than the tariff wage (u;* > ti>), can l>e compared to scenario 3 and leads
to exactly the same result: a wage gap will occur, liecause the tirm voluntarily
pays a higher wage than the tariff wage in order to maximize its profits. For the
contrary case, ii> > tr*. Muysken ami van Veen conclude that no wage gap will occur,
whatever the bargaining power of the workers is. Like in de Gijsel's (liMMi) model,
the related result in thus chapter is different: this case is again best descril>ed by
scenario 2. With the workers' bargaining power being alxw zero, the bnrgaineti
wage will always be higher than the contract wage because the workers can impose
costs of disagreement on the firm. In contrast to the claim of Muysken and van
Veen, there is apparently no reason why the contract wage should always In* 1M>1OW
the profit maximizing wage.
Next to the parameter constellation* whtrh run »lr*»«Hv rw» fntmH in tn«» #»»rH»»r
models, this chapter has identified another one, that is described in scenario 1. In
contrast to the other scenarios, here the outcome of bargaining does not depend
on the constellation of the tariff wage and the profit maximizing wage, but only on
the disagreement payoffs of the bargaining parties.^'' Then a wage gap will occur,
apart from the extremely unlikely case in which, simultaneously, the firm has full
bargaining power, ancf the union cannot impose any bargaining cost on the firm,
i.e., u(tD) = u**'* <=> u> = 3>.
After having assessed the different parameter constellations in local wage bar-
gaining, the question arises whether they are all relevant. Taking into account that
in central wage bargaining unions negotiate with employer federations, which rep-
resent different firms with different profit functions, the answer is that most likely
none of the scenarios can be excluded a priori.
Nevertheless, the determination of the disagreement payoffs remains a problem in
models of local wage bargaining. Though the probabilities 0 and 1-6" are important
expressions of the firm's respectively the workers' bargaining power, as they influence
not only the outcome but also the structure of negotiations, it is clear that the choice
of the disagreement wage u/''" and effort e**'" also has a strong impact because of
the influence of these variables on the disagreement payoffs. While it seems to be
quite reasonable to set u;'''" = ti>," the choice of e**™ is still prone to arbitrariness.
"In terms of the model of this chapter this would mean u*"' = (1 - 7)u/"*'" + -ya,ir*"' =
J4 [7£(U><''" - a)]™ — u)"*"£.. This assumption has an important shortcoming: as long as the firm
can set ui**" = u;", there is only one possible outcome of bargaining—the profit maximizing wage,
since it is the only acceptable wage for both, workers and the firm, in this case. Once bargaining
costs are introduced such that especially jr**" < 7r(tu"), bargained effective wages higher than u>*
are possible.
•^However, due to the assumption that the firm has to pay the contract wage in disagreement,
U' has some influence on the bargained effective wage.
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It in likely that there is a lower boundary of the disagreement effort, ejjjf,,. Since
industrial actions are not allowed in most countries after a tariff wage has been set,
'•iii"n "'*y k*-' technologically given and represent, for example, work-to-rule. The real
disagreement effort must then be somewhere between «„,'"„ and e(tt>). But though,
at first sight, workers have an incentive to choose for a disagreement effort as low
as possible, they may face some obstacles. First, it may worsen the atmosphere of
negotiations, lead to a breach of trust and cause the firm to make less concessions in
Int. i n<yotiations. Second, if having high bargaining power the workers must take
itiin ;i<< omit that the firm may be forced to shut down if the bargained effective wage
implies negative profits. Hence, self-restraint with respect to e**'* can be necessary in
order to prevent the firm's disagreement payoff from falling below a certain threshold.
It follows that >I1HO the choice of r'"'" is an expression of bargaining power and it seems
as if this variable is far away from t>eing unidimensional as is assumed implicitly in
most of the literature alxmt bargaining.
Yet, the solution might be found on another level. This chapter has focussed on
local wage l>nrK>iiniug and ignored the presumable interdependence between local
and central negotiations. However, if the workers' threat in local bargaining really
consists of work-to-rw/e, i.e., "work according to working rules" (Moene 1988), it
is unlikely that the disagreement payoff is just technologically given. Rather, it is
very probable that the parties to collective bargaining on the centralized level have
a stake in their determination. The following chapter, though it does not deal with
local bargaining, might shed some light on this problem.
has to pay the last period's effective wage u>_i during a disagreement.4.A. Appendix 87
4.A APPENDIX SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS (4.11) AND (4.12)
The two equations (4.11) and (4.12) form a system of difference equations with variable
but known coefficients,
"
where we have set * = ""*," ^° and • = (l - ^ry) u>o + UT^rjW*- Subtracting the first
from the second equation and rearranging we get
iv 1 -<$
Notice the implication of this equations: the differences between the wage proposals of firm
and worker increase the longer the negotiations go on, but the difference does not vanish
for < close to zero.
Except of the changing time indices, the same relation must hold for the next point of
time < + 1 :
1 -<5 ^ 1 -<*
Resubstituting this into the original difference equations leads to a system of two unjoined
difference equations:
»' = i-"/-«!•*"£• + i ,^-.^i I* + (1 -«)«(•- *)] (4.23)
I* + «(• -
Because the coefficients are not constant over time, each single equation will be solved by
developing the series. Consider first equation (4.23) for ( = T — 1,
and insert this into the related equation for t = T — 2,88 Chapter 4. Threat points in local wage bargaining
Continuing, we get for each time 1 =• •
1 -<J 1 - <5 r-i-i
U>f = i ==—rrr^'-'tOT + t r=r—-r [• + (1
Fx|uation (4.24) i» symmetric, go that we immediately can concludeCHAPTER 5
Bargaining over the effort function
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter studies a possible role of trade unions in a shirking model. The .shirking
approach of efficiency wage theory usually studies the determination of wages and
effort levels in a framework in which firms are assumed to have iiioni>|>^«>m powrr
in the labour market, while labour supply is competitive. If firnus cammi monitor
the effort of their employees perfectly, or simply find it too costly, they can raise the
wage above its market clearing level and threaten their employees with layoff once
they are caught shirking. The apparent attractiveness of efficiency wage models is
that they are backed by the trinity of personnel economics "to recruit, retain, and
motivate". As Lazear (1995, p. 70) puts it, "the story is appealing".
However, most efficiency wage models neglect the existence of unions. Partly,
this might be for historical reasons, as the original intention of these models was to
explain wage rigidities and involuntary unemployment in a perfectly rational world
wz£/iou£ unions (see e.g. Yellen 1984, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Partly, the idea
that a firm can exert monopsony power in the labour market only when facing a
competitive supply side might have contributed to the tendency to ignore the role
of unions.
Still, trade unions do affect the wage-setting behaviour in different ways. The
most apparent is collective bargaining: the resulting contract wage has to be ac-
cepted as a minimum wage by the firm. But the scope of unions is usually even
broader. They try to interfere in most points governing the relation between firms
and their employees. Consequently, unions do not only negotiate wages but they
also bargain over working conditions, work standards, layoff procedures, and some-
times even employment. Although this "bargaining over everything" might suggest
otherwise, firms still have some freedom in determining the employment conditions.
This freedom stems from at least two factors. First, in contrast to wages, the col-
lective contract must necessarily be incomplete concerning the other items, because
they are not easily controlled for and because the contract cannot possibly account
for all circumstances in the different firms and workplaces. Second, in a world of
incomplete information the union cannot behave like a monopolist governing labour
supply at its own discretion, because it faces the same moral hazard problem as the
firm.
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The problem of incomplete contracts can be partially mitigated by bargaining
on different levels, e.g. by collective bargaining over wages on a nation- or industry-
wide level, and local bargaining over working conditioas etc. on the level of individual
firms or even plants. However, though the information problem is less severe on the
local level, this two-tier bargaining raises an agency problem because the negotiators
on the local level might pursue a different agenda than their counterparts on the
centralized level.
The moral hazard problem is perhaps more severe. Although the union might
attempt to net in I lie hrst interest of all its members, tho latter cannot commit
thonisi'lvos to k<Tp i In' (mil I;K ts the union has signed on their behalf. If for example
the union attempts to trade wages for employment (at a given effort level) the
resulting wage-effort combination might just lead to shirking, and the firms will
reject tho wage cut. Consequently, if unions are to play a role in shirking models,
they must be restricted by the no-shirking condition.'
Yet even under this restriction there is room for unions. In the stylized framework
of a shirking model in the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), unions could
accept a given no-shirking condition and bargain over wages, or wages and effort,
or they could attempt to influence the no-shirking condition in their favour. The
(few) studies over unions in shirking models favour the first possibility. Bulkley and
Milts (1996) for example study the behaviour of a monopoly union in a shirking
model. Given the worker's effort function the union can either set wages, or wages
ami effort. In the first, case, employers are still free to choose the effort level, and the
resulting wage-effort combinations are therefore confined to points on the no-shirking
condition. However, whether the union will pick a wage that is greater than the
profit-ninxiiiii/.ing wage tho firm would choose, hinges critically on the assumptions
about, the union's utility function (see Goerke 1998, Bulkley and Miles 1998). In the
second case, the union can achieve wages that are higher than necessary to achieve a
certain effort level, or effort, levels lower than what workers would maximally provide
at a given wage. Rocheteau (2001) analyses the conditions under which either of
these bargaining regimes prevail. In his model workers enjoy rents not only due to a
moral hazard problem but also because recruitment is costly. A low unemployment
level makes recruitment more difficult and improves the workers' bargaining power
vis-a-vis the firm, which enables them to raise the wage above the level implied by
tho no-shirking condition.
Though these models attempt to integrate unions into an efficiency wage model,
their results do not qualify for an explanation of the occurrence of wage gaps. They
predict a wage gap pattern that is not only in line with the adaptation hypothesis,^
but they also load to the counterintuitive rosult that the wage gap will be high if the
union's bargaining power is low. On the other hand, the more grip the union has on
effort, and wages, the less likely the effective wage will be greater than the contract
'Tho no-shirking rendition states that, given the wage u- and a vector of parameters x, there
is n maximum effort lovol <-'' that tho firm can push through without provoking shirking, i.e.,
r"* < p(ti',x), with #r/0u> > 0. Tho offort function roflorts tho same relation, but with sign of
equality, «r'' = e(u>,x).
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wage.
Another drawback Ls that, if the union strives at an effort level greater than the
level the firm would choose (naturally at a greater wage than the firm would likr to
pay. as the no-shirking condition has to be satisfied), the union will Ixx-oine respon-
sible for the workers keeping their part of the contract. In other wools, the firm
could pass on the responsibility for monitoring effort to the union. It is questionable
whether a union can accept this role without losing the support of the workers.'
Therefore, this chapter takes a different direction. Its basic idea is that unions
do indeed try to influence the effort level, but that they bargain over the parameters
m/ruenctnj t/je s/»apf of the effort function rather than over wage-effort combinations
on or off a jit/en effort function. This approach has two advantages. First, to a
great extent it excuses the union from monitoring the workers. It can leave this
responsibility to the firm, which itself is free under certain restrictions to set
wages and effort at its will. Second, much of what workers' representatives do on
the firm level can be interpreted as attempts to influence the shape of the effort
function.
In order to illustrate this argument in the framework of shirking models consider
the influence unions have on layoff procedures. An implicit assumption of most
shirking models is that the detection of a shirker is synonymous with her being
fired. Though this might be feasible in a country like the U.S., where employers
are in principle free to decide about employment/ labour legislation in European
countries tends to curtail their property rights. An employer who wants to get
rid of a shirker might find himself summoned to appear in court where he has to
proo/ his case/' Unions on the other hand often provide assistance to workers facing
a dismissal, which drives another wedge between the probability that a shirker is
detected and the probability that she is sanctioned.
The model presented in this chapter takes this stake of unions in layoff proce-
dures into account by assuming that there are two different sanctioning probabilities
and two different sanctions, both depending on the extent of shirking. The under-
lying idea is that a union may find it difficult to justify the protection of a worker
who falls short of certain performance standards, while it will protect workers who
come up to these standards but fall short of higher, "exaggerated" demands of the
employer. This means that there is a performance standard, that is supportwl by
the union against the workers. In the following, this standard will be called the
"supported effort level". Another ingredient of the model is contract wage, which
serves as a minimum wage, but which also determines the possible sanction of a
''Common wisdom is that the union acts as an agent of the workers (HOC e.g. Faith and Reid 1987).
In this situation however, the union would assume the role of a principal. Indeed, a union accepting
the task of monitoring would be much like the "unions" in the socialist countries of East Europe
before 1989.
•"This means that employers in the U.S. are free to exert their property rights. In principle,
laying off a worker is then not much different from "laying off" capital (see e.g. Malcomson 1997).
^Anecdotal evidence suggests that things look even grimmer for firms. Franz (1994, p. 299)
reports a German case where a shift-worker repeatedly appeared much to late at work. The judge
nevertheless declared the dismissal of the worker null and void, because the employer was not able
to proof that being late has led to a concrete disruption of the employee-employer relationship.92 Chapter 5. Bargaining over the effort function
worker who meets the supported effort level but provides less effort than the em-
ployer demands. The union protects this "minimalist" by creating a link between
the contract wage and the supported effort level. It resists a layoff of the minimalist.
such that tin: employer can only sanction her by cutting her wage to the contracted
level. This framework designates the union for a more passive role than models of
effort-bargaining do. The union abstains from setting the effective wage and effort
level, and leaves the agency problem to solve for the firm. Instead, the union sets
(or bargains) a reference wage and a reference effort level, that determines in which
sit mil ion the union gives fn-e rein to the employer in dealing with shirkers. As it
will be shown in this chapter, this approach provides a ready explanation for the
occurrence of a wage gap. By raising the contract wage, the union also raises the
utility "I •' mctioncd minimalist, which in turn forces the employer to raise the
workers iiiui.il-IUI/UKI rent by increasing the effective wage. This mechanism does
not only make 111> • - < 11 rence of a wage gap likely, but it establishes a strong positive
relationship between the contract wage and the size of the wage gap.
In contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter does not focus on the bargaining
structure, in order to avoid any arbitrariness about the sequence of bargaining on
the parameters of the effort function. Rather, we will confine ourselves to analysing
the effects of these parameters on the effective wage and effort. The reason for this
choice is that unions can influence the effort function on different levels. While
contract wages are determined by collective bargaining on a more centralized level,
other parameters like the supported effort level and the sanctioning probability can
be determined on the centralized level or on the level of individual firms. In fact,
in Western European countries like Germany or the Netherlands, these parameters
are determined on both levels: collective agreements determine the general working
conditions,*' while some supplementary issues, and the more practical issues are
discussed on the level of individual firms. However, it will become clear that the
model of this chapter can be extended easily to allow for bargaining on different
stages.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 the no-shirking condition is
derived. The approach is essentially the same as that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
but it accounts for the different types of sanctions. Section 5.3 shortly describes the
behaviour of firms. Section 5.4 discusses the effects of the contract wage and the
supported effort level in general, while section 5.5 focuses on the consequences for
the behaviour of different types of unions. Finally, in section 5.6, the conclusion is
drawn.
"in Germany for example, there are two types of collective agreements, the so called
n/uertrdgr (collective agreements on wages), SJUI the A/anteUan/vrrfraje (collective agreements
on working conditions). The latter are usually valid over a couple of years, while the former are
typically negotiated once in a year.S.2. The effort function 9S
5.2 THE EFFORT FUNCTION
The basic framework is essentially the same as that of the shirking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) but with two extensions: first, effort r is assumed to l>e a con-
tinuous variable, and second, next to the usual "nonshirker" and "shirker" a third
type of workers is introduced, who supply a certain positive level of effort, which is
however lower than the effort the firm requires.
All workers are identical and infinitively lived. Their instantaneous utility t> in
an additively separable function which is concave in income u> and linear in effort
e:
v(u»,e) = u(u>) -e with u (w) = 0, u'(w) and u" (w) < 0 (5.1)
The present value of the utility depends on the trajectory of the iustunluueous utility
exp(-rt)t/(0d*, f
Jo o
where r is the rate of time preference.
We assume that the union negotiates a contract (w),p,p, q) with the firm. The
first variable u) is a contract (or minimum) wage that the firm must not undercut.
In exchange, the union promises to support an effort level r against the workers: if
they provide an effort less than e, they face a probability of ;> to be laid off. On the
other hand, if the firm demands an effort level of e** > « but the worker provides lc;ss
but at least e, the union does not support the firm, and the probability of a sanction
is only 9 < p. Moreover, as such a worker still provides at least the contracted effort
level, the firm cannot fire the worker but has to continue employment paying at
least the contract wage. Restricted by the contract the firm is free to set the terms
of employment: it chooses a combination of required effort e'' and wage u; > iij.
Moreover, we assume that the firm is free to choose the employment level L.
In this situation, workers face the problem of maximizing their utility over the
effort they provide. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that for a sanction
it does not matter by how much a worker undercuts either e** or e. For instance,
whether she provides 99 % of the supported effort e or no effort at all, the proba-
bility of a sanction is always equal to p, and the sanction will always be a layoff.
Consequently, workers will effectively choose only from two or three effort levels,
e € {0, min {e, e**} , e^} . We will call a worker who does not provide any effort
(e = 0) a shirker, a worker who provides only the effort level supported by the
union (e = e if e < e**) a minimalist, and a worker providing exactly the effort level
required by the firm (e = e**) a nonshirker.
Consider first the utility of a nonshirker who obeys to the terms set by the firm
and provides the effort level e** and receives the wage u; in return, as long as she
is employed. Naturally, the nonshirker does not face any sanctions. Nevertheless,
we assume that there is an exogenously given probability a that the worker looses
her job, e.g. because the firm ceases to exist. The present value of the nonshirker'sChapter 5. Bargaining over the effort function
lifetime utility V/v must satisfy the asset pricing equation
' (5.2)
where Vy i» the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker, which is assumed
to be exogenous for the moment. Equation (5.2) states that the nonshirker's value
of being employed is equal to her instantaneous utility u (u;) - e** while employed
phis the expected IOHH due to the possibility of becoming unemployed.
A Himilur equation determines the expected lifetime utility V^ of a shirker. Unlike
a nonflhirker she provides zero efTort but faces an additional probability p of being
sanctioned and becoming unemployed. It is assumed that unemployed shirkers are
not discriminated and have the same unemployment utility as a nonshirker who is
laid off for structural reasons:
rKv = u (m) + (a + p) (V,; - Vs) (5.3)
There is no difference between n minimalist and a nonshirker as long as the firm
requiroM an effort level of less than the supported efTort r. In this case, the minimalist
will simply provide the required €?ffort. If the firm requires a higher effort level,
e'' > r, a minimalist still faces the same probability of becoming unemployed, s, as
the nonshirker, because she cannot not be sanctioned by being laid off. However,
with probability </ < p, the minimalist is sanctioned by a reduced utility of V\ Her
asset equation is then
rVw = u (u>) - e + a (H; - VM) + 9 (V - V*/) . (5.4)
We assume that a sanctioned minimalist stays employed at the contract wage u>
and that she has to continue providing the supported effort e. Consequently, V is
determined by
rV = u (u)) - e + s (Vt, - V). (5.5)
However, for two reasons K might not be feasible. First, it might be less than the
utility of a shirker, Vs, at u,' = «i\ In this case, a sanctioned minimalist will reduce
her effort to zero (and become a shirker), rather than continuing to provide e. It
is reasonable to assume that under such circumstances the firm will resist to carry
on employing the sanctioned minimalist, while the union can hardly insist, knowing
that the minimalist will become a shirker for sure. In order to avoid such a situation,
tl> and e have to be chosen such that V > V$ (u>), which is equivalent to
p(tt(a)rn,)
r + s + p
Second, a sanctioned minimalist must prefer staying with the firm to quitting. The
related condition V' > Vr is equivalent toe < u(w') - rVf. It is therefore satisfied
as long as V > V>- («')•
After defining the utilities of a nonshirker. a shirker and a minimalist the no-
shirking conditions can be derived. In order to achieve the required effort level, the5.2. The effort function 95
firm must set the wage u> and the required effort level e** such that the workers prefer
being nonshirkers to U'ing shirkers or minimalists. Comparing equations (5.2) and
(5.3) we see that the first condition, Vjv > V<$ is equivalent to
which is precisely the usual no-shirking condition as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
According to this condition, the worker is motivated to provide a higher effort level
if the potential loss in utility by becoming unemployed, u(u>) — rV(;, is increasing,
or if a shirker faces a greater probability p of Iwing sanctioned.
The second condition, Vjv > V\/, is by equations (5.2), (5.4) and (5.5) equivalent
to
«<* < g(«("0 + *H/-(r + j)?) + (r + a)e ^ . </(u(u,)-u(u>)) ^
r + s + q r+s+q*
This condition is novel because it does not depend on the unemployment utility but
on the contract wage. Same as before, a worker will provide more effort the higher
her wage or the sanctioning probability is. The same holds for a higher supported
effort e, because it decreases the utility of a minimalist, who by definition provides
e. A higher contract wage, in contrast, will decrease the provided effort as it makes
the utility loss that comes with a sanction less severe.
The firm must obey the two no-shirking conditions (5.7) and (5.8). As a profit
maximizer the firm will set the required effort such that they are satisfied with sign





, ,(u(u,)-u(iS)) if«(«>) > ^gj;
It is depicted in figure 5.1. It is a kinked function with a steep lower branch e** =
r^a+p ^^ reflecting the condition V)v > Kv and a flatter upper branch e^ =
- ^ ,(U(U|)-U|ID)) jg^jygj fj-om the condition V* > VA/. The kink, the intersection
point between the two branches, is at the point (iuo,eo) with
(r + a + p) (r + a 4- q)
u(two) = ;
(r + V r + s+p r + « + g/
(r + aUp- ) (^ + * + 9)e
These two equations allow to derive a preliminary result about the effective wage
u- and effort e: combined with the feasibility condition (5.6) for the sanction for a
minimalist, they become
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5./; The effort function r (w) consists of the lower branches of the two in-
centive compatibility conditions Vy = V«c and Vv = VV Due to the
contract wage restriction u; > tZ), feasible combinations of effective wage
and effort are restricted to the bold part of the effort function: at the
contract wage ti), workers will put forward no more than the supported
effort level c.
This means that, due to the minimum wage characteristic of the contract wage ti), not
all wage-effort combinations on the effort function are feasible. Because tw > ti) > u>o
the effect ivo wage must be on the upper branch of the effort function, which reflects
the no-shirking condition V/v > Vji/. The lower branch V}v > Vs is not achievable,
because it requires a contract wage that would turn a sanctioned minimalist into a




Notice that although the effort function suggests otherwise, it is not perfectly insu-
lated from the unemployment utility V'r, because the contract wage and the sup-
port ed effort still have to satisfy the feasibility condition (5.6). Depending on the
values of »r and e, an increase in V( can. but need not, require either an increase of
the contract wage or a decrease of the supported effort level.
5.3 THE FIRM
Consider now the problem of a representative firm with a profit function5.3. The firm
The variable L is the number of workers employed by the firm, and /? (•) is the firm's
short run revenue function in effective labour <\L, with rt(0) = 0. W (eL) > 0, and
7t"(cL) < 0. The firm maximizes its profit over employment and the wage, under
the restriction of the contract (u\e\p, q):
(w, L) = argmax A(eL) - wL s.t. u; > u).
The first-order conditions for a profit maximum are*
/ c«.ff = 1 ifui>* ,. ...
u>: < - , ~ , (5.11)
^ u; = tu ewe * '
and L:e/?' = u;, (5.12)
with ru being the first partial derivative of the effort function (5.10) with respect to
the wage.
Consider first the firm's wage-setting behaviour. If there is an interior solution for
the wage. i. e., the contract wage is not binding, the two first-order conditions can be
combined to the famous Solow condition: if employment Ls at its profit maximizing
level, the profit maximizing ("efficiency") wage is found where the wage elasticity of
effort is equal to one,
e«,- = 1. (5.13)
e
Geometrically, the Solow condition (5.13) describes the point where the iso-profit
line of the firm is tangent to the effort function." This is the point where the cost
of a unit of effort is minimized. Notice that the efficiency wage only depends on
the effort function, while the revenue function and with it the output market or the
firm's production technology have no influence on the wage. Hence, the firm uses the
wage only to solve the moral hazard problem, while all other factors are captured
by the employment decision.
The contract wage Ls binding if it exceeds the wage that maximizes profits. This
is the case when the effort elasticity at the contract wage is less than one,
w I
e«,- < 1. (5.14)
The labour demand curve of the firm is described by equation (5.12). Its total
differential with respect to employment and the wage,
dL e,,,/? - 1 e«,
' These conditions represent maxima because ft is a concave function.
*The total differential of the profit function is j^ = l/fl' at any level of employment. According
to equation (5.12), the marginal revenue at the optimal employment level is eft' = u>. Hence,
<fe _ £
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that employment is a decreasing function of the effective wage. Notice that
the denominator of the first fraction on the right-hand side Ls equivalent to the first-
order condition of a profit maximum with respect to the wage. Consequently, the
fraction vanishes if the minimum wage restriction Ls not binding. On the other hand,
if the runt r ;ut wage is binding, it mast be greater than the profit maximizing wage,
and »•„ /i" 1 is negative. Therefore, there is a negative relation between wages and
employment for a// feasible wages.
5.4 THE CONTRACT, WAGES, AND EMPLOYMENT
This section analyses the effects of the contract wage «\ the supported effort level
r and the sanctioning probability (/ of a minimalist on wages and employment. In
general, two scenarios have to be distinguished, depending on whether or not the
minimum wage restriction tn > u> is binding. This is the case when the effort
elasticity at the contract wage is less than one. In order to see which parameter
restrictions result from this condition, substitute the expression (5.10) into (5.14)
and rearrange to get
e> -—tZm'(u>). (5.15)
Hecause the right-hand side is an increasing function of the contract wage, this
condition implies that, given the supported effort level, ti) must be below a certain
level to become binding. The greater e is, the greater is the threshold level of iD.
Notice that this implies that the firm will pay a mark-up on the contract wage (i. e.,
there will be a wage gap) for high rather than low levels of iD. This preliminary result
is quite remarkable because it contradicts the model of Bulkley and Miles (1996),
who predict just the opposite relation between contract and effective wage.^
' 5.^./ 77ie contract wage
Assume first that the contract wage is indeed not binding. Applying the effort func-
tion (5.10) to equations (5.37), (5.38), and (5.41) from the appendix,'" the influence
of the contract wage on the effective wage, effort and employment is calculated as
£ =-Jf^L > I > 1, (5.16)
du> urn" («;) p
L^.JH^*L>o. (5.17)
dtv p r + s + q
-777 — 1 — • 1 T T ' ^o.io;
where />: icu"/u' € (0.1) is the relative risk aversion of the worker with respect to
income, ami o := -cLTt"//?' € (0,1) a corresponding measure of the firm's revenue
* Compare swtion 5.1.
'"The equations in this subsection are derived in general terms in the appendix 5. A of this chapter
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function. Equation (5.16) states that the contract wage does not only have a positive
effect on the effective wage, but that an increase in the contract wage leads to an
even greater increase in the effective wage." Combined with the previous result
that a wage gap will occur only with contract wages (/r»'o/«T than a certain level,
the positive relation between the wage gap ir - tr and the contract wage is in strong
contrast to other models of the wage gap, which usually predict that for great tr the
gap is decreasing or even nihil.'"* Although this behaviour seems to be remarkable,
it is perfectly in line with the standard shirking model, but with unemployment
benefits replaced by the contract wage: if the contract wage increii.se>. M> <1<>I•> the
utility of a minimalist. In order to motivate its workers to provide the required
effort instead of just the supported level, the firm has to increase the wage more
than proportionally, because it cannot monitor effort perfectly. Figure 5.2 provides
a graphical illustration.
According to equation (5.17) a greater contract wage also leads to a higher re-
quired effort level. Again, this is just a standard result of shirking models. A vn-.iin
utility in case of a sanction shifts the effort function downwards, but pushes 11
up. The second effect outweighs the first, because the firm is forced to inci> • ir
worker's rent from moral hazard. See also figure 5.2. Due to the moral hazard prob-
lem, also the instantaneous utility of an employed worker is positively related to the
contract wage,
dt> ,, , du> de** r + s + op ... ,, ^
— = u' (u> — = — ^--u' (ti>) > u' (u>) > 0
du> * ' Ac dx p (r + s + q)
(see equation 5.39).
As a result of the behaviour of effective wage and effort the cost per effort unit,
c := w/e, increases with ii),
dc q u; ,, ,
3- = ?u' tZ; >0
du; r + j + i/e'
(compare equation (5.40)). Because effort and employment are imperfect substi-
tutes in production, the increased cost of effort also leads to a lower labour demand
(equation (5.18)) and consequently to lower profits,
diu r + a + q u (u>)
(compare equations (5.42) and (5.11)).
'' In order to proof that du>/dti> > 1, consider first the term — t*' (u>) /um" (to), which is the
inverse of the measure of relative risk aversion, p, with respect to the wage. As u" is negative,
the expression -ii'(ui)/ura"(tu) > 1 is equivalent to u'(u>) > -u»u"(u>). We integrate both
sides to get u (u>) > u (u>) — um' (u>) <=> 0 > -u»u' (u>), which is true because u' > 0. But if
-u' (to) /urn" (to) > 1, then also —u' (u>) /ut<" (iu) > 1, because u> < u> and u is a concave function.
D
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5.2: Effective effort c (upper graph) and effective wage it' (lower graph) as
functions of the supported effort level c and the contract wage u).
In the upper graph, the efficiency wages are derived for effort functions
at different levels of the contract wage and the supported effort level.
Tin* resulting relations between contract and effective wages are depicted
in the lowvr graph. For clarity, the effort functions in the upper graph
are drawn without their kink.5.4. The contract, wages, and employment 101
If the contract wage is below the threshold defined by equation (5.15). tin- effec-
tive wage is equal to the contract wage, ir = tr: no wage gap occurs. This can, for
example, be the case if the supported effort level is relatively high (see figure 5.2).






As the effort function (5.10) suggests, the effective effort is always equal to the
supported effort level at the contract wage. Consequently, the cost per effort unit
increases proportionally with the contract wage, leading to a decreased labour de-
mand. (Notice that c,,,i?' - 1 < 0 because the contract wage is greater than the
profit maximizing wage.)
Because the required effort level is constant, the worker's rent of moral hazard
is increasing by less than in the case where the contract wage is not binding. The
reaction of the worker's instantaneous utility to a change of the contract wage is
equal to
-r^ = u' (u;) > 0.
Summarizing, a greater contract wage will always be beneficial for a worker who is
protected from unemployment.
5.^.2 77ie supported e^ort /eve/
If the contract wage is not binding, the required effort level e has the following
influence on the effective wage, effective effort and employment:
d? *~ ~ """ :" (u;) qpu' (u;)
u'(w) 1-p
de urn" (u>) p '
Qi> 1> / 1 — © U (UU \ /I— © 1 \ L<
— I 1. ' ' I — I ^. i 1 > 0
de e \ (^> UJU" («J) / \ 0 p/ e
(Again, see the appendix 5.A for the derivation of these equations). The direction
of the effects is just the opposite of the effect of a greater contract wage. A greater
supported effort level decreases the utility of a sanctioned worker and shifts the effort
function upwards (see also figure 5.2 on page 100). As a result, the firm has to grant
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Moreover, the cost per effort unit goes down, which results in a positive scale effect
and make* labour demand increase.









In contrast to the case where the contract wage is not binding, the supported effort
Irw I li.i ,i positive effect on the effective effort (which is just equal to the supported
I'IIOI I), while the effect on the effective wage is naturally nihil. Nevertheless, the cost
per effort unit decreases in r. too, resulting in a greater labour demand, although
I Ins elfect is weaker than in the unrestricted case. The effect on the utility of an
employed worker will naturally be negative:
dv
de
- eu-, = -1
tu=tl>
Notice that an increase of the supported effort level leads to different results, if it
makes the feasibility condition (5.5) bind and forces the contract wage up. In order
to keep the analysis simple, we ignore this possibility and assume that the contract
wage shows a greater inertia than the supported effort level.
5.^.5 77ie sanction pro6a6t/t<y
In case the contract wage is not binding, the effects of the probability 9, that a




ie* _ r + s /tz>u'(u;) l-pe\
dq r+s+q\r+s+q P q/




With a greater (/ being a minimalist becomes less attractive, which induces workers
to provide any given effort level at a lower wage. As effort becomes cheaper, the
firm will require more of it. As equation (5.20) indicates, the net effect on e** is even
positive which ultimately leads to a greater effective wage. Because of that, the
effect on labour demand is indeterminate. A lower boundary for the derivative of
employment can be determined by using expression (5.15), which determines when5.5. Unions and the labour market 10S
the contract wage is binding. As dL/dq has been calculated for a not-binding u», we
must have
dL r + a L /1 - ^ urn' (w) 1 - /> urn' (u>) \
dq r + s + flc \ 4> r + s + fl /> r + s + q/
Consequently, labour demand is more likely to be an increasing function of (7, the
more the wage is raised above the contract wage (as the wage gap indicates by how
much effort has become cheaper), and the more risk averse the worker is at the
effective wage.
Similarly, also the reaction of the worker's instantaneous utility,
dt»_ r + a /r + a + qp. two' (u>) \
dq r + s + q \ q^p ,- + s + <j / ^*
depends on her risk aversion. The more risk averse she is, the less the wages and
effort will react, and the less likely is a positive effect on utility. Applying condition
(5.15) and using u/u' (u>) > um'(w), it can be shown that the derivative of i> has
indeed a (positive) upper boundary:
dt> (r + s)^ ti)u' (u>)
d (r + s + </)* <7P
If the contract wage is binding, a change of the sanction probability (7 will have
no effect at all, because with u> = ti and e** = e there is no difference between a
nonshirker and a minimalist, and therefore no worker will be sanctioned. However,
a decrease in q can of course suddenly make condition (5.15) binding, but in this
case the behaviour of u>, e'' and L is governed by equations (5.19) to (5.21) above.
Table 5.1 summarizes the effects of the contract wage, the supported effort level
and the sanction probability on the effective wage, required effort and labour demand
and the payoffs of workers and the firm.'"*
5.5 UNIONS AND THE LABOUR MARKET
This section analyses the preferences about wages, effort and employment of firms
and three different types of unions. In order to make the results comparable, it is
assumed that firms have identical, linear homogenous revenue functioas in labour
and capital. In this case, it does not matter whether L denotes the employment
level of a single firm or the whole economy.
5.5.7 ATo uniorw
First, we consider the decision of a firm in the absence of unions. We assume that
the probability p that a shirker is sanctioned, is exogenously given. It is the sanction
'''Note that the greater sanctioning probability p is not considered in table 5.1 because it deter-
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>0 (=0)
Toi/e 5.J.- Effects of the contract wage w, the supported effort level e, and the
sanction probability q on the effective wage u;, the effective effort e, the
wage cost j>er effort unit r, employment L, workers' utility u, and profits
7r. In each column the first entry indicates the total derivative when the
contract wage is not binding, while the second entry (in brackets) shows
the total derivative for a binding contract wage.
probability that applies when a shirker is not supported by a union in a case against
her. As the firm has no interest in protecting workers from being sanctioned (see
table 5.1), the no-shirking condition is (5.7). Consequently, the effort function is
e« = "(»(")-^), (5.22)
r + s + p
which is the previously unfeasible branch of the effort function (5.9). The firm will
set the wage such that the Solow condition (5.13) is satisfied. Consequently, the
effective wage solves
u (to) - W [» = rVi/. (5.23)
5.5.2 77ie insider union
The objective of the union in the shirking model will strongly depend on its degree
of centralization. In the following, three highly stylized types of unions are distin-
guisluKl: an in.sirfrr union which is typically organized on the level of individual
firms and which only covers employed workers, a /oca/ union which is organized at
the level of one or a few firms and also covers the unemployment pool generated by
the firin(s), and finally a rrritrai union, which covers all workers in the economy.
Consider first the insider union. Because it covers only workers who are currently
employed, it will—if at all—only care about employment if the firm threatens to
decrca.se its labour demand. However, if firms follow a last-in-first-out rule, workers
know beforehand whether they are affected by this threat. Unless the median worker
is affected, the union will maximize the expected lifetime utility of an employed
worker,
«(uO^+i* „!,= const, (5.24)
Restricted only by the shutdown condition of the firm, the worker's participation
constraint, and a certain threshold employment level, that must not be undercut
because otherwise the union would lose the support of its members.5.5. Unions and the labour market 105
Given the behaviour of effective wages, effort, and employment (soe table 5.1),
the agenda of the insider union is clear. It will increase the contract wage ti>, decrease
the effort level e it supports against its members, and decrease the probability of
a sanction against a minimalist worker </ until the mentioned restrictions become
binding. Because the union's objective is a linear function of the instantaneous
utility of an employed worker, »> = u(u>) — e"*. the union will manipulate the shape
of the effort function such that the firm will maximize its profits at the combination
of effective wage and effort that the union desires. Due to the functional form of the
effort function (see equation (5.10)), the levels of u\ e, and </ that solve the union's
problem will not be uniquely determined but depend on each other.
Summarizing, the policy of the insider union—compared to the case without
unions will lead to lower productivity at higher wages, thus aggravating the ineffi-
ciency of the labour market.
5.5.5 77ie /oca/ union
The local union will care about the level of employment became of its unemployed
members. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the union's objective
is equal to the average utility of its members,
^ = ^VJV + ^-^VI/, V[/ = const., (5.25)
even though not all the members face the same ex ante unemployment probability.
The parameter AT denotes the exogenously given number of members. The local
union accounts for the direct employment effects of its behaviour. However, because
the union is organized on a local level, it neglects the effect of L on overall unem-
ployment. Therefore, it will treat Vj; as a constant and ignore the side-effects of
employment.''* As a result, the union will evaluate the trade-off between wages and
employment incorrectly, putting too much weight on wages.
Consider the case of a monopoly union that has to decide about the contract
wage t<) and the supported effort level e (at a given sanction probability </). The
first-order condition for u) and e is
dx r +
Using the results from section 5.4 and rearranging, it turns out that both first-order
conditions are identical:
J^t^ (5-26)
The reason for this identity is that the contract wage and the supported effort level
affect the effort function in a similar way, i.e., they are considered to be substitutes
'•*When discussing the central union, we will see that the expected lifetime utility of an unem-
ployed also depends on the utility of an employed worker. We assume that the local union ignores
this effect, and behaves as if Vi/ were a "black box".106 Chapter 5. Bargaining over the effort function
with respect to their influence on the effort function. It is important to notice that
equation (5.26) does not determine the effective wage and effort uniquely, but that it
repn:sents the local union's utility maximizing effort function. This does not mean
that there are combination* of w and c, such that the real effort function (5.10) is
equal to this "effort function" for all possible wages. Rather, the union sets u> and e
Midi that the effort function mimics equation (5.26) in the firm's optimum. In other
words, the union sets the contract wage and the supported effort level such that the
effective wage is determined as if the firm solved the Solow condition asing equation
(5.26). Consequently, the utility maximizing effective wage of the union solves
u (u>) - um'(w) = rV(,, (5.27)
which Imdl to the same effective wage as in the case without union (see equation
(5.2.H)). However, the resulting levels of required effort will typically be different. A
comparison of the effort functions (5.22) and (5.26) reveals that the union will prefer
a greater required effort than the non-unionized firm if
Whether this condition is satisfied depends on the values of 0, which measures how
sharply the marginal value product of effective labour is decreasing, and p, the
relative risk aversion with respect to workers' income. In general, the union will
prefer a higher effort level if labour demand is very sensitive to wages. Thus, due to
employment considerations the union might choose a higher effort level than in the
no-union case, at the same wage. The reason is that, in contrast to the firm, the
local union cares about the fate of the unemployed.'''
Suppose now that the union is confined to contract wages that are too low to let
a wage gap occur. In this case, the two first-order conditions for the contract wage
and the supported effort level are
#uw' (tD) = v -
</>
and e = u -
10
'*Thla would be one of the rare cases that a union decreases the inefficiency of the labour market.
The positive effect of a higher effort level can be derived by analysing the firm's first-order condition
for the profit maximising employment level (see equation (5.12)), which states that labour input
eL depends negatively on the wage rust per unit of effort, W(eL) = w/e. If the wage set by the
local union is equal to thr wage in the no-union case, but effort is greater, then employment A.
must be greater under the local union. To sec this, we differentiate the first-order condition:
de ~
So employment increases with effort if
0 l>L
This is true for e. g. a short-run Cobb-Douglas production function.5.5. Unions and the labour market 107
Resolving the dependencies between these two equations reveals that the union will
attempt to reach the same wage level as in the unrestricted case:
(5.28)
(5.29)
However, the chosen effort level might violate condition (5.15), which states that
the supported effort level must exceed a certain level in order to make the contract
wage binding.
5.5.^ 7Y»e centra/ union
Finally, the central union also maximizes the average utility of its members, but it
is able to internalize the indirect effect of employment. Consider the asset equation
of the expected utility of an unemployed worker,
rVi/ = a + 6(V,v-Vt/). (5.30)
As long as she is unemployed she receives an unemployment benefit, which gives
her a utility of a. With probability 6 she finds a new job which provides her with a
discounted lifetime utility of Vyv- Because also employed workers face a probability s
to become unemployed, the equations (5.2) and (5.30) can be solved simultaneously:
= fc(»(«0-«)+(r + «)q (5.32)
" r(r + 6 + s) * '
The asterisks indicate that the interdependency between Vjv and VJ/ has been re-
solved.
Let for the moment L and iV be employment and the number of workers in
the whole economy. At each point in time sL workers are laid off for structural
reasons and enter the unemployment pool, while N — L workers are searching for
employment. If unemployment is at its steady state, the reemployment probability
must be equal to
6 = *^. (5.33)




The main difference between this objective and that of the local union (5.25) is that
Viz is replaced by the unemployment benefit a < rVy. Therefore, we can simply108 Chapter 5. Bargaining over the effort function
reuse the results for the local union. The first-order condition with respect to the
contract wage and the supported effort level Ls then
Thin Vffort equation" prescribes a higher effort level than the corresponding equa-
tion (5.26) at any given wage.
Applying the Solow condition to the first-order condition yields the wage equation
u(u;) - um' (tu) = a,
which implies that the central union prefers a lower effective wage than the local
union (compare equation (5.27)). However, although the central union's "effort
equation" lies above the equation of the local union, the effect of the lower wage
dominates and tin- resulting effective effort will be lower than in the local union
case.'" Nevertheless, this combination of lower wage and effort leads to lower cost
per effort unit and therefore to a higher employment level.'*
As in the case where the contract wage is not binding, the results for a binding
contract wage can simply be adopted from the local unions. Equations (5.28) and
(5.29) then become
u (u>) - tDu' (tD) = a,
(1-</>)(«(«>)-a) = e. ()(())
These equations compare in the same way to the corresponding equations of the
local union as the equations for the not-binding contract wage do.
' 5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The model discussed in this chapter strongly supports the mark-up hypothesis of
the wage gap. Unions can create a wage gap by setting a reference wage and effort
'"Tb see this, combine the "effort function" and the wage-setting equation for both types of
unions to got in both cases
e W(u,),
^ (r + a + q) + qp
which is to be evaluated at the respective union's optimum. Because urn' (w) is increasing in u>,
the greater utility-maximizing wage of the local union must coincide with a greater effort level. D
'''The coot per effort unit is c = u'/e- If evaluated at the profit maximizing wage, it is
_ (^(r + a+ 9) + W>)M> _ »(r + a + q) + qp
_
•/>) twi' (u») 4 (p + * - *p) u' (tu)'
for both types of unions at their respective optimal wage (sec the previous footnote). The derivative
of the cost with respect to the wage is
dc _ (0(r + a + q) + qp)u"(w) ^
du> *
Therefore the greater wage of the local union will lead to higher cost per unit of effort. D5.6. Conclusions 109
level. By protecting those workers from unemployment who fail to provide the effort
the firm demands, but who still keep to the reference effort, unions dissolve the link
between the effective wage and any outside option, and create a new link with the
contract wage. Via thus link, the contract wage does not only serve as a minimum
wage, as in the model of Bulkley and Miles (1996), but it becomes a powerful tool to
influence the effective wage. By raising the contract wage, a union can increase the
utility of a sanctioned worker, which in turn forces the firm to increase the effective
wage. Because in shirking models workers earn rents due to imperfect monitoring,
the firm will usually have to raise the effective wage by even more than the initial
increase in the contract wage. In other words, the occurrence of a wage gap is
not only likely, but a greater contract wage also leads to an increased wage gap.
Moreover, it is shown that a wage gap will occur with high contract wage levels.
In principle, the greed of the union or its members is therefore only restricted by
employment considerations.
However, a wage gap will not occur in any case. Depending on the value of the
parameters, it is possible that the firm maximizes its profits at a lower wage and
effort level than the reference values set by the union. In this case, the contract wage
serves as a minimum wage, and the effective effort is set equal to the supported level.
Only then, unions are forced to set effective wages and effort directly. However, as is
shown in section 5.5, this scenario results in the same effective wage as the scenario
with a wage gap.'* This comes at no surprise, because ultimately it is the effective
values unions care about.
As was argued in section 5.1, one drawback of direct negotiations over wages and
effort is that the firm might shift some respoasibility for monitoring the performance
of workers to the unions, which could undermine their reputation with the workers.
The wage gap scenario avoids this problem, while the union still has the ultimate
control over the effective wage and effort. Nevertheless, the shirking model of this
chapter is able to reproduce the result of Bulkley and Miles (1996), that unionization
does not necessarily lead to a reduction of effort. last cad, it comes to the same
conclusion, that as long as a union cares about employment, the effective effort level
depends on the workers' risk aversion and the shape of the firm's revenue fianction.
Actually, unionization might lead to a higher effort level (and even to lower wages),
such that the wage cost per effort unit is lower and employment is higher than
in the case without unions. This is all the more remarkable, because it qualifies
the claim of Walther (1989) and Goerke (2000), that effort is raised if shirkers are
stigmatized and receive a lower unemployment benefit than nonshirkers who are laid
off for structural reasons. In this chapter, the relation is just reversed: a sanctioned
minimalist must necessarily receive a greater utility than an unemployed worker, but
effort can still be greater than in a situation without a union, where unemployed
shirkers are not discriminated.
Given the simplistic framework of the model, it is an appropriate question whether
the assumed behaviour of unions is realistic. Of course, unions bargain over wages,
'* Notice that the no-wage gap scenario never applies for a monopoly insider union, because it
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but in there really something like a "supported effort level"? The introduction of this
chapter has already hinted at the information problem involved in dealing explicitly
with effort in collective bargaining on a centralized level. However, on the level of
individual firms the representatives of unions usually do influence decisions about
work standards and personnel. It is also on this level, where unions decide whether
to back a worker whom the management wants to discipline. Hence, it is likely that
a reference value of effort does index*! exist.
This (suggest* an interesting extension of the model. Instead of bargaining simul-
taneously over the contract wage and the supported effort level, negotiations could
take place on two different levels: on a centralized levels, unions and employer feder-
ations bargain over the contract wage, while the supported effort level is determined
on the level of individual firm* If this involves an agency problem, because the
local branch of the union (and the employer) pursue different agendas than their
counterparts on the centralized level, a two-tier bargaining process also would be
able to uniquely determine the contract wage and the supported effort level, which
is not always possible in simultaneous bargaining.5.A Analysis of a parameterized effort function 111
5.A ANALYSIS OF A PARAMETERIZED EFFORT FUNCTION ' •" - •• • ' •'*
In this appendix the effects of the parameters tl\ e and g on wages, effort, employment and
utility are derived in general terms. For this purpose the effort function i.s written a.s
where J- is one of the parameters u>, e, and <j. If the values of tlu*se parameters
that the minimum wage is not binding, the usual Solow condition (5.13) determines the
wage:
«•„. (u;,x) — r = l « u>e»(u>,x) - e(u>,x) = 0 (5.35)
Otherwise, the effective wage is simply equal to the contract wage.
w = tD. (5.98)
The total differential of the equations (5.35) and (5.36) with respect to the effective wife
if and the parameter x is'*
The parameter x has two effects on the optimal required effort level. On the one hand, it
directly influences the shape of the effort function. On the other hand, it determines via
its effect on the wage—which point on the effort function is chosen. The overall effect is
' jj. — 1 - . - dtf :r ... _ .T. • (5.38)
Consequently, the effect of x on the instantaneous utility of an employed worker, w =
«(u;) — e**, is given by
dv _ / . . du> de _ / / . . » du>
dx dx dx ^ ' dx
l!^-"' • (5.39)
if u> = u>
The effect of x on the cost per effort unit c := «;/e is interesting because it helps to
the effect of the union on efficiency:
The total differential of equation (5.12) describes the effect of x on the firm's employment
decision:
dL # + eLfl" L dw e^fl' - 1 dw
dx ~ c^fl" ' e "dx e^fl" dx
'^Notice that the case w = u) is not trivial because w has to satisfy the feasibility condition
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Notice that -eL/f'/R' is a measure of the relative curvature of the revenue function—
Himilar to the meamire of relative rink aversion. Substituting 0 := —eLA"/^ simplifies the
equation above to
di f *te«- + 3E^-) £ ,....
rtnallj. P>IH mint I mi (5.11), (5.12) and (5.37), the effect of x on the firm's profits can
be calculated M
if ti/> ti> -, .„>
ifw = «i ' ^ 'Part II
Surplus sharing and the wage
gap
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,:..>: I... i ' I §. .i H r-:; *-:;Why do wage gaps occur? This question actually comprises two problems: Why do
employers and workers have an interest to determine a (contract) wage, although
they know beforehand that this wage will be altered afterwards? and, Why are
employers and workers not content with the contract wage, but settle on a different
effective wage?
The answer given in the two chapters 6 and 7 in this part of this thesis is that a
wage-setting system which provides for a predetermined, "lixiHl" base wage, but on
the same moment allows to settle on a different effective wage, can lie efficient. In
the two chapters, two criteria are used for the efficiency of a wage-setting system.
The first is, whether it avoids inefficient separations: as long as an employment
relation generates a joint payoff that is greater than the sum of the outside options
of firm and worker(s), the wage-setting system should provide for a wage that both
parties prefer to their outside options. The second criterion is whet her or not the
wage-setting system induces firm and worker(s) to make optimal investments in the
employment relationship instead of wasting resources outside the relationship.
The two chapters provide different, partly competing reasons for the efficiency of
a wage-setting system with a predetermined wage that can be changed afterwards,
both chapters emphasize the importance ot investments in the tramework ol an
employment relation between a single worker and her employer. Chapter 6 focuses
on the role of specific investments, i.e., investments which gem-rate returns only
within in the relation, but are worthless outside. In this case, both employee and
employer are, on the one hand, interested in securing their returns from expropriation
by the other side. By this argument, a fixed wage is beneficial to both parties. On
the other hand, both parties are interested in maintaining the employment relation,
because in the case of a separation they have to write off their investments. Hence,
this argument just calls for a flexible wage. In chapter 6, a (re)negotiation game is
proposed which carefully weighs the competing needs for stability and flexibility.
Chapter 7 basically uses the same framework, but it focuses on a different type of
investments, which is commonly given more attention in the literature about wage
formation. In the model of this chapter, the worker has the choice between investing
effort either in the firm or in her outside option. It is argued that in this caw; only
a wage consisting of a fixed base rate and a performance dependent component is
able to provide the correct (efficient) incentives.
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Wage gaps, labour contracts and surplus sharing
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Why do employer federations and unions, individual employers and workers make
wage contracts, when they know beforehand that the wage might be altered during
the contract's period of validity? The alternatives would l>e either to make a rout met
that does not determine a wage at all, or to determine a wage and to forbid any
change. However, such contracts are seldom found in reality, and, taking a heuristic
approach, this could teach us that they are inferior to a contract that determined a
wage that can be altered later on. But if this is true, in which way can the parties
influence the process of a posteriori wage changes when making the contract, and
how does this affect the wage gap?
This chapter attempts to give an answer to these questions by focusing on the
relation between a firm and a single employee. It is argued that when they start
a long term employment relation it is optimal to determine the distribution of the
surplus to be generated a priori. This can be due to hold-up if specific investments
matter, or to turn-over costs that a party incurs when ending the employment re-
lation, and that make this party vulnerable to attempts to appropriate parts of its
surplus. However, when time passes, economic circumstances might change in a way
that one party prefers to end the relation if the wage is not adapted to the new
situation. If an alternative distribution of the surplus could prevent this party from
separating, a separation would be inefficient.
Hence, both parties have an interest to alter the wage rate under certain circum-
stances, but at the same time, they might prefer the process of alteration to obey
certain rules, in order to avoid extortion and hold-up. The model in this chapter
discusses a renegotiation game that has the desired features by warranting necessary
adjustments of the wage rate to exogenous shocks. The wage gap is then the resulting
difference between the wage originally written in the contract and the renegotiated
wage.
Admittedly, by confining to this simplistic framework, the scope of this model i»
limited. As collective bargaining is left out of consideration, it might be desirable to
replace the term "contract wage" by "contractual wage". However, wage gaps can
also be observed in countries where there is no collective bargaining. In any case,
the difference between the contractual wage at the beginning of a (contract) period
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and the wage* effectively paid in the run of that period has to be explained.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 motivates an employment con-
tract that weiglis the advantage* of wage rigidity and flexibility by determining a
wage level and setting rules for changing it during the period of validity of the con-
tract. In section 6.3, after introducing the time structure of the model, a renegotia-
tion game is proposed that is in line with the contract. After exploring some general
characteristics of the game, its outcome in the cases of complete and asymmetric
information an- derived in section 6.4. Section 6.5 examines the implications of the
different scenarios for the contract wage and the wage gap. Section 6.6 deals with
possible drawbacks of the model as an explanation of the wage gap. Furthermore,
the theoretical predictions are contrasted with some empirical findings about wage
behaviour in non-corporatist countries like the US. Finally, suggestions for further
research are made.
6.2 WACE CONTRACTS AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY
When a firm and a worker are making a contract, they have to take .several issues
into account. Next to agency and controllability problems, which we will neglect in
the following, the fact that employment contracts are in general long-termed, has
important implications.
First, it is likely that a positive net surplus is generated in the employment
relation; the worker's marginal product is greater than the sum of the outside options
of the parties to the contract. This positive net surplus can, for example, be due to
investments the pail ies make in order to increase their benefit from the employment
relation. The worker might spend time and effort to become acquainted with her
col leagues and the organization she works for, she might move to the vicinity of
her employer, and acquire firm specific human capital. The firm on the other hand
might invest in equipment, even gear the place of work and the organization of
work routines to the employee, and it might provide vocational training. All these
investments have in common, that they do not only affect the payoff of the investor
(and possibly the other party) in the relation, but are often worthless outside or
even decrease the investor's outside option.'
Another reason for a positive net surplus can be found in costs the parties have
to bear when separating from each other and choasing an outside opportunity. As a
consequence, their outside options a/ter they have started the employment relation
might be lower than before: employers for example often have to obtain permission
to lay off workers from works councils, courts or even governmental institutions.
And both parties might have to bear search costs after having separated.
Obviously, the parties to the contract covet the net surplus of the employment
relation. In the case of specific investments, this makes the investor susceptible to
' FVom there the term specie investment: the returns are only generated as long as the relation
is mtuntnincd. Notice that in the case of the worker this type of investment must not be confused
with effort. If a worker "invests" effort in her job, the returns accrue directly to the firm in the
form of a higher productivity. The worker participates only indirectly in these returns by receiving
H wage from the firm. Investments in effort are analysed in chapter 7 of this thesis.6.2. Wage contracts and wage flexibility 119
attempts of the other party to appropriate a part of t he ret urns. If the contract, itself
does not provide means to prevent this, the effect will he inefficiently low investments:
hold-up occurs. As in general both parties benefit from these investments, m.l is
hold-up might affect both, they have an interest to sign a contract which delci mines
a wage a priori, which makes it difficult, if not imjxxssiblo, to change it.
However, though a predetermined and rigid wage protects the parties' returns
on investments, the long-term characteristic of the employment relation, that is a
prerequisite for these investments, also makes flexibility desirable. If the contract
prohibits any change of the wage, a party might find that her outside opportunities
are more attractive than maintaining the employment relation; her outside option is
binding. If in this case the sum of the parties' outside options exceeds the worker's
marginal product, it is efficient if firm and employee separate. However, as long
as still a positive net surplus is created, a separation would lie inefficient, as both
parties would benefit from changing the distribution of the surplus by chousing a
new wage that makes neither outside option binding.
Apparently, there is a dilemma. If firm and employee agree on a contract that
determines a wage and prohibits changing it afterwards, they are safe from extortion,
and the returns of their specific investments are protected. They pay for this security
with accepting the risk of inefficient separations. If in contrast the contract does
not specify a wage or if it permits that the contractual wage is changed, inefficient
separation can be avoided at the cost of hold-up and possibly costly clashes about
the wage.
This dilemma can at least partially be resolved by making a contract that does
not only settle a wage but also provides rules for changing it. If hold-up matters, it
would be ideal to have a rule that allows for changes only in case they are necessary
to avoid inefficient separations, and only to the extent that is necessary to avoid
that a party's outside option becomes binding.
It is, of course, impracticable to include such a rule literally into an employ-
ment contract, because outside options are private knowledge. Firms and employees
therefore have to rely on other arrangements. They can, for example, delegate the
task of deciding about wage changes to a third party. As Teulings (1995) argues,
collective bargaining might serve this purpose. As it—depending on the level of
bargaining—accounts for aggregate shocks that affect outside option and marginal
product, collective bargaining can reduce conflicts between a firm and its employees.
Another possible remedy is to sign a contract that fixes the wage but also determines
a period after which it has to be renegotiated. Finally, the contract might demand
mutual consent as a prerequisite for any wage change. The ban of industrial actions
during a period in which a contract wage Ls valid, would enforce this.* This is the
starting point for the model presented in the following section.
•'Two points should be noted here: first, in some countries, such as the United States, employers
are explicitly allowed to announce a wage change unilaterally. The change is considered to be
accepted even if the worker protests but continues to work (see Malcomson 1997). Second, firm*
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•„ 6.3 THE MODEL • ,
tf.5. / Time structure o/t/»e mode/
In thin and the following section we discuss the possible occurrence of a wage gap
within a fixed period of validity of an employment contract between a firm and a
single employe*-. For simplicity it is assumed that the parties' time horizon ends with
this period; derisions taken after expiration of the contract, like over continuation
of the employment relation or bargaining about a new contractual wage and work-
ing conditions, do not influence the decisions taken in the period of consideration.
Moreover, no collective bargaining will occur in this period. Hence, any alteration of
the wage can only be achieved by the parties to the contract themselves. The wage
gap is thus defined as the difference between the wage written in the employment
contract and tin- wage effectively paid during the period of validity of the contract.
The model < .insists of two periods, labelled 0 and 1, with period 1 being divided
in a fixed number 7 of sub|>eriods of equal length. In period 0, a firm and a worker
meet in order to start an employment relation by making a contract that determines
the terms under which work will take place. However, no work occurs in period 0,
and when fixing the contract, neither the firm nor the worker have exact information
about, the worker's marginal product, and what their outside options will be when the
contract comes to apply in period 1.' What is important for the further analysis is
that a surplus over the outside options might be created in the employment relation.
This surplus can be due to specific investments or to costs occurring when a party
takes her outside option."* For reasons mentioned before, both firm and worker
might prefer to agree upon the employment conditions before the contract comes
to apply in period 1, instead of bargaining about shares of the surplus after all
information has become available. The factors creating the surplus will not be
modelled explicitly. Moreover, possible differences in work quality and quantity are
not taken into account. The contract is therefore assumed to solely settle a wage
rate IJ>O for a constant amount of labour.''
In period 1 the employment contract, comes to apply and the worker can take up
her work. At the very beginning of this period, firm and worker learn their alternative
opportunities, «/.- and a\»-. and the worker's marginal product m. These can either
be common or private knowledge. Under complete information, i. e., if both the firm
and the worker know the exact values of TH. Of and o» , they will decide to end
the employment relation immediately if it creates a negative surplus, m< ap + an-.
Otherwise, if they believe that the relation does create a non-negative surplus, they
continue the employment relation. However, knowing their outside options, a party
*See Hall and Laaoar (1984) and MacLeod and Malconuon (1993) for models with a similar
structure.
*In the case of specific investments, the assumption of incomplete information is not necessary.
The superiority of a predetermined contract then results from the hold-up problem that would
occur when the parties twrgain a wage after the value of the relevant variables has been revealed.
A predetermined contract protects the parties from being "ripped off".
"instead of ic as in the rest of this thesis, the notation u\i is chosen for the contract
because in this context it indicates the contractual wage in period 0.63 The model 121
might be dissatisfied with the wage u»o settled in period 0 and claim a renegotiation
of the contract.
The structure of the renegotiation game will lx> explained in dot nil in the following
subsection. At this place, only a sketch of the timing is given. Period 1 is divided
in T subperiods of equal length. If a party claims renegotiations, either the linn or
the worker can propose a new wage level in each of these subperiods. Moreover, in
each subperiod, the parties have to decide whether they let work occur. The time
structure of the model is depicted in figure 6.1.
period 0 period 1
1 i 2 i ,T- 1, T
Firm and worker meet
and determine the con-
tract wage t«o-
• I ii
Firm and worker renegotiate the wage con-
tract during 7' subperiods. In each subpe-




Figure 6.7: Time structure of the model
6.5.5 77ie renajottatton
As was explained in section 6.2, the parties to an employment contract have an
interest to impose restrictions on wage renegotiations. So renegotiating an existing
contract puts worker and firm into a different situation than when bargaining a com-
pletely new contract. In general, if the contracting parties are aware of the possibility
to change a posteriori the terms agreed upon in the contract, the raison d'etre of the
contract, protecting the returns on specific investments, could be undermined. On
the other hand, renegotiations can be necessary if the outside option of one party
turns out to be binding under the wage contract. If the contract settles a wage
that leads to a payoff lower than what a party can secure if she chooses her outside
opportunity, even though the surplus the employment relation would generate is still
positive, the consequence would be either an inefficient quit or an inefficient layoff.
In such a situation both parties can take advantage from renegotiations.
The renegotiation game proposed in this section is an altered version of the one
of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). When renegotiating the contract wage, neither
the firm nor the worker are allowed to take industrial actions. Consequently, work
occurs and a surplus is generated as long as no party chooses to separate. Moreover,
the wage can only be changed if 6otA parties agree. As long as no new agreement is
reached, the wage both parties have agreed upon before determines the distribution
of the marginal product m, even if there is a disagreement.122 Chapter 6. Wage gape, labour contracts and surplus sharing
The structure of the renegotiation game is as follows. As long as no party has
taken itH outside option, in each subperiod £ = 1,..., T of period 1, the following
game take* place:
1. The proponing agent is selected randomly with probabilities 0 (firm) and 1-0
(worker), with 0€ (0,1)."
2. The agent selected at .stage 1 makes a wage proposal u>* to take the place
of the previously valid wage u>,_i (or u>o, if t = 1), where the superscript X
indicates a wage proposal of the firm (X = F) or the worker (X = W).
3. The agent who wan not selected responds by one of the following actions:
• accepting the proposal, which then becomes the new valid wage, w« = u/j*,
or
• rejecting it, then the previously valid wage remains valid in this subperiod,
«)( = i«|.|,or
• ending the employment relation. In this case the renegotiation game ends,
and firm and worker will earn their outside options, Of and aw, in this
and all T — f following subperiods.
4. If the responding agent has not ended the game, the selected agent decides
whether to continue the employment relation (and the game) or to end it.
Again, in the latter case, the firm and the worker will earn their outside options
in this and all following subperiods.
If the responding agent has decided to continue, the worker produces her
marginal product m ami receives the wage u>< determined at the stages 2 and
3 in this subperiod. Accordingly, the firm receives m — UJ(.
The game continues at stage 1 in subperiod t + 1, unless the end of period 1
(i.e., subperiod T) was reached.
The renegotiation game in a subperiod f is depicted in figure 6.2. Its structure is
similar to the bargaining model of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Malcomson
(1997). However, there are two changes: first, in the mentioned studies both parties
can decide whether they let work occur and produce the worker's marginal product
before continuing the renegotiations in the subsequent subperiod. whereas in this
game it is assumed that the parties have to let work occur if they have decided to
continue the game. The reason is that the parties are not allowed to take industrial
actions as long as the contract applies. Allowing for a deliberate choice about the
occurrence of work would mean that the parties can put pressure on each other in
frequency at which a party is able to makr a proposal is often interpreted as an expression
for th« party's bargain ing power. Thr argument is that the more often a party makes a proposal
th« greater her influence on the Itargaining outcome is. It will turn out, however, that in this special
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proceed to subperiod / + 1 if f < T\
The stages of the renegotiation game in some subperiod
order to enforce a desired outcome/ However, it was the intention of both parties
to avoid this situation when making the contract.
Second, in the bargaining model of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Mal-
comson (1997) there is nothing similar to stage 4. So in their model, a party cannot
take her outside opportunities if she is selected to make a proposal. Malcomson
(1997, p. 1928) argues that it is more plausible to assume that one party is always
able to make a final offer before the other party quits for an outside option, instead
of having one party making an offer and quitting for its outside opportunity if it
is turned down without waiting for a counter offer." The reason why in the model
of this chapter both parties the one who makes an offer and the one who has to
respond—are given the opportunity to end the game in each round is one of syn>
* Notice that industrial actions are in general forbidden during the period a wage contract applies.
However, firm and worker might have other means to harm each other if there is a disagreement.
The firm might, for example, announce short time work, and the worker might reduce her effort.
Notice, that this gives the worker an advantage: reducing her effort will be relatively painlcM to
her but harm the employer, whereas working short time harms both partie*. Moreover, the firm
often has to obtain permission for short time work from the works council.
"These alternatives reflect the two formulations of outside options in bargaining theory drawing
back to Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Snaked (1994).124 Chapter 6. Wage gape, labour contracts and surplus sharing
metry between the parties when they do not have the opportunity to refuse work.
This argument can bent be explained by example. Consider the renegotiation game
without stage 4 and assume that one party is selected to make the wage proposals in
all Hubperiodit. Assume furthermore that the wage initially fixed in period 0 makes
this party's outside option binding. Obviously, thus party would be willing to quit
if the wage is not renegotiated. However, without stage 4 the rules of renegotia-
tions would not allow for this, and the (always) responding party can effectively
resist any adaptation of the wage. The proposing party would be, as it were, taken
hostage, and a high probability of being selected as proposing party -reflected by
the parameter 0 would not be a sign of high bargaining power, as is the common
interpretation, but turn out to be a sign of weakness. Moreover, it is not plausible
to assume that there is a rule (implicitly) forbidding a party to quit at any time it
wants to.
There are two characteristics which distinguish this renegotiation game (and that
of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)) from other non-cooperative bargaining models,
drawing back to Kubinstein (1982). First, an explicit distinction is made between
outside options and disagreement payoffs. As Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989)
show, both should not be confused if a bargaining situation is to be modelled ad-
equately. Outside options become relevant, for the game's outcome only if one party
can credibly threaten to abandon the negotiations in favour of another opportu-
nity, whereas disagreement payoffs accrue to the parties as long as no agreement is
reached. Uwause they actually determine the cost of delaying an agreement they
are by far more important for the outcome. The outside options, in contrast, just
constitute restrictions to the bargaining outcome.
The second important characteristic of the renegotiation game is that when there
is a disagreement the parties can always come back to the latest wage level they could
agree upon in a previous subperiod (or the contract wage wo from period 0). Hence,
this wage determines the disagreement payoffs in the game. As long as it leads to
payoffs not less than the outside options, there is no cost of disagreement and the
pressure to come to a mutual consent is virtually nihil."
6.4 THE OUTCOMES OF RENEGOTIATIONS
6.-1. i Cofnp/ete in/ormalion
In the following the characteristics of the renegotiation game are presented verbally
rather than in a formal way. Must of the results can be understood intuitively. The
reader interested in the underlying mathematics can refer to the appendix of this
chapter on page 135 ff. Throughout this section it is assumed, that the outside
options «u- and a/.- mid the worker's marginal product do not change in period 1
(i. e., they are the same in all subperiods f = 1,..., 7"). However, as it is assumed
that the renegotiation game continues even after an agreement has been reached,
"Only if it is assumed that worker and firm might refuse to let work occur, a disagreement is
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it is straightforward to generalize the results derived in the following to multiple
shocks (see also pp. 127).
In order to explore the outcome of the game the information available to th<<
parties has to be taken into account. Assume first that they arc fully informed
about their own and their opponent's outside option and about the worker's marginal
product.'" Obviously, they will end their relation at the earliest possible time when
it becomes clear that the sum of the outside options exceeds the marginal product,
Of + aiv > m. In this case, no wage rate can be found that distributes the marginal
product such that both parties prefer maintaining the employment relation to their
outside opportunities (see scenario (b) in figure 6.3), and a separation is efficient.. If
however the employment relation generates a positive surplus, it is continued. The
effective wage is then determined by the renegotiation game. As the contract, wage
u/o determines the disagreement payoffs, it will co-determine the outcome of the
game. Two scenarios can be distinguished."
First, if the contract wage Ls such that both firm and worker earn at least their
outside options, u>o > aw and m — tun > a/.-, renegotiations cannot, alter the wage.
If in any subperiod a party makes a wage proposal in her favour, the responding
party will reject at stage 3 of the game and the contract wage remains valid. Neither
agent has an incentive to end the relation at stages 3 or 4. Thus, rejecting a proposal
different from the contract wage is not costly, and the contract wage w<i is retained
throughout all subperiods in period 1. This outcome is depicted as scenario (a) in
figure 6.3.
Second, if the contract wage makes one of the parties' outside options binding,
i.e., either 0 < u>o < aw orm-af < too < fi, but still generates a positive surplus,
m > af + aiv, both parties are interested in maintaining the employment relation
given an adequate distribution of the surplus. However, if the party whose outside
option is binding does not expect that the wage is altered, she would choose her
outside opportunity at either stage 3 or 4 of the renegotiation game. As this would
mean an inefficient separation, the other party has an incentive to give way to a
wage change. The circumstance that the disagreement payoffs are still determined
by the contract wage strongly forces the outcome of the renegotiation game to be
close to the original wage. Whereas the party whose outside option Ls binding would
effectively face a loss compared to his outside option during a disagreement, the
other party receives more than she can expect after the agreement Ls reached. As
shown in the appendix (p. 139) the outcome of the renegotiation game converge*
to the contract wage t^o, restricted by the outside option under consideration, with
increasing number of subperiods 7\ In this case, the other party becomes the residual
claimant; the wage is set at the level of the binding outside option. This situation
is depicted by the scenarios (c) and (d) in figure 6.3.'^ If the number of remaining
'"The case of asymmetric information will be discussed in the following subsection.
"The results referred to in the following arc derived in the appendix. It should be noted they
only hold if firm and worker have equal time preferences. If this is not the cane, multiple equilibria
are possible. Furthermore, it is assumed that the parties arc risk neutral.
'^Notice that this result does not hold if the parties can decide whether the marginal product
















Figure tf.5: Contract and effective wage under complete information. u>o is the con-
tract wage, that was fixed in period 0 (before work can occur), u> is the
effective wage in period 1, m — ap is the wage that makes the firm's out-
side option binding, and aw is the corresponding wage for the worker.
The case where u»o < 0 or u>o > m, is not depicted.6-4. The outcomes of renegotiations 127
subperiods is relatively small, the altered wage might provide a payoff well above
the outside option to the respective party.
The results so far were derived for the case that the worker's marginal product m
and the outside options ap and «u remain constant throughout the whole period 1.
However, the longer period 1 lasts, the more likely the values of these variables will
change over time. Apparently, in this case the outcome of the renegotiation game
will be qualitatively the same if the parties do not anticipate future developments of
m, af and a»-, and if after their values have changed the disagreement payoffs are
no longer determined by the—now obsolete- contract wage, but by the latest wage
rate both parties have agreed upon. Then, the effect is again only altered if it makes
a party's outside option binding. However, even if the occurrence of future changes
is anticipated, the predicted wage pattern is not necessarily different, if the number
of subperiods between the anticipated shocks is sufficiently large. The reason is that
in each subperiod before such a shock occurs, the responding party at stage 3 can
successfully resist any change of the current wage rate as long as neither outside
option is binding. If however the current wage makes an outside option binding the
••—o^ J-.~J.~-.J— -..ill -A-U »~—......p,» —«u •.w.i IU -.._—_i_,^ ^..i.^ ;,..„* _„...,; v,«,
current outside option. The reason is again that the disagreement payoffs are always
determined by the latest wage the parties could agn>e upon. However, after a shock
has occurred, the wage rate will be adapted immediately.
Figure 6.4 shows how under complete information the effective wage might de-
velop if the outside options change over time. As long as neither outside optioti is
binding, the wage rate remains constant. If however one agent's share of the sur-
plus drops below his outside option, the wage rate is changed in the way that this
agent will earn precisely his outside option. It should be noted that this adaptation
process is somewhat idealized. The depicted co-movement only results if the renego-
tiating parties believe the change of the outside option to be permanent and unique,
and if there is a sufficiently large number of subsequent subperiods. Otherwise, the
renegotiated wage might provide the party whose outside option is binding with a
considerable share of the net surplus. However, once the wage is renegotiated, it will
remain constant until an outside option becomes binding again. So the wage might
not slightly glide with the outside options but perform jumps. But even when allow-
ing for these implications the mast striking implication of the model the stickiness
of the wage rate as long as no outside option is binding—remains intact.
(ab)used for putting pressure on the other party, a party might be worse off when work occurs at
the contract wage than when no work occurs, i. e., either u>o<0orwo>m. Anno work will occur
until an agreement is reached, the contract wage is irrelevant for the outcome of the renegotiation
game. Hence, it becomes similar to a game of the Rubinstein type. The parties agree upon a wage
that divides the net surplus according to the probabilities 0 and 1-0 that either the firm or the
worker is selected to make a wage proposal in a certain subperiod. The outcome is only restricted
by the outside options. The parties can prevent such a situation by agreeing on penaltien a party
haa to pay if she refuses to let work occur. If the penalty is sufficiently high, work is preferred to
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tf.^.2 Asymmetric in/ormaJion
'1'he results of the previous subsection were derived under the assumption of complete
information. Both agents know their own and their opponent's outside option as well
as the worker's marginal product. As can be expected in this case, the resulting wage
is always efficient in the sense that no inefficient layoffs or quits will occur. Though
complete information is a common assumption in most models of bargaining, it
is hardly found in real-life bargaining situations. The worker will not have full
information about her value in the firm, m, and the firm's outside option, Of,
whereas the firm will lack full information about the worker's outside option, OH-.
Rather, they will hold beliefs about these variables.
As the analysis of the renegotiation game with multiple periods is extremely
difficult, only the wage proposals firm and worker would make in a one-period game
are derived in the appendix on page 140. As usual, these proposals are similar
to those that would occur with monopsonistic or monopolistic wage setting; both
parties determine their wage proposal such that their expected payoff is maximized,
taking into account the (subjective) probabilities that the opponent might reject the
proposal or even end the employment relation and choose their outside opportunity.
Under the most simplifying assumptions, the resulting proposals are
u> = m - or -
where JYy and -Yu are non-negative terms reflecting the parties' beliefs about their
opponent's outside option (and the marginal product) and about the opponent's
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parties propose wage rates that consist of their outside option plus a mark-up, taking
into account that these proposals might induce their opponent to end the relation-
ship.'"' Formally, this result is equivalent to the two non-bargaining scenarios in
the model of Hall and Lazear (1984), and same as in their model, this wage-setting
behaviour can lead to inefficient quits and layoffs.
Thus inefficiency is not lessened when looking at the renegotiation game with more
than one subperiod because the parties are not able to obtain more information and
update their beliefs in the course of time. As work can occur at the contract wage
or at a wage the parties agreed upon in the previous subperiod even if a proposal is
rejected, provoking a disagreement by proposing a new wage or rejecting a proposal
is costless and cannot serve as a credible signal that one party's outside option is
really binding.'^ The only situations where information is revealed are when a party
accepts a proposal or when the employment relation is terminated by either a layoff
or a quit. In both situations this information is of no use.
On this background the wage proposals in subperiod 1 of a multi-period rene-
gotiation game will obey the same rules as those calculated for the one-shot game.
It is important to note that these are no equilibrium proposals in the seiute that
they are always acceptable. Whether they will be accepted depends on the beliefs
of the responding agent. It is passible that there is a continuous disagreement in
all subperiods of the renegotiation game without one party separating. In addition,
even if it was efficient to alter the wage due to a change of one party's outside option
(or the worker's marginal product), an according proposal might be rejected because
the responding party cannot verify the claim.
As a result, wages will be even more inert under asymmetric information than
they are already under complete information. Furthermore, inefficient quits and
layoffs can occur.
6.5 THE WAGE GAP AND WAGE CONTRACTS
The opportunity to alter a contractual wage during renegotiations and the informa-
tion available during these renegotiations will in turn have an effect on the contract
wage itself. The purpose of renegotiations is to adapt the wage level to unpredictable
exogenous shocks that affect the parties' outside options and the marginal product.
If there is complete information in period 1 this enables the parties of an employ-
ment relation to avoid inefficient quits and layoffs the relation is continued as long
as it yields a positive (net) surplus. Though determining the parties' payoffs, rene-
gotiations are not a device for rent sharing.'^ This happens when the wage contract
'''Only if a party's wage proposal is equal to the wage that makes his outside option binding, this
party can be sure that his opponent will not end the employment relation unless it is inefficient
anyway.
"This characteristic distinguishes this game from the multistage bargaining game of Sotx-I and
Takahashi (1983). In their model, rejecting a proposal is a costly signal because work doe* not
occur in disagreement.
'* Recall that the outcome of the renegotiation game is in general independent of the distribution
of bargaining power, reflected by the probability that a party is selected to make a proposal in the130 Chapter 6. Wa labour contracts and surplus sharing
i« fixed in period 0 before the employment relation actually starts.
Figure tf.5: Outcomes of the renegotiation game in the (ow, m - OF) space, depend-
ing on the level of the contract wage u><). The size of the different areas
is correlated with the probability that the values of (dn',m - a/r) are
within this area.
Source: Hall and Lazear (1984), Teulings (1995).
Suppose that the outside options ap and aw and the marginal product m do not
change in the run of period 1. If their values are not known when firm and worker
settle a wage contract, the parties are faced with the following problem, depicted in
figure 6.5. For each passible level of the contract wage there are combinations of aw
and m - «/•• (area I in the figure), for which it does not have to be renegotiated, and
combinations that make an adaptation of the wage rate necessary (areas II and IV).
In area II upward renegotiations and in area IV downward renegotiations would be
necessary in order to avoid an inefficient separation. Area III finally comprehends
combinations for which continuing the relation is inefficient no matter at which level
the contract, wage is set.'^
Firm and worker will be especially concerned about the occurrence of combina-
tions of uu and m - a/.- in the areas II and IV. If there is complete information in
period 1, the firm will earn its outside option in area IV and the worker will earn
her outside option in area II. and their respective opponent will become residual
claimant. As the danger of inefficient separations does not exist (the size of area III
does not depend on M>U), the firm strives at a contract wage as low as possible in
renegotiation game. There is, however, one special case where this is not true: if the contract wage
makes a party's outside option binding («''* ^ [a\»-.rn - a/r]) and if either 0 = 0 or 0 = 1 (one
party can make all thr proposals). As the contract wage cannot be maintained without making
the party \vli«v<- mitsiili- option is binding separate, the ever proposing party can set a wage such
that tin- i-tln-i i>.ut\ just rixrivns her outside option, no matter whose outside option was binding
at thi . outi.i. I wage.
"So»- KISO I rulings (1995).6.6. Conclusions 131
order to avoid a situation as in area IV, whereas the worker has just the opposite
aim. At the end. the influence the contract wage has on the probabilities to end up
in area II or IV might be more important in bargaining than the actual level of the
contract wage.
The parties' motives are different when there is asymmetric information in period
1. Because it is not warranted that the wage is adapted for combinations of a\v and
m - OF. represented by the areas II and IV, inefficient separations might occur.
Therefore, next to getting a share of the surplus as big as passible, 6of/t parties
have the common interest to find a contract wage that suffers no pressure from
renegotiations. Thus, they will jointly strive at maximizing area I, and the wage
contract will be less influenced by the distribution of bargaining power than with
complete information.
These arguments still enforce the predictions concerning the wage gap that can
be derived from the discussion in the previous section. With complete information,
renegotiations ensure that the wage is adapted whenever a party's outside option
becomes binding. This allows for rather extreme levels of the contract wage, which
would just make a correction possibly reckoned on necessary. With asymmetric
information, wages are more inert in period 1. As a consequence, firm and worker
try to stabilize their relation by avoiding to end up in a situation where one of
their outside options becomes binding. If they are successful, there will be even less
pressure on the wage. The occurrence of a wage gap should therefore be the more
likely the more information about his opponent a party has available.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter attributes the occurrence of a wage gap to the need to adapt wage
contracts to changing economic circumstances in order to avoid inefficient quits
and layoffs. A renegotiation game is discussed that can provide the needed wage
flexibility without unnecessarily undermining the original wage contract. However,
to which extent renegotiations can serve this purpose depends on the information
available to firm and worker. The outcome will be the more efficient the more
accurate the agents' beliefs over their opponent's outside option are. As Hall and
Lazear (1984) show, avoiding inefficient separations is impossible in the absence of
full information. This has to be recognized when the wage contract is settled before
the labour relation starts.
The model combines characteristics of the early Phillips-curve models of the wage
gap in the tradition of Hansen and Rehn (1956), Gerfin (1969) and others, and of the
bargaining models drawing back to Holden (1988, 1989, 1998), which have gained
interest recently. As in the latter models, wage gaps are the result of deliberate
renegotiations between a firm and its employees. In contrast to these models, wage
contracts allow for renegotiations not in order to bargain about surplus sharing for a
second time, but to avoid inefficient quits and layoffs. Therefore, the predicted wage
pattern is more in line with the early Phillips-curve models of the wage drift and the
adaptation hypothesis. By focusing solely on labour demand, these models however132 Chapter 6. Wage gaps, labour contracts and surplus sharing
only provide an explanation for the need to adapt wages, but not for the actual
adaptation process. To this respect, this chapter has provided a microeconomic
foundation for the Phillips-curve theory. However, its scope goes beyond this. It
also focuses on the mutual dependency between contract and effective wage, which
ha* been disregarded not only by the theories mentioned above. '*
An obvious objection against the model as an adequate explanation for wage
gajw is that it does not make a difference between effective wages above or below
the contract wage on theoretical grounds. In other words, there is no downward wage
rigidity. The wage gap, however, is per de/imhonem a positive difference between
contract and effective wage.
However, there are arguments that tone down this objection. First, wage drift
(and the wage gap) occupied economists mainly in the 1950s and 60s, a period
that was characterized by rapid wage increases. Thereafter, when this development
moderated, tlit* interest waned remarkably. It is therefore possible that for historical
reasons it has been overlooked that part of the wage gap might be due to mechanisms
that can also work towards the other direction, an effective wage lower than the
contract wage, too.
On this background it is worth noticing that effective wages below what has been
initially agreed upon in a labour contract are not just an esoteric theoretical result.
Kin pineal studies of Baker, Gibbs, and Holinstrom (1994) and McLaughlin (1994) of
wage dynamics in the US suggest that there is a significant share of workers staying
with the same employer while experiencing nominal wage decreases. When looking
at real wages instead this share is naturally even greater. Moreover, the reported
share of employees who receive nominal wage increases of precise/y zero stands out.
As is predicted by the model presented in this chapter, there obviously ore forces
that resist any wage change.
It should be noticed that such patterns might be specific for non-corporatist
countries and especially for the US."* However, wage increases are still more common
than decreases. But taking into account the characteristics of employment contracts
the model can account for that. Agreements about remuneration are normally settled
in nominal terms, mostly for reasons of controllability and enforceability. Though
indexing the wage is theoretically possible, it often turns out to be impracticable in
reality. Next to control and information problems the parties would have to agree
upon the relevant price index. As time passes, inflation does not only erode the
purchasing power of wages, but also effects the agents' alternative opportunities and
'"In the Phillips-curve model as well as in the efficiency wage models of Schlicht (1992) and
Gahlen and Ramaer (1087), or in the search model of Klcinhiickelskoten and Spaetling (1980), the
contract wage is taken as an exogenous variable. Moreover, the "contract wage" just serves as
some kind of benchmark in theae models and could easily be replaced by "previously valid wage",
which could its well be the previously valid effective wage. In contrast, it is in principle possible to
determine the contract wage in the models of local and central bargaining (see c. g. Holden 1998).
'"Malcomson (l!)i>7) reports an asymmetry in labour relations in the US: if an employer announces
ii \\,\i.r , h.tiu'.r .mil an employee continues to work, be it under protest, the modification is assumed
to I', i'llr. n\c If in contrast an employee demands a change, and the employer continues the
eni|»lo\ iiu'iit nlation. the claim is not supposed to be accepted. Consequently, the employer can
act as « monopsonist. However, in long-term employment relations, employees are better protected.6.6. Conclusions 133
the worker's marginal product in nominal terms. Employees are aware of rising
wages elsewhere, and space for raising money wages is created by increasing product
prices. It is therefore more likely that for a given wage rate the employees outside
option becomes binding rather than the outside option of the employer, resulting in
a positive gap.
Moreover, there might be an information problem that causes downward rigidity.
As was shown, the effective wage has a tendency to stick at the level prescribe! in the
contract if the parties are not fully informed about their opponent's outside option.
As Hall and Lazear (1984) and the discussion of the asymmetric information case
in this chapter have shown, it is in general impossible for a party to credibly reveal
her outside option to the other party. Whether renegotiations can lead to necessary
adaptations of the effective wage levels therefore depends on —possibly biased—
information from other sources. It then seems plausible to assume that a firm's
management has lietter information about the, at least awragr, outside option of
its employees than a single employee has about her marginal product and the firm's
outside option: a firm in general employs several workers, and information about
the average wage levels for certain professions and branches arc frequently published.
Workers, on the other hand, have to deduce information about their job's value in
the firm from rather vague indicators as the number of incoming orders and the
general economic situation.
Other reasons for a downward rigidity of nominal wages might l>e found in psy-
chological factors. Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) report that most people
consider it to be unfair if an employer takes advantage of an increased outside op-
tion. As, unlike the situation in the US, wages often can only be changed by mutual
consent, employees might resist any attempts to cut wages even if such a behaviour
is not optimal in view of the renegotiation game presented in section 6.3. Moreover,
even an employer who can behave as a monopsonist cannot dismiss fairness con-
siderations, because employees might express their discomfort with a lowered wage
with a decrease in effort. If an efficiency wage argument plays a role in labour re-
muneration, this can be costly for the firm while causing virtually no cost for the
employees. Both, the mentioned information problem and the psychological factors
would lead to a situation in which the wage Ls raised (and a mark-up on the contract
wage is paid) when upward renegotiations are necessary because the worker's outside
option has become binding, whereas in the opposite case, when the firm's outside
option becomes binding, downward renegotiations fail, and the employment relation
is—inefficiently- dissolved by the firm.
Though the model of this chapter provides an explanation for the occurrence of a
wage gap, it must not be overlooked that the assumed institutional setting Ls rather
extreme, especially with respect to the renegotiation game. There are several factors
that would flaw such renegotiations in reality. First, it is hardly possible for a firm
to organize them, on a regular basLs. for each employee. Furthermore, bargaining
is rather costly as it consumes time and resources to obtain and process nfrcessary
information. Both parties would gain if at least the employees could delegate the task
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and a works council the predicted outcome will not change substantially, but might at
least partially avoid the efficiency problems associated with insufficient information.
The multistage wage formation process that has evolved in corporatist countries
might be explained on this background. At the beginning of an employment relation,
management and employee bargain about sharing a surplus. As time passes, the
relation is subject to external shocks. These can be aggregate shocks affecting a
whole biwiiuws or even the whole economy, or idiosyncratic shocks on the firm level.
Kirm level renegotiations might fail to properly account for the former. Again,
insufficient, information might play a role. As Teulings (1995) argues, the gap could
be filled by collective wage agreements.
Other points that deserve further analysis are the implications for employment
and the invest incut derisions of both parties. In principle, both factors can be used
to manipulate the net. surplus or the outside options in order to achieve a greater
payoff. The firm, for example, could manipulate the parameters decisive for the
renegotiation outcome through its choice of the employment level. By hiring more
workers, the firm could decrease its employees' marginal product and claim wage
concessions. Because workers are interested in maintaining the employment relation
as long an a positive net surplus is created, they might be willing to accept a lower
wage in case the (inn's outside option becomes binding. That this kind of behaviour
on the part of linns is not observtxl might be due to the arguments put forward in
favour of downward wage rigidity. Moreover, such a behaviour will undermine the
linn's reputation and if specific investments play a role -lead to hold-up on the
side of the workers.
Workers, on the other hand, might have an incentive to direct parts of their in-
vestment, or effort, into increasing their outside option, instead of investing only in
the employment relation, in order to get a greater share of the surplus. The impli-
cat ions of this possibility for the efficiency in an employment relation are analysed
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6.A DERIVATION OF THE OUTCOME OF THE RENEGOTIATION C;AMK : '>•
6..4./ Complete tn/ormatton .: : '•
We will solve for the outcome of the renegotiation game in several steps. First, we look
at the last subperiod T and calculate the special solution for u>/\ Then we turn to an
arbitrarily chosen subperiod t < T in order to derive some basic characteristics that help
to analyse the game. Afterwards we state and prove some propositions about the game's
outcome that will finally provide the general outcome of the game under complete infor-
mation. If not mentioned the contrary, we will assume that the labour relation is efficient,
i.e., that m-Of - aw > 0.
Subperiod T
Assume first that neither agent has ended the game in the subperiods before T. Denote
the wage that was valid in subperiod T - 1 by u>r~i, and the wage that will be valid in
subperiod T by I»J-. We will solve for the outcome of the renegotiation game in subpcriod
T by backward induction:
At stage 4 (if reached), the agent selected to make a proposal in this subperiod decides
whether to continue the game or to end it. If he decides to end the game, both agents
will earn their outside option, U7-|,.,,,i «t «. 4 = iiv and nr|,.,,,i «i m 1 = «;••• If he continues,
both parties engage in production and share the marginal product m according to the
wage U>T determined at stage 3. In this case, the payoffs are ur|continue m «t 4 = IOT and
Trlcontinue at »t. 4 = m — tur- Hence, if the worker is the selected agent, she will continue if
u'7- 6 [ow,m], and if the firm is selected, it will continue if u>-/- 6 [0, m - af].
At stage 3, the responding agent has to decide between accepting the selected agent's
wage proposal, rejecting it in favour of U>T-I, or to end the game. First, consider the
case where the firm is the responding agent. It has to make a decision between u>r-ii
the worker's proposal 1117- and ending the game. Choosing the latter option yields again
payoffs of ur|end at »t 3 = aw and n7 |e,,<i «t «t 3 = op. Furthermore, the firm knows that
deciding for a wage which is smaller than aw will make the worker end the game at the
following stage. It will not decide for a wage greater than m - af-, because this option
cannot yield a higher payoff than ending the game. Hence, if WT-I,U)^ € [aicm - ap]
the firm will decide for the lower of the two wages, if 11)7-1 G [aw,"i — a*.-] but u>-/^ ^
[OK- , m - af] it will decide for u> 7-- 1 and reject the worker's proposal, if w^' € [a w, m - apj
but U>T-I £ [dHr,m — OF] , it will decide for u;^ and accept the worker's proposal, and if
Ufr-i.^r £ [aiv.ni - OF] , the firm will end the game. If the worker is the responding
agent, her decision will be the same, except for the case tur-i.u/f € [aiv,m - a*-] where
she will decide for the higher of the two wages.
At stage 2 the selected agent has to make a wage proposal. Consider the decision of
the worker when being selected. If u>r-i 6 |aw,m — ar|, she knows that her proposal will
only be accepted by the firm at stage 3 if her proposal u;-^ is le«s than u;/- -1. However,
the worker has no interest in making such a proposal because it would yield a lower payoff
to her than u^-i- So the worker has no interest in making a proposal.'" If however
WT-I £ [aicm — af], the firm will only end the game if also u;-^ £ [dif,m - ap]. Hence,
"If the worker is forced to make a proposal by the rules of the game, she will optimally propone
some wage greater or equal than t^r-i, knowing that the firm will reject it anyway. In order to g g q r g j
simplify the notation, assume that the worker will propose u>" = m — o/r if u*r_ 1 £ (oiv.m - of ]136 Chapter 6. Wage gaps, labour contracts and surplus sharing
the worker will set w^ = max [aiv.m - OF] = m — OF, the firm will accept this proposal
and trade will occur. In case the firm is selected to make a proposal, the argument is
similar. The firm's optimal proposal will be u>f = min [dit.m - ar| = aw.
Hence, the expected wage in subperiod T before Nature makes her choice about the
proposing agent is given by
if wj i £ [aiv, fn — OF]
Furthermore, both agents expect trade to occur in T and to earn a payoff at least as high
as their outside options.
Some general characteristics
Having solved for the (conditional) outcome of the renegotiation game in subperiod T, we
can now turn to some general characteristics of the game. First, we make some useful
conventions
For simplicity mistime that both agents have the same time preference reflected by the
dim-omit factor <5 € ]0, 1( .•*' Denote the expected discounted payoff of agent i, i = /% W, as
Hiihgame-pcrfect. outcomes of the subgame starting in subperiod f, given a wage u> that was
valid in Mime subperiod <' < t by V," HO = £^_, o"V (m, HO)' *"«"* t;'(u>, MO)
is the piiyoll agent, i gets in subperiod 2 when u> was the valid wage in £'. Let the total
surplus generated in the labour relation be S; in subperiod < and the total discounted
surplus be S< = £l»«^*~'*«> then the maximal achievable surpluses are given by
«r = max {OF + a»,m} V t < T,
r
-t
— (OF + o»v
1 -(5
with s,* = in if the labour relation is efficient, and s," = OF + an if it is inefficient, i.e., if
m — OF — on- < 0. We now turn to some basic characteristics of the payoff functions.
Proposition 1. fftangr o/tAe
// t/»e /a6our tr/afton «.< f/f«cien(. (Vie minimum and tAe mantmim discotinfed paj/oj^s an
i, t = F, W, can ever ejpecf in a stifcpenod < < T as su6jame-per/ect outcome* o/ tA«
starring in t are jtven by
V I, mm V^X'-'
V," "" =
w/ierr a, and <Jj are (Ae outside options o/ (Ae agents.
^'Notice that this is a crucial assumption. If the time preferences are not the same, the outcome
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Pnoo/. Consider an arbitrarily chosen subperiod ( < T. Suppose that agent i is selected to
make a wage proposal in this subperiod. At stage 4 (if reached), after agent j has decided
whether to accept or reject the proposal (or to end the game) agent i must make a choice
between continuing the game or ending it. If he ends the game his (certain) discounted
payoff is given by V',' (end). If he continues the game with the wage «'t picked by the
responding agent j at stage 3, he expects his discounted payoffs to be V,' (ti><|t). Supp<xse
that V,' (u>i|t) < V,' (end). Then agent i will optimally end the game and earn his outside
option a, henceforth. If however V,' (u>,|f) > I',' (end), he will optimally continue the game
expecting a discounted payoff at least as high as V,' (end). Now V,' (end) = £,V, <$' 'a,.
Suppose now that agent i is the responding agent. At stage 3, after agent j has made
his proposal u>/ he must decide between accepting this proposal, rejecting it in favour
of u?t i, or ending the game. Denote the corresponding expected discounted payoffs by
V,' (u)i-i|t), V,' (ur/|t) and V,' (end). The agent chooses to end the game if I',' (end) >
max { V,' (u>f-i|t), V,' (u^|<)} . In this case, he will earn his outside option a, henceforth.
Consequently, V,' (end) = £)!=< ^*~'<*t-
Note that if agent t decides to end the game at stage 3 or 4 and earns his outside
option henceforth, also agent j will earn his outside option henceforth. Consequently, each
agent i, t = F, W, can expect a discounted payoff of at least V,'' '"'" = £, , <5' 'a* =
-a;. D
The maximum expected discounted payoff of agent t, t = F, W, can be calculated as
the maximum surplus in case the labour relation is efficient minus the minimum expected
discounted surplus of agent j. So V/ '""" = 5,' - V/ """ = £'^, <T Sri - £'[ , 6' 'a, =
'"* _a— (m - aj). Agent t cannot expect a higher payoff, because this would imply that
agent j earns less than his outside option. Agent j would end the game in this case and
both agents would earn their outside option. If however V,' = V/' """, agent j is just
indifferent between continuing and ending the game. D
The analysis of the determination of the valid wage in a subperiod f can be done in a
quite simple way without solving the outcome of the renegotiation game in ( :
Proposition 2. ^5<o6ti»<y /j
5uppo.se tAat tAe emp/oyment ne/atton is e^ctent and t/wt u><-i u t/ie vaitd" wage in
»u6period t — 1. 77»en u> / u^r -1 can oniy fcecome tne vaiid* wage in auApenod t i/ »< t»
strict/y pre/erred" fty 6oth agents.
Proo/. Denote the expected present value payoffs from having u;, i a« valid wage in « by
K' (ui( i|f) and V'/ (tui _ i jf), and the present value payoffs from having u) as valid wage in
t by V,' (u)|t) and V/ (u)|t). Suppose that agent i is selected to make a proposal. Then, at
stage 3, agent J must decide between accepting or rejecting t's proposal (and ending the
game). He will prefer accepting a proposal u> to rejecting it if V/ (ti>|0 > VV (t«( -1 |f) • If
however Vy" (u>,-i|t) > V/(tS|i), he will prefer to reject the proposal. Consequently, at
stage 2, agent i will optimally make a proposal u> / u.'(_i which satisfies
w = arg max V," (u>|t) s.t. V,' (u>|<) > V/ (w, _, |<).
If there is such a wage, agent j will accept it. Otherwise, Wi-i will be the valid wage in
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Proposition 3. f.S'tafeWity //,/
t-i i» (Ac va/wf wa^e m
«ufcpent>d t - 1. 7'/ien it unM ai«o 6e t/»e vaitd tiNi^e in sufcpenod t »/
/*roo/. Agent i strictly prefers an alternative wage w to u>»_i if V,' (u>|f) > V,' (wt-i|t), and
agent j strictly prefers u> to w« i if V/ (u)|t) > V/ (u/< 11<) • (Note that these conditions
imply that V,' (w|0 > V/ (a,) and V,' (u>|t) > V,' (a,), because otherwise, one of the agents
would prefer to end the game.) Adding up the two inequations yields V,' (u>|f) + V/ (tD|t) >
V,' (u>, i|0 + V/ (wi 11() — 5*. Hence, both conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously,
HI id by proposition 2a, wr i must also be the valid wage in subperiod ' D
Note that proportion 3 implies that once a wage w € [att-.m - OF] has become the
vulid WIIK«' i" « Hiibpcriod < < T, it will also be the valid wage in all subsequent subperiods
until 7' (or until the agents' outside options change such that one of them becomes binding
given the ongoing wage).
Outcome of the renegotiation game
So far wo have shown that once a wage tu € [flH',m — OF] has become the valid wage in
a subperiod / < T, it will also be the valid wage in all subsequent periods. This implies
that if the agents have bargained a wage wo 6 [aiv.m - OF] in period 0, it will remain the
valid wago throughout period 1; renegotiations cannot alter the wage level and the contract
holds. However, u>o might be set such that it makes either the worker's outside option bind,
Wo < oif, or the outside option of the firm, u»o > m - ap. In these cases, the contract has
to be renegotiated, because otherwise one of the agents would prefer to end the game.
Proposition 4. ff/ptrani and doumwani r
// </»c rmp/oj/men/ nc/ation is p/jSctent, u>o 6 [0, m] and T su/j'ictent/y /arje, tAe otilcome
o/ </»e renegotiation gante is as /o//ou;s:
i. //«>» € [atv,m - OF] , u>o un// rematn tne voitd waye in ai/ ««6periods t < T, and t/ie
to t/ie agents are given 6y
u. = u>o Vt<T,
f. //u>o 6 [0,<iH'[ ftAe outside option o/ t/»e uwrfcer « btndingj, u» = an unft 6e
t»a/id mage in ai/ suftpenods f < T. and tAe payojff.i to tne agents are given by
u, = ovv V t < T, t/i = 5Z **"'«« = ~ . ow,
= rn-an Vt<T. n, = ^<5*"'T, = y—^- (m -6.A. Derivation of the outcome of the renegotiation game 139
5. // two € ]m — op, m] (t/ie outside option o/ tAe /irm is frtndtnoj, w = m - a*-
(Ae valid wape tn ai/ subpertods t < 7\ and t/ie payo/fs to Me apmts arc atven
u, = m-OF Vf<7\ t/i = V<J'"'u, ()
" 1-cS
T
t <• J , Hi = > O JT| = — I-OF. ~ *-^ 1—0
« = l
Proo/. Part (1) of the proposition has already been proven. Note that it is true for all T.
The proof of parts (2) and (3) can be done jointly. Consider subperiod f < T and assume
that there was no agreement so far, i.e., u»o was the valid wage in all subperiods before
t. Denote the subgame-perfect wage proposals in t by u>f and u>" . Note that ti>f .wj*' €
[aw, rn - ap] and that these proposals are acceptable. Since we have complete information,
the agents also know what the subgame-perfect proposals in the following subperiod, UJ,., |
and u','\i, will be. Ignore for the moment the possibility that an agent might end the
game if the proposal is rejected. Then, if they reject wf or ii/" , they will earn u (tAi) =
twi and TT(U>O) = m - two in subperiod t and expect to earn u(0u;/Vi +(1 — 0)u»JVi) =
0w£t i + (1 - 0) UJJV i and 7r (0u>/+1 + (1 - 0) u>)+1) = m - 0w/Vi ~ (1 ~ ^) *"i+1 henceforth.
Therefore, the wage proposals have to satisfy
Ml J«l+1
T T
E <T~' (m - u>," ) > (m - u>o) + <5 >
or equivalently,
Furthermore, the proposals have to satisfy wf > aw and u;J" <m-aF, because otherwise
an agent might end the game if a proposal is rejected. Note that both agents will opti-
mally propose the same wage level if the right hand of the inequations is within the range
[oir.m — OF] ." So we have
wf > a«-, u;J* <m-or.
Rearranging we get a first order linear difference equation,
^' This means that the agents' optimal proposals are equal to the expected wage proposal in escb
subperiod (except of subperiod T). Hence, instead of solving for 0t»f + (1 -fl)u;,'*', t < 7\ we
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which ha* the general solution
The optimal wage proposals in subperiod T if U>T- I ^ Imcm — OF] are given by u>j- = a»v
and uij! = m - of . Hence, the optimal proposals in subperiod 1 are u>f = UJ" = *I, if
4>i € [oiv.m -ar], with*, = * ,**T'"*> + <*' ' r^r I*"**" + ^ - 0)(m - OF)] • Note that
liniT—<x> •• • u*>- Thin cannot be the valid wage, however. Therefore u;f = ui}* = aw if
the worker's outside option is binding, u><i < aiv, and u;f = u;* = m - OF if the firm's
outside option in binding, u»o > m - a/.-. The agent whose outside option is binding cannot
expect n higher payoff than his outside option by either rejecting these proposal if he is the
responding agent, or proposing an alternative wage if he is the agent to make a proposal.
•
The Intuition behind this result is that before an agreement about a wage within the
range [<i» , rn - OF] in reached, the agent whose outside option is not binding, has a higher
payoff in Htil>periodn before the agreement is reached than he can expect to have afterwards.
On the other hand, the agent whose outside option is binding, has payoffs lower than his
outside option in these subperiods. Hence, the latter agent would like to reach an agreement
an soon as possible, whereas the former would like to postpone an agreement, would not he
have to take into account that the latter agent might end the game. Therefore, both agents
come immediately to an agreement with the former agent receiving his outside option.
tf.j4.2 /Isymmetric in/ormotton
Suppose that the firm has private information about its outside option <JF and the worker's
marginal product m, and that the worker is privately informed about her outside option
<iu . Furthermore, both agents hold believes about their opponent's variables.
In order to illustrate the effects of this assumption on the outcome of the renegotiation
game, consider a one-shot version of the renegotiation game" and assume that the firm is
selected to make a proposal.
At stage -1, the firm has to decide whether to end the relationship and earn its outside
option af in this subperiod, or to continue and receive the marginal product minus the
wage selected by the worker at stage 3. In the latter case, the firm earns m - u>. Obviously,
the firm will continue the relation if u> < m — ar. Suppose that the worker assigns a
probability /*/• to the case that the firm will continue the relation. It is reasonable to
assume Hint /•'" = 1 if te = te^, i.e., that the worker believes that the firm is always
willing to continue (and let work occur) if its proposal was accepted.
Upon this belief the worker has to choose between accepting or rejecting the firm's
proposal u»* , or ending the relation. When accepting the worker knows that she will
earn «>*", when ending the relationship she will receive her outside option au , and when
rejecting the firm's proposal she expects her payoff to be P^UHJ + (l - P*") oir. So the
worker will end the relationship only if both wage levels, u>o and tr^, are less than her
outside option. Moreover, she will prefer accepting the proposal to rejecting it if u>^ >
/'* uv + (1 - P^)«ir. This, however, means that the firm, when determining its optimal
proposal «•'', does not only have to hold a belief over the worker's outside option but also
'•"I.e., the game is played only in a single subperiod. Equivalently, consider subperiod T.6.A. Derivation of the outcome of the renegotiation game 141
over the worker's belief over m — ar, reflected in the probability P*\ It can neglect the
latter, if it makes a wage proposal greater than the previously valid wage. In this case,
the worker can assume that the firm is willing to continue the relation under both wage
levels and will assign a value of one to the probability P* . For wage proposals less tlmn
the previously valid wage, the firm has to take the worker's belief into account, though.
Consequently, two cases have to be distinguished when analysing the linn's lii'lmviour
at stage 2. If it is committed to make a proposal not less than the previously valid wage,
it sets
ti>*" = arg max P*" (m - u^) + (l - P") OF
p"
= m — OF —
where P" is the probability the firm assigns to the case that the worker will continue the
relation given this proposal, and ^p- > 0. Note that at. stage 3, rejecting the proposal is
always weakly dominated by accepting it.
If there is no restriction on the firm's proposal, the structure of beliefs becomes much
more complicated. In order to keep the notation simple, denote the probability that the
firm assigns to the case that the worker will accept a proposal given the previously valid
wage by Q" , the probability that the worker will reject, by Q}} , and the probability that
the worker will end the relationship by Qy . Obviously, all these (subjective) probabilities
depend on u/ and w. It is reasonable to assume that
The firm then sets
t/" = arg max Q^(m-W'') + QR 1+ Qg
with x = wo if the firm continues the relation after the worker has rejected its proposal,
and x = ap if the firm ends the relation. In the latter case, the optimal wage proposal
simplifies to
F <?*
which is similar to the equation when the firm was committed to set a wage not less than
the previously valid wage.
The optimal wage proposal the worker would make can be calculated similarly.CHAPTER 7
Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses again on the question, whether a wage-setting scheme in which
a contract wage is determined that can he altered subsequently can bo efficient. As
in the previous chapter, two criteria are used for efficiency: first, does the wage-
setting scheme avoid inefficient quits and layoffs, and second, doiw it induce firm
and worker to make optimal investments in the employment relation? In answer-
ing these questions, we will use a set-up similar to that of the previous chapter 6.
However, while that chapter stressed the importance of specific investments, which
generate returns that accrue directly to the investor, we will now focus on the type of
investment that is generally considered to be typical for employment relations: tin;
worker exerts herself in the job and generates some output, which does not accrue
to herself directly, but to her employer, who in turn pays a wage to the worker.
The question addressed in this chapter is therefore, whether there are contracts
providing for a wage gap, which induce an efficient investment or, as we will call
it, allocation of effort—in the firm.
The indirect link between the investment (exertion or effort) and its returns
(the wage) does not create a problem as long as the employer and the worker can
make an enforceable contract about the investment. If, however, the worker can
evade control by the employer and the investment decision becomes a hidden action,
making a contract that induces a desired investment is a nontrivial task.
This problem has evoked an exteasive literature that can be structured along
two closely related ideas—efficiency wages, especially the shirking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), that is used at several places in this thesis,' and principal-
agency. In the shirking model, a firm is usually perfectly able to control its worker's
exertion (her effort) in the job, but because monitoring is costly, it confines itself to
taking samples and threatens its workers with sanctions if caught shirking. Since
monitoring is incomplete and the hardest possible sanction is usually a layoff, the
firm will pay a so called efficiency wage that consists of an optimal mark-up on the
worker's outside option to induce the worker to provide the desired effort in order
to keep her job. The efficiency wage is announced fte/ore the worker decides about
her effort.
'See chapters 4 and 5
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Principal-agency in a broader approach that applies to a wide range of relations
between two parties called principal and agent. The principal wants the agent to
undertake a certain costly action, but he cannot monitor the agent. Instead, he
receives information that is only indirectly related to the agent's action.^ The prob-
lem of the principal (in our setting the firm) is to find a transfer (a wage) to the
agent (the worker) to induce the desired action. Because the firm cannot simply tie
the wage to the worker's unobservable input, the optima) transfer is usually related
to the n-ceived information. The wage is therefore determined a/<er the worker has
decided about her action. Consequently, the contract between firm and worker must
consist c >f .1 \«. iiv-setting scheme describing how the wage will be set ci po.«<, after the
firm luth i" < ivrd the information. In the simplest setting, the optimal wage-setting
scheme will reward favourable information and punish unfavourable information, in
order to induce the worker to take actions that increase the probability of favourable
information. In both efficiency-wage and principal-agent models, the wage, or wage-
set ting scheme, is used to reveal the worker's investment, thus resolving the problem
of asymmetric information, and in both kinds of models this is costly to the firm. It
faces a tni<l<--i)tr that usually results in inefficient allocations.
Thi* cliiiptiT adopts the principal-agency approach. It assesses the performance
of different wage-setting schemes in a highly stylized, yet reasonably realistic relation
between a firm and a single worker, based on a model of Aghion, Compte, and Jehiel
(1998). The worker's investment decision consists of the allocation of one unit of
effort over two uses: in the firm, in order to increase the total surplus to be generated
in the employment relation, or outside the firm, in order to increase her outside
option. The firm cannot observe the effort allocation directly, but it can observe the
generated surplus (the worker's marginal product), and it receives a signal about
the worker's outside option. Based on the signal, the firm can assess the worker's
real outside option only if it has a correct estimate of the worker's effort allocation.
As far as only the allocation of effort in the firm is concerned, this setting is a
standard textbook principal-agent problem. The firm maximizes its profits subject
to an incentive-compatibility constraint, which results from the worker's utility-
maximization problem and describes how much effort the worker will allocate in
the firm given a certain remuneration scheme. Usually, the incentive-compatibility
constraint equalizes t ho marginal cost of effort allocated in the firm with its marginal
return. As the returns accrue directly to the firm, the firm must promise to give
the worker a certain share in the returns generated by the effort allocated in the
linn, i.e., in her marginal product.' The resulting effort allocation will typically be
inefficient from a social point of view, as the firm will not transfer the whole surplus
alternative definition is given by Fudenbcrg and Tirole (1991, p. 243): "..., [T]here is a
'principal' who would like to condition her actions on some information that is privately known
by the other players, called 'agent*.'" For a comprehensive overview of principal-agent models see
also Hart and Holmstrom (19S7).
'An even better solution for the firm would be to punish the worker for generating a low surplus.
However, this is usually prevented e* ante by the participation constraint, which will be discussed
in the next paragraph, and ex po*i, because either the worker can evade the punishment, or because
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to the worker. "
This problem could in principle be resolved by letting the worker enjoy the whole
returns of effort allocated in the firm, minus a predetermined lump sum for the firm.'
Yet, the firm has to take another restriction into account, namely that the worker
participates in the contract. If the firm fails to pay a wage that is not at least
equal to the worker's outside option, the worker will quit. As long as the firm can
observe the outside option, it can tailor the mentioned lump sum to avoid a quit.
However, two features of our model complicate the situation: the outside option is
private knowledge of the worker, and the worker can influence her outside option by
allocating effort outside the firm.
In this chapter, we will not stress the information problem, but focus on the
effect of the worker's ability to influence her outside option. If the worker can
choose between allocating effort in the firm or outside, the following problem arises:
one cannot simply tie the wage to the worker's marginal product only, in order to
make the worker allocate all her effort in the firm and maximize the total surplus
of the employment relation. Instead, the contract l>etween firm and worker must
also reward the worker's investment in the outside option, because' otherwise the
contract might jeopardize the employment relation, if the wage makes the outside
option bind ei posf.
The problem of finding an "optimal" contract that on the one hand provides the
appropriate incentives for the worker to allocate all her effort in the firm, while on the
other hand it respects the e:r pos< participation constraint'', is virtually unsolvable in
general terms. The worker is—using the terms of principal-agent theory described
by a two-dimensional type space, her marginal product, and her outside option,
which makes it hard to derive meaningful results.** Moreover, the incentive compat-
ibility and participation constraints are nonconvex, and, as Rasmusen (1994, p. 176)
points out, they will therefore "... rule out a very complicated set of possible wage
functions."
In view of these difficulties, the strategy chosen in this chapter is based on a sim-
plified version of Grossman and Hart's (1983) three-step procedure/ Rather than
directly attacking the optimization problem of the firm or a benevolent dictator,
we investigate in the incentives different wage-setting schemes provide to both cm-
*For example, the contract might provide for a piece rate reflecting the market value of the
worker's output, but in order to earn that rate, the worker has to deliver a certain amount of
output for free.
''Strictly speaking, the term participation constraint means that the worker has to agree to the
contract ex ante, i.e., before she decides about her effort allocation, while we are concerned with
an ex post constraint that avoids a quit of the worker after the consequences of her allocation have
become visible.
sSee for example Laffont, Maskin, and Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), and Rochet
(1985).
*The term three-step procedure was not invented by Grossman and Hart themselves, but it was
coined later on by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Related to the problem at hand, the three steps
would be, (1) to find for each possible effort level the set of wage-setting schemes that induce this
effort level, (2) to find the wage-setting scheme that induces this effort at lowest cost, and (3) to
find the most efficient combination of effort and cost-minimizing wage-setting scheme.146 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
ployees ami employer. For each of these schemes we identify the effects of different
parameters, concerning the distribution of bargaining power, the size of minimum
wages, and the information structure, on the effort allocation, as well as on the pay-
offs of worker and firm. At this point, the goal is not only to find constellations of
parameters that lead to an efficient effort allocation, but also to find out, whether
the preferences of worker and firm concerning these parameters coincide. The under-
lying idea is, that an optimal wage-setting scheme would both, provide the worker
with the incentive to allocate all her effort in the firm, and be preferred by firm and
worker to other wage-setting schemes.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the general structure of
the employment relationship l>etween worker and firm, and it explains the assump-
tions about the information structure of the model. The sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5
then focus on the characteristics of different wage-setting schemes. In the first part
of section 7..'l, the effective wage is solely determined by (Nash) bargaining between
worker and firm. From this simple wage-setting scheme, some general conclusions
about the behaviour of the two parties are derived. The second part of this section
extend* the one-tier to a two-tier wage-format ion process by adding an exogenous
minimum wage that can make the bargaining wage bind. Two-tier wage-formation
processes are also discussed in sections 7.4 and 7.5. Section 7.4 analyses the perfor-
mance of a wage-setting scheme similar to the one of the previous chapter 6, in which
an exogenously given contract wage is only adjusted if it makes the outside option
of either the firm or the worker bind. Section 7.5 discusses a wage-setting scheme,
in which an exogenously given contract wage serves both as a minimum wage, and
as a co-determinant of the threat points, when worker and firm negotiate over the
distribution of the joint payoff. Finally, section 7.6 compares the outcomes of the
different wage-setting schemes and discusses the implications for the occurrence of
wage ga(KS.
7.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The time structure of the model is very similar to the model of Aghion. Compte,
and Jehiel (1998). The model deals with the relation between an individual worker
and her employer over two time periods, which are depicted in figure 7.1. In the first
period, both parties meet and agree to start an employment relationship. No work
occurs in this period. Instead it is used for decisions around the effort allocation of
the worker.
First, firm and worker agree on a wage-setting scheme u>. This can be a fixed
wage rate, or a prescription how the wage is to be determined in the second period,
after the worker's marginal product m and a verifiable signal s about her outside
option have realized.
The worker has one unit of effort which she can allocate for two uses: in the
firm, in order to achieve a greater marginal product, and outside the firm, in order
to improve her outside option. We assume that firm and worker cannot include
the effort allocation in their contract, because it is private knowledge of the worker.7.2. Assumptions 147
firm and worker meet
wage setting scheme us is set
" firm announces belief i^
worker decides about
effort allocation e
marginal product m and
signal s realise
Period 2 **8* ^s.m.ii) is set
worker decides whether
to take up work
payoffs are made
7./: The time structure of the model
However, after the wage-setting scheme is set, the firm announces its belief r; nl>out
how much effort the worker is going to allocate in the firm. This belief is assumed to
be static in the sense that the firm will not update it after it has olwrved the signal.
Knowing the wage-setting scheme and the firm's belief, the worker decides about, her
effort allocation, i. e., how much effort she allocates in the firm (e), and how much she
allocates outside (1 -e). Notice that the assumption that P is a continuous variable is
one of the important differences to the assumptions of Aghion, Compte, and Jehiol.
As we will see, this difference can have severe implications for the outcome of the
model.
The effort allocation influences the distribution of the signal a and the marginal
product m of the worker. They realize at the beginning of the second period and
are observed by both parties. We assume that in period 1 the functional forms of
the probability-density functions of s and m are known by both the worker and the
firm. However, only the worker knows her effort allocation, while the firm has an
incorrect perception of the distributions, unless it holds a correct belief about the
effort allocation.
The probability-density function and the distribution function of the marginal
product are denoted by #(m|e) and G(m|e), with g(m|e) > 0 for m € [mo.mi]
and all e, and g(m|e) = 0 for m ^ [m«,mi| and all c. The more effort the worker
has allocated in the firm, the greater Is the probability that the realization of the
marginal product exceeds a certain value m* G [mo, "ii). However, the more effort
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probability: -w'-yv. »
a rr (m > m ) ao (m |e) cr^ rr (m > m )
9e c)e ~ ' cte^
l^^=0 (7.1)
A similar assumption in made for the signal.«. It Ls some verifiable evidence about
the worker's outside option, for example a concrete job offer or an advertisement for
a job for which the worker qualifies. If the worker is allocating effort outside the
firm, she is acquiring skills that can be iLseful in alternative jobs, and she is actively
searching for job offers. These activities will increase her value for other employers,
and they will produce evidence about her value outside the firm, e. g. in the form
of letters of potential employers, or advertisements for jobs for which the worker is
suilrd Consequently, a lower r (more effort allocated outside the firm) increases
tin i II.UM i of a high signal. However, we assume that the more the worker allocates
outside the linn, the less is its marginal effect. We denote the probability-density
function and the distribution function by /i (.s|t) and // (s|e). with /i (s)e) > 0 for




Although the signal is verifiable evidence about the worker's outside option, it is
typically not equal to the outside option. If, for instance, the worker presents a job
offer as evidence, the relation between signal and outside option can be distorted in
two ways: first, the job offer will not necessarily translate into a job, and second,
an alternative employer might promise to pay wage supplements which are not con-
tractible, and which the worker can therefore not present as evidence. Either way,
the outside option will be positively related to the amount of effort the worker allo-
cates outside the firm, because the worker then acquires more skills useful in other
jobs. We assume that there is a positive relation between the signal and the outside
option, which is the stronger, the more effort the worker has allocated outside the
firm:
(7.3)
Moreover, we assume that the worker's outside option increases in the amount of
effort allocated outside the firm, but that the effect becomes smaller the more effort
the worker has already outside the firm,
ton *££U 0, v, (7.5)
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We assume that both the firm and the worker know the functional form of the
worker's outside option a(s,e). Consequently, if the firm has a correct perception
of the worker's effort allocation, T/ = e, it knows the distributions of the marginal
product m and the signal s before they realize, and it knows the value of the worker's
outside option after the signal has realized.
Recall that the effort allocation is private knowledge of the worker. We assume
that the firm cannot infer the correct value of r from the realization of the signal or
the marginal product. However, the firm knows the worker's objective, the wage-
setting scheme, and the functional forms of the density functions and the worker's
outside option. Therefore, it will typically be able to solve for the worker's optimal
effort allocation.
A last set of assumptions concerns the firm's outside option a/.- and the payoffs
generated in the employment relation. Because we want to focus especially on the
effects of the worker's outside option, we assume that the firm's outside option is a
constant, that is known by both firm and worker already at the beginning of period 1.
Moreover, same as in the previous chapter, we assume that the employment relation
is efficient in the sense that a greater joint payoff is generated in the relation than
outside, i.e., the worker's marginal product always exceeds the sum of the outside
option of the firm (a/r) and the worker (a(s,e)):
m > a(s,e) + a/r Vs,m,e
=• mo > a (si, 0) -I- op (7.6)
This assumption ensures that there is always a wage rate that makes both the firm
and the worker prefer to maintain the employment relation to choosing their outside
option. Hence, any quit or layoff is inefficient. The only possible reason for a
separation of firm and worker is asymmetric information.
7.3 NASH BARGAINING
7.5J 77ie e/for< ai/oca<ton o/ ffte u/orfccr
The first wage-setting scheme that is analysed in this chapter is bargaining about
the effective wage tu/v, after the marginal product and the signal have realized.
Same as Aghion, Compte, and Jehiel (1998), we will examine a slightly adapted
Nash-bargaining solution that accounts for asymmetric information be.twwn the
bargaining parties. Because the bargaining outcome ti;^, if accepted by the worker,
becomes the effective wage, the wage-setting scheme of this section does not make a
provision for a wage gap. Nevertheless, it is useful to analyse this rather simple wage-
setting scheme, for it provides some general insights in the behaviour of firm and
worker under asymmetric information. This will prove to be useful when analysing
the other wage-setting schemes. Another reason for dealing with Nash bargaining
in detail is that we will augment the model with a minimum wage in section 7.3.3.
The difference between minimum wage and bargained wage can then be interpreted
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In the course of bargaining, the firm will attempt to maximize its profits 7r =
m — u»/v, while the worker will try to maximize her wage U>N- Doing so, both parties
make wage pro{>osals such that the opponent's payoff be as close as possible to his
outside option. In a noncooperative bargaining game a la Rubinstein (1982) the firm
would propose a wage that is equal to the worker's outside option plus an amount
that makes the worker just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer,
while the worker would follow a similar strategy proposing a wage that is based on
the firm's outside option
However, because the firm does not know the worker's effort allocation, it can
only baw its proposals on its perception a(«, 77) rather than on the true outside
option «(a,r). Consequently, the bargaining outcome is described by
= arg max (m - tw - ap)* (u; - a (a, rj))'~*
(7.7)
where 0 € (0,1] In the bargaining power of the firm, and 1-0 the bargaining power
of the worker. The bargained wage is a weighted average of the worker's outside
option as perceived by the firm, and the marginal product, minus the firm's outside
option, with the weights being the bargaining power of the firm and the worker.*
At the moment the worker has to decide about her effort allocation in period 1,
she knows the linn's belief, the distribution of bargaining power, and the distribu-
tions of the signal and the marginal product contingent on her decision. For the
moment, we neglect the possibility that the worker wants to quit if the bargained
wage turns out to be lower than her outside option. Then, the worker will choose
to allocate that amount of effort in the firm that maximizes the expected wage




"The argument about the bargaining game follows Aghion, Compte, and Jehiel (1998). It
should be noticed, however, that it is not entirely correct: if the firm overstates the amount of
effort allocated in the firm, r; > e, its estimate of the worker's outside option will be too low.
This can but need not -load to a breakdown of the negotiations, namely if the firm fails to
make acceptable wage proposals and if it has too much bargaining power. In order to avoid an
unnecessary complication of the analysis, we neglect this case and assume instead that the wage
u>jv is the bargaining result, which the worker might reject by leaving the firm. In this subsection,
we will moreover assume, that the worker is locked in the employment relation and has to accept
u\\-. Later on, this assumption will be relaxed.
"The second-order condition,
!• strictly negative by equations (7.2), (7.3), (7.4), (7.5) and (7.1) in section 7.2. Hence, the first
order condition (7.8) describes a maximum.7.3. Nash bargaining 1S1
weighs the marginal effect of effort allocated in the firm on the expected perceived
outside option and on the expected marginal product by the relative bargaining
power of the firm and the worker. The greater the bargaining power of the firm is,
the more important the firm's perception of the worker's outside option becomes
for the determination of the bargained wage, and the more effort the worker will
allocate outside the firm in order to produce better evidence about her outside
option.'" At the same time, it becomes less important for the worker to achieve a
greater marginal product. In the opposite case, the marginal product, becomes more
and more important, and the worker will allocate more effort in the firm.
By differentiating equation (7.8) with respect to the firm's bargaining power,
de
gfl»E[q(...n)|r| < 0, (7.9)
we see that the wage maximizing amount of effort allocated in the firm is indeed
a decreasing function of the firm's bargaining power." The effect on the expected
bargained wage is also negative, as the worker can only partially compensate for its
lower share in the marginal product by allocating more effort to her outside option:
dE[u;,v|e|de _
The effect on the expected profits of the firm is ambiguous. On the one hand, the
firm gets a greater share in the marginal product, because the wage decreases. On
the other hand, the marginal product decreases because the worker allocates more
effort outside the firm:
dE[7Tjv|e] dE[m|e] dE[wyv|e] 9E[m|e]dc #E[u;/v|e] ._,
However, as the effect via the effort allocation is only indirect, it is likely that the
positive effect of an increased share in m is prevailing. In the opposite, case, the firm
could increase its expected profits by keeping a lower profile in the negotiations with
the worker. In any case, a higher bargaining power of the firm comes at the cost of
a lower efficiency of the employment relation, as it diverts effort from the relation
and leads to a lower expected marginal product.
Another parameter that influences the worker's effort allocation is the firm's
belief 77 about the amount of effort e the worker allocates in the firm. The total
differential of the first-order condition (7.8) with respect to the firm's belief is
-j- = ~ .aan,.,.^i.i .^ *" .. /ari,..,...i.i >0 for C < 1. (7.10)
'"Recall that by allocating more effort to her outside option, the worker acquires more skills that
are valuable outside the firm, and she increases her search activities on the labour market.
"See equations (7.25), (7.26), (7.30) and (7.31) in the appendix for the signs of the derivatives
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itive relation between the belief rj and the real effort allocation e is due to
the effect of the belief on the wage proposals the firm makes when negotiating with
the worker. After the firm has learned the signal .<* at the beginning of period 2. it
forma its perception of the worker's outside option, a (A, r;). The greater its belief r?
is, the lower will be its estimate of the relation between a and s, and the lower will
be its wage proposals, which are based on this estimate. Therefore, it pays less for






7.2: The worker's effort allocation as a function of the firm's bargaining
power, at two different beliefs rft > f/i.







The belief r; is peculiar because, on the one hand, a rational firm should form its
belief on the basis of tho behaviour of the worker (i.e.. on the basis of the first
order condition (7.8)), while on the other hand the behaviour of the worker is just
influenced by the belief the firm announces. There are two possible consequences of
this characteristic. First, the firm could announce its true belief, taking the worker's
behaviour into account. This would result in fixed points r; = e (0, r/). According to
Brouwer's fixed point theorem at least, one such fixed point for each distribution of
bargaining power will exist. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether a
fixed point is unique or whether there is a multiplicity of points, without specifying7.3. Nash bargaining 153
the functions.'^ In case there are multiple fixed points, the firm could in principle
choose. As its expected profits increase in the amount of effort allocated in the firm,
the firm would then optimally decide for the greatest fixed point.''
A second possibility is that the firm does not care about fixed points but uses its
belief as a strategic variable. In this case, the firm would not announce its true belief
but a greater value in order to achieve a greater expected profit. This possibility
Ls problematic, because the worker can see through the manipulation, which would
undermine the firm's bargaining position. During the wage negotiations the firm
could not credibly assert that the worker's outside option is lower than it actually
is. The consequence is that either the firm has to take back its claim, or that the
negotiations break down. Yet, the firm will avoid a break down of the negotiations,
as this would leave the firm with only its outside options. Hence, pretending that
the worker's outside option is lower against better knowledge of the worker is not a
optimal strategy. Moreover, even if the firm succeeds in reaching a bargained wage
based on its false belief, it risks that the worker quits if her real outside option turns
out to be greater than the wage.'* This possibility was up to this point ruled out
by assumption.
We will now relax the assumption that the worker Ls locked in the employment
relation, in order to provide another argument why the firm cannot, deliberately
announce an exaggerated belief. We will show that the fixed points r (0,»/) are not
affected when the worker is allowed to quit, while it can be costly for the firm if it
announces a belief that is too high against its better judgement.
If the worker is not locked in the employment relation she will leave the firm
whenever at the beginning of period 2 the bargained wage turns out to be less than
her outside option, .. .^.., .^^ •.«*&*•
= 0a (s, q) + (1 - 0) (m -OF)<O («, e). (7.11)
Because the wage is never less than the outside option as perceived by the firm, a
situation where the worker chooses her outside option can only occur if the belief is
greater than the true effort allocation, 77 > e, and if the firm's bargaining power 0
is high enough to make the wage sufficiently close to the perceived outside option.
In order to identify the combinatioas of r and 0 at which the outside option
can be binding ez ante, notice that the wage is increasing in the worker's marginal
product m, and that both the wage and the outside option are increasing in the
signal s. On the other hand, the outside option reacts more strongly to an increase
in the signal if the firm overestimates the amount of effort allocated in the firm.
'^The answer will depend on the size of |{{j (see equation (7.10)). If it is either leas or greater
than one for all T;, the fixed point is unique. Otherwise, multiple fixed point* can exist.
"In the model of Aghion, Compte, and Jehiel (1998) there are indeed two fixed points (called
equilibria) for a certain range of bargaining power 0. However, this result is due to their assumption
that effort is a discrete variable, e € {e""',e'°} . Their dual fixed points capture the different—
possibly unique—fixed points that occur if effort is a continuous variable.
'•"The firm might succeed if it is negotiating a wage not with only one worker, but with a group
of several heterogeneous workers. However, in this case the firm's belief will most likely be wrong
for every individual worker, anyway. i**-'.i :•?«'* s-=••*• • «•• -w-« > ••«- -;•-.•-< > .*• -•• •"*- — ••-.'--154 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
Hence, we can define two critical values e^ and 0j^ such that
0JV<J (01,7/) + (1 — 0Jy) (mo — Of) = o (^li^Jv) • (7-12)
For values (9 < 0J^ of the firm's bargaining power, and values e > e^ of the worker's
effort the outside option cannot be binding because there are no signals s € [so.*i)
and marginal products m € [m«,mi] that satisfy inequation (7.11). Notice that the
greater the critical bargaining power is, the more effort the worker must allocate in
the firm in order to avoid that her outside option can become binding: the first- and
second-order total differentials of equation (7.12) are
(™° - «r - a («,,!,))» < a
• We can now consider the allocation decision of the worker. At the moment the
worker has to decide about her effort allocation in period 1, she now expects her
payoff in period 2 to be
v i" th^ non-negative additional expected payoff due to the opportunity to
nxin. In the appendix on p. 186 ff. its characteristics are analysed in detail.
fiaOMlM the gap between the firm's belief and the true effort allocation narrows when
thr worker allocates more effort c < r/ in the firm, the additional expected payoff
is decreasing in t. Therefore, for combinations (0,e) € ((0j^, 1], [0,ej^,)), where the
outside option can turn out to be binding, the derivative of expected utility,
is smaller than the derivative of the expected wage, and the worker will choose to
allocate less effort in the firm than in the scenario where the worker is locked in the
employment relation. However, l>ecause her outside option cannot become binding
if the worker chooses the same effort allocation the firm has predicted, the fixed
point (s) r = »/ are not affected. See figure 7.3 for a comparison of the two scenarios.
In contrast to the scenario of section 7.3.1, the reaction of the worker now makes
it costly for the firm to—at least massively—overstate its belief. If the firm exag-
gerates, the worker will not only choose to allocate less effort in the firm, leading to
reduced expected profits, but she might ultimately decide to quit, leaving the firm
with an ex post profit just equal to its outside option.
Due to the inability of the firm to succeed in bargaining with a false exaggerated
belief, as well as due the potential cost involved if the firm succeeds with a false7.3. Nash bargaining 1S5
e
Figure 7.5: The worker's effort allocation with the opportunity to quit. The shaded
area indicates combinations of c and 0 where the worker s outside option
can become binding. The probability that the outside option becomes
binding is equal to zero on the curve r^, (0^,) and equal to one on the
. ; lines e = 0 and 0 = 1 within the area. The dashed line is added for
comparison with the scenario where the worker cannot quit.
belief, the firm is highly restricted in using its belief as a strategic variable. For the
performance of the employment relation this Ls good as well as bad: on the one hand,
the firm Ls prevented from jeopardizing the employment relationship by massively
exaggerating the belief. On the other hand, a mild exaggeration which does not
endanger the relationship is also prevented, although it would induce the worker to
allocate more effort in the firm, and lead to a higher joint payoff.
The main reason for the failure of the Nash-bargaining scenario to produce the
efficient effort allocation e = 1 Ls that the wage depends on both the worker's perfor-
mance in the firm and on her outside option. The more important the outside option
becomes for the determination of the worker's payoff, the less effort she allocates in
the firm. Unless the firm sacrifices its share in the joint payoff, Nash bargaining
leads to inefficient outcomes.
7.5.5 a minimum u;a</e
In order to establish an efficient fixed point in the Nash-bargaining scenario Aghion,
Compte, and Jehiel (1998) propose the introduction of a minimum wage that replaces
the bargained wage if the bargained wage is less than the minimum wage. They
argue that such a wage-setting scheme with an appropriate minimum wage can
(re)estabUsh an efficient fixed point e = 17 if the Nasb-bargaining wage fails to.
According to Aghion et al.. the minimum wage could be enforced by a union. The166 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
resulting wage-formation process would then be similar to the two-tier processes
discussed earlier in this thesis,''' and could explain the occurrence of wage gaps. As
we will show, however, the claim of Aghion et al. that a minimum wage can enhance
the efficiency of the employment relation, is not necessarily true when effort is a
continuous variable '"
We denote the minimum wage by u> and assume that it is exogenously given, for
example an the result of collective bargaining. The effective wage U>A/ in period 2 is
now equal to
Whether the bargained wage makes the minimum wage binding depends on the
constellation of the signal «, the marginal product m. and the parameters 5 and
77. At it given level of the firm's bargaining power 0 and its belief r/, the minimum
wage becomes binding if « or m realize below certain critical values s^, € (so,S|]
and m^, t (//»<i, mi|. The critical signal just makes the bargained wage equal to the
minimum wage at given rn, 0, and rj,
|,ij) + (l-»)(m-OF) = tD, (7.13)
while at the critical marginal product the same relation holds at si,
0a(«o,»?) + (1 - *) ("»;, - OF) = u>.
In period 1, the worker expects her payoff in period 2 to be equal to the expected
bargained wage plus a term >Uf reflecting the situations where the minimum wage
becomes binding,
Notice that the expected payoff does not depend on the real outside option of the
worker. This is justified because the arguments developed in the previous section
about the firm's belief still apply: the firm announces a belief that leads to a fixed
point «• = »/, and the worker's outside option can never become binding.
The expected additional payoff is related to the expected difference between mini-




Its derivative with respect to the effort allocation is calculated in the appendix on
page 188, equation (7.40). It is equal to
the models in the chapters 3.5, 4, and 5.
"Recall that Aghion et al. assume effort to be a binary variable.7.3. Nash bargaining 157
Its sign is in general ambiguous. However, for extreme distributions of bargaining
power—i.e., under the assumption that the minimum wage can be binding for nil 0—
either the worker's outside option or the marginal product vanish from t In* wage
equation, and by equations (7.1) and (7.2) the derivative of the expected additional
payoff becomes
A comparison of these equations with the first-order condition (7.8) in the Nash-
bargaining scenario shows that in the vicinity of 0 = 0 (full bargaining power of
the worker), the amount of effort allocated in the firm tends to be lower due to
the minimum wage, while in the vicinity of 5 = 1 (full bargaining of the firm),
the amount of effort allocated in the firm just tends to be lower than without a
minimum wage. Although the optimal effort allocations at 0 — 0 and 0 1 cannot
be altered, the equations (7.15) and (7.16) indicate that for 0 € (0,1) the minimum
wage induces the worker to choose less extreme effort allocations than in t lie Nash-
bargaining scenario. If the derivative of the expected additional payoff Is continuous,
the optimal effort allocation will behave as depicted in figure 7.4.
The left part of figure 7.4 depicts the effort allocation when the minimum wage is
sufficiently high, such that it can be binding for all distributions of bargaining power.
If the firm's bargaining power is low, the first-order derivative of the expected wage
is smaller than in the Nash-bargaining scenario, which means that the worker will
choose to allocate less effort in the firm, depicted by the switch from point /I to /I'.
In the opposite case, with the firm's bargaining power being high, the worker decide*
to allocate more effort in the firm, resulting in a switch from point Z? to /?'. The
right part of the figure depicts two possible effort allocations in case the minimum
wage cannot be binding for all distributions of bargaining power. The worker will
still allocate more effort in the firm if the firm's bargaining power is high, but for
lower 0, the effect of the minimum wage on the effort allocation is ambiguous. It
cannot be solved for without specifying the functions.
The described effect of the minimum wage qualifies the claim of Aghion et al.,
that a minimum wage can increase the amount of effort allocated in the firm. The
minimum wage insures the worker agaiast low outcomes of the wage negotiations,
but it does not make a distinction between the case in which this low outcome is due
to a low realization of the signal and the case in which it is due to a low realization
of the marginal product. Therefore, the minimum wage encourages moral hazard.
If, for example, the firm's bargaining power is low, the bargained wage in mainly
determined by the worker's marginal product, and without a minimum wage, the
worker would allocate most of her effort in the firm in order to achieve, a high
marginal product. Although the marginal return of effort allocated in the outside
option is relatively high in this situation, the worker prefers to allocate most effort158 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
high" u> "low" u;
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Fi^wrr 7.^: The worker'* effort allocation in the minimum wage scenario. The
shaded areas indicate the combinations of effort and the firm's bargain-
ing power at which the minimum wage can be binding. The bold line
depicts effort as a function of the firm's bargaining power. Its dashed
part indicates an area for which the shape of the effort function can only
be deduced from its behaviour in the vicinity of 0 = 0 and ft = 1 (points
/I, .4', B. and i?'). For comparison, the thin dashed line depicts the
effort allocation of the Nash-bargaining scenario.
in the firm because also the probability that the signal realizes at an unfavourably
low level is high. The minimum wage, however, protects the worker from this risk,
and she can allocate more effort in her outside option. For the same reason, the
minimum wage leads to more effort allocated in the firm if the firm's bargaining
power is high.
Despite its inefficiencies, the worker will always favour the introduction of a
minimum wage. Its effect on her expected value function is given by
dtD dp dtD 3tD dtD ~
The reaction of the expected profits at the worker's optimum to a change in the
minimum wage is described by
dEfmle]
dtD
_ #E [m|e] de c
de dtD
Since the expected effective wage E[u/.u|e] is always an increasing function in u>,
the effect on expected profit* depends on the worker's reaction to a change in the7.4. Fixed wages and renegotiations 159
minimum wage. If the firm has high bargaining power, the worker will choose to
allocate more effort in the firm, if the minimum wage increases. In this case, the
firm gains from a higher expected marginal product, but it looses from a higher
expected effective wage. Most likely, the overall effect is negative, as the changed
effort allocation is a second-order effect. If, in contrast, the firm has low bargaining
power, the effect on expected profits is unambiguously negative. A higher minimum
wage will still lead to a higher expected effective wage, but the worker will choose
to allocate less effort in the firm, which leads to a lower expected marginal product.
Consequently, the firm will most likely oppose the introduction of a minimum wage
in any case.
The results of this section indicate that a minimum wage that is imposed as
a restriction on the bargained wage, is in general not the best way to achieve an
efficient effort allocation, because it fails to give the adequate incentives. Still,
it is questionable whether such a wage-setting scheme is realistic, anyway. If the
minimum wage is the result of collective bargaining, as Aghion et al. argue, it should
not. just serve as a restriction on the outcome of negotiations between linn and
worker, but influence the whole bargaining process. It is likely that in the course of
bargaining, the parties' threat points are determined by the minimum (or, contract)
wage, and not by their outside options. Models that recognize this are discussed in
the chapters 4, 5, 6, and in chapter 3, section 5 of this thesis. In the following, we will
investigate whether the application of two of these models, the one of Holden (1988,
1989), and that of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), results in more efficient effort
allocations.
7.4 FIXED WAGES AND RENEGOTIATIONS
This section is related to the asymmetric information case of the previous chapter 6.
We consider a wage-setting scheme in which firm and worker still bargain about the
effective wage, but in which their threat points (or, disagreement payoffs) are now
determined by an exogenously given contract wage w;, which is the result of collective
bargaining between unions and employer federations. A related bargaining game is
proposed by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and a modified version of it is analysed
in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. It is based on the most simple assumption that
the disagreement payoffs are just equal to u> for the worker, and m — «/ for the firm.
This assumption can be justified by the common obligation binding on employers and
unions to avoid industrial actions after an agreement has been reached in collective
bargaining.'' Due to these disagreement payoffs it is not costly for either party to
reject a wage proposal that deviates from the contract wage, unless the contract
wage makes one of the outside options bind. In the latter caw;, rejecting a wage
offer that secures for the party with the binding outside option a payoff that is at
''Such an obligation is known in virtually all countries that have a system of collective bargaining.
Yet, apart from industrial action, both workers and firms have other means to make a disagreement
about the effective wage costly. See, for example, the bargaining model of Holden (1988), which is
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least equal to its outside option, will jeopardize the employment relation. Hence, the
wage will bo adapted to the outside option, giving the affected party a payoff exactly
equal to the outside option, while the other party becomes residual claimant. It is
important to notice that the adjustment will occur in mutual consent, because no
party has an inten-st to put the employment relation at risk, and because the wage
is only altered by an amount that is just necessary* to keep the relation intact.
If we apply this bargaining structure to the model of this chapter, the ex post
effective wage uif in period 2 solves
wjr = argmax((m-u>) - (m - ti>))* (t/> - u;)'~*. 0 G (0,1)
s.t. u> > ti), a («,»;) < u; < m — ap.
The first factor in the Nash niaxinmnd is equal to the difference between the firm's
ex po.i< payoff after an agreement has been reached, m — w, and its payoff during
a disagreement, m - u>. This factor can l>e simplified to — (u> — ti>). The second
factor is equal to the worker's agreement payoff tr minus her disagreement payoff
tZ;. lioth factors are weighed by the respective bargaining power of the firm and the
worker. As the two factors are just the negative of each other, the Nash maximand
nan an unrestricted maximum only at uip = u), irrespective of the distribution of
bargaining power.'" The reason for the irrelevance of bargaining power is that,
during a disagreement, neither the firm nor the worker can inflict bargaining cost
on their respective opponent, so their joint payoff after an agreement is reached
cannot be greater than their joint payoff in a disagreement. Consequently, there
is no Pareto-efficient wage other than the contract wage, unless the contract wage
makes one of the outside options bind. Hence,
= tZ>












As was pointed out in chapter 6, this effective wage can lead to efficient specific
investments, i.e., investments that generate returns which accrue directly to the
investing party, because hold up is avoided. In this chapter, however, a different
kind of investment is considered: the effort the worker allocates (or, invests) in the
firm does not accrue directly to herself but first of all to the firm, which then pays a
wage to the worker. In the following, we will show that this change in the assumption
about the kind of investment will in general lead to inefficient outcomes.
In order to derive the worker's effort allocation, three cases have to be distin-
guished. In the first case, the contract wage tr = ti't cannot make any outside option
bind n priori, i. e., a(.si,n) < tt>i < m«i — Of. When deciding about her effort al-
location in period 1, the worker then knows that the expected wage is equal to the
'"This is not true in case cither party has full bargaining power (0 = 0 or 0 = 1). This <
is excluded by assumption. However, in the original noncooperative bargaining game, which is
discussed in chapter 6. a party with full bargaining power cannot carry through a wage proposal
different from the contract wage. Inxause the other party can still reject it.7.4. Fixed wages and renegotiations 16![
contract wage, <
E[u,F,|e] = ti>,, (7.17)
and that her decision has no influence on her payoff. Consequently, the worker is
indifferent between all possible effort allocations, unless additional factors play a
role. Such factors, all beyond the scope of this model, could bo the duration <>f the
employment relation, or loyalty issues. For example, the worker might allocnir all
her effort in the firm expecting that in return, if economic circumstances worsen, the
firm will not lay her off. If, in contrast, the worker faces a certain layoff probability
that is independent of her performance, she will prefer to allocate all her effort in
her outside option.
The second case comprises all contract wages ti>2 that can make the firm's outside
option bind, i.e., mo - u>2 < op. Since by equation (7.6) only one of the outside
options can be binding, the worker's expected payoff in this case does not depend
on her outside option. Her objective is
maxE[t«2|e]= / (m - <JF) y (m|e) dm + / ti>2g (m|e) dm
= «>2- / G(m|e)dm, (7.18)
where m^ is the critical level of the marginal product that makes the firm's ei
payoff exactly equal to its outside option, mj.- - 1S2 = a/.-. If the marginal product
realizes at levels m > mj-j. the firm's outside option will not be binding, and the
worker will receive the contract wage. But for lower realizations of the marginal
product, the effective wage has to be adapted to the firm's outside option, and the
worker will only receive a wage of u;p2 = m-op. The derivative of the worker's
objective,
_ _ /""« aG(m|e)dm > 0,
is nonnegative by equation (7.1). This means, that the worker will allocate all her
effort in the firm, in order to avoid that the firm's outside option becomes binding.
In the last case, the contract wage tD.-j is set such that only the worker's outside
option can become binding, i.e., W3 < a(«i,0). The expected utility of the worker
now depends on the relation between the worker's true effort allocation and the firm's
belief about it. Depending on this relation, two subcases have to be distinguished.
In the first subcase, the worker chooses to allocate more effort in the employment
relation than the firm predicts, e > r/. The firm's perception of the worker's outside
option is always greater than the worker's true outside option, a («, r/) > a (*, e) V *,
and the firm will voluntarily adjust the wage at signals « for which an adjustment is
not necessary, and it will adjust the wage to an extent that is not necessary in order
to maintain the employment relation.
We denote the critical signal that makes the perceived outside option exactly
equal to contract wage, a (Sf-Sa'f) = ti>3, by aj^. The worker's expected effective162 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
wage (and payoff) can now be written as >
E[u>F3je]=/ ti^/i (s, e) ds 4- / a(s,r/)/i(s|e)ds
^^//(s|e)ds. (7.19)
The worker maximizes its expected payoff over the amount of effort allocated in the
firm. BecauHe the derivative of the objective,
c)a//(slc),
in nonpositive for all r, the worker will allocate all her effort in her outside option.
Because this is a contradiction to the original assumption that e > r?, this first case
can never occur if the worker acts rationally.
In the second subcase, the firm's belief is greater than the real amount of effort
allocated in I lie firm, r < n, i.e., the firm will underestimate the workers outside
option for all realizations of the signal, a (.s, ?/) < a (s, e) V s. If the worker's outside
option now becomes binding, the firm will reject a wage adjustment that is actually
necessary to save the employment relation. Either it will reject any adaptation of
the wage, or it will only grant a wage increase that is insufficient to make the worker
prefer to stay in the firm. In either case, the worker chooses her outside option.
Therefore, her expected payoff is
/
'Fill /"*'
tZ>3/i (s|e) ds + / a(s,e)/i(s|e)ds
= a(si,e)- / —^—i/(s|e)ds,
where s£..,,, is the critical signal at which the contract wage is exactly equal to the
worker's outside option, u) = a(Sf3j,,e). The derivative of the expected payoff is
calculated as
36|e) ds* f™.9f#)
+ / u»—^—ds dr
Because it is less than zero, the worker will again allocate all her effort in her outside
option. Obviously, the firm's belief does not matter for the worker's decision, because
both the real outside option and the firm's perception of the outside option are7.4. Fixed wages and renegotiations 16S
increasing in the signal. With the chosen effort allocation, the worker maximises
the expected signal and thereby the probability that her outside option is greater
than the contract wage, without having to fear any repercussions from neglecting
her marginal product. Thus, a low contract wage results in a moral hazard problem
that is similar to the one that occurs under the wage-setting scheme with Nash
bargaining augmented by a minimum wage.'"
Although a contract wage less than the maximal outside option a(.si,O) leads
to an inefficient effort allocation, it will not put the employment relation at risk,
because a rational firm will anticipate the worker's decision and form the belief
IJ = 0. Therefore, there will always l>e a mutual consent, about a necessary wage
adjustment, and the equilibrium expected payoff is equal to E [tHf;»,,|0].
In contrast to the wage-setting schemes we have discussed so far, an infinitesi-
mally small change in the contract (or, fixe*!) wage w can now lead to a discrete
change in the effort allocation, namely if this change results in the switch from one
case to another. This may have consequences for the firm's and the worker's pref-
erences about the fixed wage. As an inspection of the relevant expected payoffs
of the worker in the three cases, (7.17), (7.18), and (7.19), shows, the worker will
benefit from a higher fixed wage in any case, similar to the minimum wap- M cnurio
of the previous section. The expected payoffs of the firm in the three CILSI^, given
the choices of the worker, are equal to
E[7ri|e] = E[m|e]-u), e e [0,1] if a(«i,0) < tZ> < r«o -
E[7T|1] E[m|l]E[u;|l) if m,, - u>< a/.-
if «><a(si,0) (
E[7ri|e] = E[m|e]-u), e e [
E[7T2|1] = E[m|l]-E[u;F2|l)
E[7r3|0] = E[m|0] -E[U;F3«.|0
Within each of the three cases, the firm will prefer a contract wage as low as possible,
because the effort allocation does not change and the expected marginal product is
constant, while the expected wages are increasing in the contract wage. However, if
a change in the contract wage leads to a switch between the cases, the firm might
prefer a higher contract wage.
In order to show that such a situation can (but need not) exist, suppose that the
minimal joint payoff that can be generated in the employment relation, m<, - OF -
a(si,0), is very small such that a(sj,0) « mo - ap. Compare two contract wages
JZ>2 and u>3, and assume that the former is infinitesimally greater than mo - a/.- and
can make the firm's outside option bind, while the latter is infinitesimally smaller
than a(«i,0) and can make the worker's outside option bind. Now compare the
expected effective wages related to u>2 and u>3,
lim E[«;F2|1]= lim u>2 - / G(ro|l)dm =
lim E[«;F3a|0]= lim a(«i,0)- / —^—//(«|0)d« = a(«i,0).
—>a(«i. ) 113—a(»i, ) •'*F3a
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i a(«i,0) « mo — Of, the firm expects that it has to pay virtually the same
effective wage in both cases. At the same time, the expected marginal product is
greater for «/;.-•, because the worker allocates all her effort in the firm.
In general, the firm will approve a contract-wage increase that leads to a switch
from case 3 to caw? 2, if the resulting increase in the expected marginal product is
great enough to compensate for the higher expected wage due to the switch. The
described wage-setting scheme can then lead to an efficient outcome, even if the
rout.rart wage was initially so low that it could make the worker's outside option
liind.
7.5 LOCAL WAGE BARGAINING
Holdcn (1988) proposes a negotiation game which he claims to be suitable for ne-
gotiations between firms and workers on the level of individual firms ("local" wage
bargaining), after the contract wage has been set by collective bargaining. Similar to
the previously discussed bargaining game, Holden starts out from the idea that dur-
ing local wage bargaining, both parties are obliged to avoid industrial actions, such
that tin' disiinriM-iiu'iit payoffs are determined by the contract wage rather than the
outside* options. However, different from the former model, he assumes that workers
can express their dissatisfaction by exerting themselves less in the job—for example
by working to rule, which is not considered to be industrial action. By lowering their
marginal product during local wage bargaining, workers make a disagreement costly
to the firm and can obtain an effective wage that is greater than the contract wage
sot by collective bargaining, even if no outside option is binding.
Tin* Holden model is discussed in detail in chapter 3.5 of this thesis. At this place,
we use a slightly different version adapted to bargaining between a single worker and
the firm, in order to investigate whether it can lead to an efficient effort allocation of
the worker.''"' During a disagreement, the worker can decrease her marginal product
by a factor a (E (0,1), while the firm has to pay the contract wage tZ>. Consequently,
the disagreement payoff of the firm is equal to am — tZ>, while the worker receives
tD. Different from the original Holden model, we make a provision for the case that
the bargaining outcome makes one of the (perceived) outside options bind. In order
to avoid an inefficient quit or layoff, we assume that in this case, firm and worker
mutually agree on adapting the effective wage such that the party with the binding
outside option receives exactly its (perceived) outside option. The effective wage is
then
«;// = arg max ((m — u>) - (am - tZ;)) (u> - tZ))
= argmax((l - a)m - (u> - €•))* (if -
s.t. u> > u>, a(s,rf) < u> < m - ap.
'"'The term "local wage bargaining" for the wage-formation process described in this section is
chosen in order to refer to Holden's model. Notice, however, that o// the wage-setting schemes
diacussad in this chapter are in fact based on some kind of local bargaining on the firm's level.7.5. Local wage bargaining 168
The first factor is the difference between the firm's payoffs during and after the
negotiations, weighed by its bargaining power, and the second term is the related
difference of payoffs of the worker, weighed by her l>argaining power. Notice that,
in contrast to the renegotiation scenario considered in the previous section, a dis-
agreement is now costly to the bargaining parties. Due to the reduced effort during
a disagreement, reaching an agreement will create a surplus, ami the negotiations
are just about sharing out this surplus between the parties. Therefore, bargaining
power matters in this scenario. The resulting effective wage is equal to
•I
tu//i = tD + (1 - 0) (1 - o)m if a(«,r;) < u>«i < m - a/.-
=m-OF if m - U/HI < ap
=a («. f?) if U7H i < o (a, fj)
If the bargained wage makes neither outside option bind, the effective wage is equal
to the contract wage plus a mark-up, which positively depends on the marginal
product, the worker's bargaining power, ami her ability to reduce the marginal
product during the negotiations. The previously discussed scenario of H fixe*I wage
with renegotiations can be interpreted as a special case of the local wage-bargaining
scenario, in which the firm has full bargaining power (0 = 1), or in which the
worker has no ability to reduce the marginal product during a disagreement (n - 1).
As this case was investigated before, we confine the analysis to situations where
To determine the worker's decision about her effort allocation in period 1 we
must again distinguish three cases, one in which the bargained wage makes neither
outside option binding (case 1), another in which only the firm's outside option can
become binding (case 2). and a third, in which only the worker's outside option can
become binding (cases 3a and 3b). In the latter, we must again make a provision
for the case that the firm underestimates the worker's real outside option.
The bargaining outcome can make neither outside option bind « priori if a («i, »>) <
u>+ (1 - 0) (1 - a) m<) < mo - <*F- In this case, the worker expects tin; effective wage
to be




The expected wage is an increasing function of the expected marginal product.
Therefore, it depends positively on the amount of effort allocated in the firm: the
wage provides an incentive to the worker to allocate all her effort in the firm.
In the second case, the bargained wage can make the firm's outside option bind,
t& + (i _ 0) (i _ a) mo > mo - a/r. We denote the critical marginal product that
makes the bargained wage exactly equal to the outside option by m^, ie., u> +
(1 - 0) (1 - o) m^2 = "»//2 ~ "F. or equivalently,166 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
The bargaining wage w//i makes the firm's outside option bind, if the marginal
product realizes at a level lower than mjyj- Then, the worker becomes residual
claimant and earns m - a^ instead of the bargaining wage. Her expected effective
wage is now




[u) + (l -0)(1 -a)m]$(m|e)dm
*




ItH derivative* with respect to the amount of effort allocated in the firm is nonnegative,
Because the effective wage depends on the realization of the marginal product, but
not on the worker's outside option, the worker will allocate all her effort in the firm.
In contrast to the two previously discussed cases, the worker's expected payoff
depends on her (perceived) outside option in the third case. The bargaining wage
can make her outside option bind if tD + (1 - 0) (1 - a) mo < a(*i,0). Because the
wage can only be adjusted by mutual consent, the effective wage depends on the
firm's perception of the outside option. Same as in the related case in the previous
section, we will first assume that the firm either holds a correct belief, or that it
holds a belief that does not lead to an underestimation of the worker's outside option.
Consequently, the worker will never quit for her outside option. This subcase, in
which e > TJ, will be indicated by the index //3a.
If the signal exceeds a critical level sjy^, at which the bargained wage U>HI and
the perceived outside option are exactly equal,
«> + (1 - 0) (1 - a) m = a (sj^n),
the effective wage will be adjusted to the outside option as it is perceived by the
firm. Moreover, there might be a critical mj^, defined by the equation
:= a(*,.IJ).
such that for realizations of the marginal product greater than this critical level
there are no signals that can make the outside option bind. The expected effective
wage is in this case equal to the expected bargained wage plus an additional payoff
A//:<,,, that reflects the situations in which the perceived outside option is binding:7.5. Local wage bargaining 167
The expected additional payoff v4w3n is derived in general terms in the appendix




= (1 - 0) (1 - a) / (1 - /f (,J,,Je)] G (m|e) dm.
Jmo
By equation (7.36) its derivative with respect to e is negative,




because the expected (positive) difference between outside option and bargained
wage becomes smaller the more effort the worker allocates in the firm. Without
specifying the functional forms of the worker's outside option and the density func-
tions of the signal and the marginal product, it is imj>ossibW' to solve for the worker's
optimal effort allocation. However, we can evaluate the derivative of the effective
wage in the vicinities of e = 1, and e = 0. By equations (7.1) and (7.2) the derivative
of the worker's objective converges to
- (1 - g) (1 - Q)
)
The signs imply that the effort allocation that maximizes the expected wage has
an interior solution e € (0,1). The worker will not allocate all her effort in the
firm, because at e = 1. the expected marginal return of effort allocate in the
outside option is greater than the expected marginal return of effort allocated in
the firm (which is equal to zero). Different from the fixed-wage scenario of section
7.4, however, the worker also will not allocate all her effort in her outside option.168 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
According to the efficiency criterion introduced in the introduction to this chapter,
local wage bargaining performs better than the fixed wage with renegotiations.
Which effort allocation the worker will ultimately choose, depends on the prob-
ability that the worker's outside option becomes binding, and on the size of the
oxpfrted additional payoff. Both factors are in turn determined by the contract
wag*-, the worker's share in her marginal product, and the firm's belief about the
worker's effort allocation. These three parameters influence the derivative of the




7 y,,,« #*/ #e
#>a (s, t/) #//(s|e)
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A greater contract wage, higher bargaining power of the worker, a greater ability
to lower the marginal product during a disagreement, and a greater belief of the
firm raise the bargained wage H'HI , and thereby lead to a lower expected additional
payoff. Therefore, it becomes less attractive for the worker to allocate effort in her
outside option. As the total differential of the first order condition ^•l"^f»«l'l _ n7.5. Local wage bargaining 169
shows, the worker will in these cases allocate more effort in the firm,'"
• 0*Elf,».|c) £d*U»




Notice that the effort allocation is more sensitive to a change of the parameters
describing the worker's bargaining power, than to a change of the contract wage.
The reason is that the factor (1 - 0)(1 - a) determines how strongly the bargained
wage ti'Hi depends on the worker's marginal product, which in turn drtri mines
the incentive effect of the bargained wage. The contract wage, in contrast, only
co-determines the level of the bargained wage.
The described effort allocation holds only if the worker accepts the effective wage
itJ//3, and if she does not leave the firm because her real outside option is greater
than the firm's perception of it. If, however, the firm holds a belief r/ > p, the worker
will be forced to quit if her real outside option is binding, because the firm will not.
agree to the necessary adjustment of the wage. In the last part of this section we will
discuss how the worker's behaviour changes, if the firm overcst imiiUw the amount of
effort allocated in the firm, and thereby underestimates the worker's outside option.
This subcase will be indicated by the index //3ft.
When we replace the outside option as jx'rceived by the firm with the worker's
real outside option, the effort allocation does not only influence the probability that
the outside option becomes binding, but also the difference between outside option
and bargained wage. In the equation of the expected additional payoff,
/
•""Hat /•«>




the critical values of the signal and the marginal product, a^and mj^, are now
functions of e. Applying equation (7.36) from the appendix to this case, the derivative
of the expected additional payoff with respect to the amount of effort allocated in
" Since we evaluate the total differential at the utility maximizing level of e, the second derivative
*y.M must be lea than zero.170 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
the firm can be written as . -
=/ / —5—i
+ (1 - 0) (1 - a) I [1 - //
mo
The first Miinmtuid describes the effect of a change in c on the size of the additional
payoff, while tin- last two simimands describe its effect on the probability that the
outside opt ion become* binding. The latter are similar to the corresponding equation
(7.20) for the case 3a, in which the worker accepts the effective wage tu//3. With
all three suminnnds being negative, the worker has an even greater incentive to
allocate effort in her outside option, than in the case where the effective wage W//3 is
acceptable. In contrast to that case, the derivative of the expected additional payoff
can now also be negative in the vicinity of e = 0:
mo
•'1
As the derivative in the vicinity of c = 1 is negative anyway,^" there is now a
possibility depending on the parameters and the distributions of the signal and the
marginal product that the worker will choose r = 0 and allocate all her effort in
her outside option. However, the greater the contract wage, the worker's bargaining
power, or her ability to lower the marginal product during a disagreement are, the
smaller is the difference between the outside option and the effective wage, and the
lower is the incentive to allocate effort in the outside option. The derivative of the
is trw* in ijrnrm7 if the worker's outside option can be binding. See also equation (7.38)
on page 185 in the appendix.7.5. Local wage bargaining 171





Again, the effect of a change of (1 - 0)(1 - Q) will be stronger than the effect of a
change of the contract wage u).
When forming its belief, a rational firm will anticipate the worker's behaviour.
As we argued in section 7.3.3, the firm has no interest to provoke the worker into
quitting, and will announce its belief truthfully. As long as there are multiple fixed
points e = r;, the firm will naturally pick the greatest one, which yields the greatest
expected marginal product and the lowest expected effective wage. Otherwise, if
only a single fixed point exists, the firm can achieve a more efficient effort allocation
only via the bargaining outcome—by conceding some of its bargaining power (lower
0) or by allowing a greater reduction of the marginal product (lower «) during a
disagreement. Most likely, however, the firm has no interest to do so, as both a
reduced 0 and a reduced a have a direct negative impact on the wage cost, while
the resulting increase in effort allocated in the firm yields only an indirect positive
effect on the expected marginal product. This is different from the related case of
the scenario with fixed wages and renegotiations (see section 7.4), where a change
in parameters can possibly induce a switch from e = 0 to e = 1, and lew! to an
increase in expected profits, while the wage cost go up, too. In general, however, the
local wage-bargaining scenario leads to more efficient effort allocations, because for
any constellation of the contract wage, there is a strong incentive to allocate effort
in the firm, whereas in the fixed-wage scenario, strong incentives are only provided
if the firm's outside option threatens to become binding.172 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
7.6 CONCLUSIONS . -.
This chapter haw analysed an employment relation between an individual worker
and her employer, in which the worker can decide how to allocate one unit of effort
over two uses: in the firm, in order to increase her marginal product, or outside
the firm, in order to increase her outside option. The firm can observe neither the
effort allocation nor the workers outside option, but has to form a belief about the
two variables. Using this simple structure, we have discussed the efficiency aspects
of different wage-netting schemes under asymmetric information. Two yardsticks
were used for efficiency: first, whether a wage-setting scheme provides the necessary
incentives to the worker to allocate all her effort in the firm, thereby maximizing the
joint payoff, and second, whether the wage-setting scheme is able to maintain the
employment relationship, which in principle generates a greater joint payoff than the
Mum of the outside options of firm and worker. Table 7.1 on page 176 provides an
overview of the wage-setting schemes discussed in this chapter with respect to their
efficiency.
The result concerning the second problem is that in none of the discussed wage-
Mttlng scliciiu'M tin- tutyitiiiietric information about the worker's effort allocation
puts the employment relation at risk. In all cases, the wage-setting schemes re-
vealed enough information to the firm to deduce the effort allocation of the worker.
Therefore, the only possible reason for an (inefficient) separation would be that the
firm nets dumb and, in order to achieve a lower wage, pretends to believe that the
worker will allocate less effort in her outside option than she actually will. We have
shown, however, that such an attempt to deceive will either not be feasible, because
the worker looks through it, or it can even backfire on the firm: a lower wage in-
creases the probability that the worker's outside option can become binding, which
induces the worker to allocate less effort in the firm. At the end, the firm will see
its expected profit decrease.
The first problem about the incentives of the different wage-setting schemes has
proved to be more complicated. All the wage-setting schemes under consideration
have in common that the effective wage is determined by bargaining between a single
worker and her employer. In section 7.3, we have analysed simple Nash bargaining
between firm and employer about the effective wage. The bargaining outcome turns
out to be inefficient because it depends positively on both, the worker's marginal
product and (the firm's perception of) her outside option. The more bargaining
power the firm has, the smaller is the share of the joint payoff the worker receives,
anil the more the effective wage depends on the outside option, which makes it
increasingly mint tractive to allocate effort in the firm. The firm, on the other hand,
can in principle achieve a more efficient effort allocation, either by misreporting its
perception of the worker's outside option, or by giving up some bargaining power
and letting the worker enjoy a greater share of her marginal product. As turns out,
however, the former is not feasible or even jeopardizes the employment relation,
whereas the latter involves cost that the firm is most likely not willing to bear.
In the last part of section 7.3, a minimum wage was introduced in the Nash-7.6. Conclusions 173
bargaining scenario, in order to check the argument of Aghion. Oompte. and Jehiel
(1998). that it could induce the worker to allocate more effort in the firm. Aghion.
Compte, and Jehiel identify the minimum wage with the outcome of collective bar-
gaining between a union and employers, and reason that, due to the claimed effect on
the worker's effort allocation, unions can enhance efficiency. Our results qualify this
claim because the minimum wage encourages moral hazard. It provides insurance
against unfavourable realizations of the marginal product <imf the outside option,
which induces the worker to allocate her effort more evenly over its two uses. While
this leads to more effort allocated in the firm if the firm's bargaining |x>wrr is high
and the bargaining wage is mainly determined by the worker's outside option, it has
the contrary effect if the firm's bargaining |x>wer is low
Aghion, Compte. and Jehiel's (1998) claim about the efficiency enhancing effect
of unions would even turn out to be wrong if, as is likely, the bargaining |x>wt>r of
employees in the firm is positively related to the bargaining power of their union.
If the position of the employees vis-a-vis the employer is weak, the Nosh-bargaining
wage will be low and most effort is allocated outside the firm. Hut if the union is also
weak, it will typically achieve a low contract (minimum) wage, which only provide*
little insurance and will not change the effort allocation much. On the other hand,
if the bargaining position of both the union and the individual employees is strong,
the resulting high contract wage will even decrease the amount of effort allocated in
the firm.
Sections 7.4 and 7.5 analyse two wage-setting schemes that are also discussed in
another context elsewhere in this thesis. Section 7.4 discusses again the renegotiation-
game model of chapter 6. In that chapter, it was argued that a wage-Netting scheme
that provides for a fixed contract wage, which can only be adjusted if the outside
option of either the firm or the worker becomes binding, avoids hold-up. It leads to
efficient specific investments (with returns accruing directly to the investing party),
while avoiding inefficient quits and layoffs. As turns out, however, this wage-setting
scheme in most cases fails to lead to an efficient effort allocation. With a fixed wage,
the worker is neither encouraged to exert herself more in her job, nor to invistt in her
outside option. Strong incentives are only given if the contract wage can make one
of the outside options bind. If this is the firm's outside option, then the worker will
allocate all her effort in the firm, in order to avoid that her wage mast be reduced
to prevent the firm from laying her off. If, however, the contract wage w low enough
to possibly make the worker's outside option bind, the worker has an incentive to
maximize her outside option by allocating all her effort outside the firm. Conse-
quently, the effort allocation is extremely sensitive to the size of the contract wage:
efficient incentives are given only in case the contract wage is sufficiently high to
possibly make the firm's outside option bind. In the other cases, either no incentives
are given at all, or they lead to the least efficient effort allocation.
The fact that the fixed wage performs well in providing efficient incentives in
only one of three possible constellations, while it can even lead to a totally inefficient
effort allocation in another case, might give the impression that this wage-setting
scheme is in general inferior to the others. It should be noticed, however, that this174 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
impression can be deceptive. AH we have shown, just because the effort allocation
in very sensitive to the; contract wage, the preferences of the firm and the worker
may coincide, with both parties favouring contract wages that are sufficiently high
to make only the firm's outside option bind. If an increase in the contract wage
induces the worker to switch her effort allocation, the firm's labour cost go up, but
on the other hand, it benefits from a higher marginal product. At the end, the firm
might WM! its profits increase. Therefore, high contract wages that provide efficient
incentives might be more likely, than we have predicted in the previous chapter.**
However, if this is true, another problem about the interpretation of wage gaps
is raised. Already in the previous chapter 6 we have seen that, depending on the size
of the contract wage, Ixith positive (if the worker's outside option is binding) and
negative ga]>s (if the firm's outside option is binding) can occur. In that chapter,
wr argued that positive gaps might be more likely, because first, firm and worker
have conflicting preferences about the size of the contract wage, and second, the
winker's outside option might increase over time. If however, as we predict in this
chaptei. also the firm can have an interest in raising the contract wage, negative gape
would heroine more likely. Moreover, the interpretation of positive wage gaps would
become nioht peculiar: the results of this chapter imply that positive wage gaps
will only occur in a situation where the contract wage is low and workers allocate
all their effort outside the firm. While the efficiency-wage hypothesis of wage gaps
claims that firms raise the effective wage over the contract wage in order to motivate
their workers, positive wage gaps would instead be a result of the workers' frustration
about low contract wages.
Section 7.5 finally examines the incentive effects of local wage bargaining a la
llolden (1988, 1989). Same as in the Nash-bargaining scenario considered in section
7.3, firm and worker negotiate about the division of the worker's marginal product.
Yet this time, the threat points are not determined by the parties' outside options,
but by the contract wage. The resulting effective wage is equal to the contract wage
plus a mark-up (a wage gap), which is positively related to the worker's marginal
product and her bargaining power. Because the bargained wage does not depend
on the worker's outside option, it only provides an incentive to allocate effort in
the firm, but no incentive to allocate effort in the outside option. Unlike Holden,
however, we make a provision for binding outside options and allow for necessary
adjustments of the locally bargained wage. Due to this possibility, the worker can
be induced to allocate some effort outside the firm, if the locally bargained wage is
low enough to make the worker's outside option bind. Yet, the incentive to allocate
effort outside the firm is weaker than in the comparable situation in the fixed-wage
scenario, because the worker's expected payoff still depends on her share in her
marginal product, which she receives via the bargained wage.
The local wage-bargaining scenario also leads to different predictions about the
occurrence and the characteristics of wage gaps. Because the mark-up on the con-
fact, the argument here is the same as for efficiency wages. The employer announces ex onte
to pay a fixed wage greater than the worker's outside option. The worker then exerts herself in the
job in order to avoid that her high earnings are reduced ex post.7.6. Conclusions 178
tract wage is just the object of local wage bargaining, positive wage gaps are inherent
in this wage-setting scheme. Negative gaps can only occur if already th«> contract
wage alone makes the firm's outside option bind. Moreover, different from the fixed-
wage scenario, positive wage gaps are not related to an inefficient etfoit allocution.
because the bargained wage gap just provides f/ir incentive to the woiki i in allm ale
effort in the firm. , -
The discussion has shown, that out of the four wage-Mttlng tdwmei that hK*t
been analysed in this chapter, only the fixed-wage and the local wage-bargaiolnft
scenario can lead to an efficient effort allocation without requiring, that the worker
becomes ex ante residual claimant over the surplus generated in tin- employment
relation. However, in order to provide positive incentives to the worker, also the
fixed-wage scenario requires a relatively high wage that ran make the firm's outside
option bind, such that the worker still can become residual claimant #\r /*»•/. I^o-
cal wage bargaining, in contrast, leads to an efficient effort allocation at any hut
the lowest levels of the effective wage. In fact, the local wage-bai <-euario
owes this favourable characteristic to the structural similarity of its dlcitivc wage
to the classical incentive scheme of principal-agency models: the wage of the worker
depends on a performance-dependent component (the wage gap), which makes the
worker put forth the desired effort in the job, and on a lum|>-suin component (the
contract wage), which distributes the surplus between firm and worker. This simi-
larity suggests that the firm should in principle not be concerned about local wage
bargaining. Although employees (or a local union) force local wage bargaining on
the firm by the threat that they will otherwise reduce their effort, the resulting wage
gap just leads to an efficient effort allocation, which will ce<cri» partitw also benefit
the firm. Instead, the firm should mostly be concerntxl about the size of the contract
wage. This might explain why the public discussion about wages mainly focuses on
collective bargaining.179 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
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wage may be adapted
to the parties' outside
options.
The firm can perceive
the worker's outside
option correctly: the
wage will never make
the worker's outside
option bind.
The firm can perceive
the worker's outside
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The firm can perceive
the worker's outside
option correctly: the
wage will never make
the worker's outside
option bind.
The firm can perceive
the worker's outside
option correctly: if the
wage is adapted to the
outside options if nec-
essary, no inefficient
separation will occur.
The amount of effort allocated
in the firm depends negatively
on the firm's bargaining power.
Only if the worker has full bar-
gaining power, she will allocate
all her effort in the firm. How-
ever, the firm has no interest in
giving up some of its bargain-
ing power to achieve a more ef-
ficient effort allocation.
The minimum wage provides
insurance to the worker against
bad outcomes. The effort allo-
cation still depends on the dis-
tribution of bargaining power,
but tiw worker tend* to jprsad
her effort more evenly over its
two uses. The firm has no in-
terest in giving up some of its
bargaining power.
If the fixed wage can make nei-
ther outside option bind, the
worker's effort allocation is un-
determined. If it can make the
worker's outside option bind,
she will allocate all her effort
outside the firm. The worker
will only allocate all her effort
in the firm, if the fixed wage
can make the firm's outside op-
tion bind. The firm may have
an interest in a higher fixed
wage to achieve this outcome.
The worker allocates all her
effort in the firm. Only in
case that the bargained wage
can make the worker's outside
option bind, she will allocate
some (but not necessarily all
her) effort in her outside op-
tion.
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7.A APPENDIX
7.i4./ 77ie erpec(«tf outside option and mar^inai product
The worker's expectation about her outside option, contingent on her effort allocation r, Ut
E[o(«,e)|e]= /a(«,e)a(«|Od* = a(«,,e)- / *»**''> W(«|r)d*. (7.21)
Its derivatives with respect to the effort allocated in the firm are
(7.22)
(7.23)
(See assumptions (7.2), (7.3) and (7.5).)
The firm's expectation about the worker's outside option is similar, but the true effort
allocation e has to be replaced by the firm's belief r;.
The expected value of the worker's outside option as perceived by the firm, but contin-
gent on the true effort allocation, is
'»0
= a(*,,t,)- /" ^i^i«(,|e)da. (7.24)
•/•„ o»




(See assumptions (7.2), (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5).)
The expected value of the worker's marginal product is
/
"I /"•!
my (m|c)dm = mj — / G(m|e)dm.
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The signs of its derivatives with respect to the effort allocation are
(See assumption (7.1).)
7..A.2 Generoi cAaracferisttea o/tfce erpected payo/f
In this section we derive the expected payoff of the worker and its relevant derivatives in
cane the worker's real or perceived outside option can become binding. We do this in rather
general terms in order to be able to apply the results to the different wage setting schemes,
especially Nash bargaining with binding outside options (section 7.3.2), fixed wage with
renegotiations (section 7.4), and local wage bargaining (section 7.5). The scenario of Nash
bargaining with a minimum wage (section 7.3.3) has a different constellation of parameters.
(See alwi appendix 7.A.4.)
The expected bargaining wage
In most general terms the er po.sf bargaining wage u; can be written as a function of the
worker's marginal product m, the signal s, and a vector of parameters £, which—depending
on the considered wage-setting scheme—can include the firm's bargaining power, its belief,
or a minimum wage:
aw a«;
am ' a» ~~
Consider the expected bargained wage,
/
•"•I /••«!
/ tu/i (a|e) 9 (m|e) dsdm.
'Ml ^4O
It can be developed by repeatedly integrating by parts. The inner integral is calculated as
'(sole)- / ' ^W(s|e)ds
»0
for W (so|r) = 0, and //(«i|e) = 1. The expected bargained wage can now be written as
the sum of two integrals,
E[u»|e] = / u»(st)g(m|e)dm - / / — H(a|e)<;(m
The first summand is calculated as
/:
G(m|e)dm7.A. Appendix
because G(mo|e) = 0, and G(mi|e) = 1. The second suimnand is also integrated by purls,
with /"' ^//(s|e)ds being one part and g(»i|r) the other Then,
=G(m,k) / ^
As all wage-setting schemes considered in this chapter are linear in the marginal product
and the (perceived) outside option, we have *jfc'* = £j£ and J£J£J • 0. Adding up the
two summands then yields
E[He]=u;(m,,«,)- / ^G(m|e)dm
Its derivatives with respect to the amount of effort allocated in the firm are equal to
3c y,,, a« Se
y a a< am ae» y.,, a*
e] /""' a'w aG(m|e) /"•' a*u; a//(a|f)
" y^ ama* ae "* A,, a«a^ a* *
The sign of the second derivative is due to the assumptions about the distributions of m
and s (equations (7.1) and (7.2)).
The expected additional payoff
The ex post additional payoff over the wage is equal to the difference between (perceived)
outside option and the bargained wage. If the firm perceives the worker's outside option
correctly, or if it overestimates it, the additional payoff is equal to
while it is equal to
a(«,e) - tu(m,«,()
if the firm underestimates the worker's outside option. In order to capture both cases, we
denote the ex poat additional payoff by
/:=/<m,.,e,0. £ < 0, g > 0, g < 0.
If, given the vector of parameters £, there is a positive probability that the worker*!
(perceived) outside option can become binding, there are critical levels of the signal and180 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information

































Tb* worker'N oiitnidc option is binding for signals A > A* and marginal products m < m*.
After tin- firm has announced its belief, the worker chooses the effort allocation that
maximizes her me ported payoff. Bwause she receives her (perceived) outside option if * > a*
and MI < m*, her objective is
/ w/i(«|e)0(m|<-)d»dm+ / / a/i (s|e) s(m
/•"•I /••!
+ / / w/i(«|e)9(m|e)d«dm
/•mi /•«( /-m* /•«,
/ / u;h(«|e)g(m|e)dsdm + / / (a - u>) ft (s|e) </ (m|e) dsdm
•fmo t/jo •'mo •'a*
/
•mi /•!, /-m* /-si
/ u>/i(a|c)3(m|e)dsdm + / / //i (s|c) g (m|e) dsdm
where a is either equal to a (s, r/) or equal to a (s, e), depending on the case under consid-
eration.
Consider the second summand /I of the expected payoff. In the following, we call
,4= (7.33)
the expected additional payoff. Its term can also be developed by repeatedly integrating
by parts. Applying this rule for the inner integral we get
= /(«,) |£If (a|e)da,
because hv definition, /(s*) = 0 at all m 6 [mo,m*].
l'lu- ( \IH-CI<H1 additional payoff can now be written as7.A. Appendix 181
We integrate the two summands by parts. The first becomes - > • •'
= J/(«,|e)(/(m,,a*)G(m»-/(mo,ai)G(mo|e)]
because by definition, / (m*, ai) = 0. In order to develop the second sumiiiand. we Udn UM
inner integral /^'.' g£// (s|e)da as one part, and 9 (»i|c) as the other. Notice I lint »* (m*) *
We) d*. Then.
= -G(mo|e)
r r *7 «,
— / / —//(a
./mo ./.• ^*^»
Adding up the two summands yields
A = -/(mo,si)//(s,|e)G(mo|e)
This term can be further simplified by using the fact that all wage-setting Mchernret under
consideration imply a bargained wage that Ls linear in the marginal product and the outside
option as perceived by the firm. Consequently, ^^ = £§£-i = JLL, »Z£tt2 = §f, *nd
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Moreover, W(«o|e) = G(mo|e) = 0, and //(«i|e) = G(mi|e) = 1. Hence, . ^ I:J;
(7.35)
In order to calculate the first derivative of the expected additional payoff with respect to
the amount of effort allocated in the firm, we must take into account that the boundaries




a* (m*) = ai and /(«*) = 0, the first two summands are equal to zero. Conse-
quently,
7T = / / ^
oc 7,,,,, y,. de
The first .summaiid is nonpositive, because ^ < 0. If the firm does not underestimate the
worker's outside option it even vanishes because $£ = 0. The second summand of ^ is
similiir to the term of /t in equation (7.33), with either h (s|e) or 3 (m|c) being replaced by
their derivative with respect to e. Using equation (7.34), the second summand of ^ can
be written as
) , ,x wn jj
s|e) g(m|e)dadm+ /
0G(mo|e)
Since // (ao|«) = G(mo|e) = 0, and // («i|e) = G(mi|e) = 1, irrespective of the value of e,
their derivatives are ""ViM = **"t?H>l*> = 0 for all c. Therefore, the second summand can7.A. Appendix _____ —
be further simplified to
and the derivative of .4 becomes
!s2dm<0. (7.36)
It is strictly negative, because §f < 0, £ < 0, ^fe^i > 0, 22£W < 0, and W (.'|e) < 1.
Unfortunately, the sign of the second derivative of .4 cannot bo determined without
specifying the distribution functions.
The cross derivative with respect to a parameter £ is given by
Consider the first summand. It is
m
The second summand is calculated as184 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
Repeatedly integrating by parts this simplifies to •
with






The optimal effort allocation if the worker's outside option ran be binding
We are now ready to derive some general results about the effort allocution if the real or
perceived outside option can become binding Using the equations (7.32) and (7.36), we
can write the first derivative of the worker's expected payoff with respect to the amount of
effort allocated in the firm as
After simplifying and arranging the terms, this becomes
] •
In general, its sign cannot be determined. However, in the vicinity of the two extreme
effort allocations we get
(7.38)186 Chapter 7. Wage bargaining under asymmetric information
This implies that the worker will never allocate all her effort in the firm if either her real
outside option or her outside option as perceived by the firm can become binding.
7.J4.3 77ie expected addtttonai payo/f tn (Ae Mu/i 6aryamtng scenario
The worker will quit if the bargained wage is less than her outside option, wjv < a («, e).
This Hitiiation can only occur if the firm overestimates the amount of effort allocated in the
firm, r/ > r, and if the worker has not the full bargaining power.
In order to identify the values of the signal and the marginal product for which the
worker'H outside option ran be binding, notice first that both the wage and the outside
option are functions of the signal. We define a critical signal s^ (m,0, e,r/), such that
a(«*^,e) = u;/v(^,m,tf)=fla(^,r;) + (l-fl)(m-aF). (7.39)
Because of assumption (7.4), the outside option is binding for all signals 5 > s^ (m,0), if
such a signal exists in [«o,«i]. Differentiating equation (7.39) shows that the critical signal
in an increasing function in the marginal product m and the amount of effort allocated in








In a similar way we define a critical marginal product m]v (0, e,r;):
a (a,, e) = 0a (s,, r,) + (1 - 0) (n»V - ar)
If such an »t]v € [mo, mi) exists, then for all m > m)v there are no signals s € [so,*i] that
make the outside option bind. The critical marginal product is an increasing function of
the firm's bargaining power 0 and its belief r/, and a decreasing function of the amount of
effort allocated in the firm e:
dm^ _ m^ -OF -a(3|,r/)
d0
de 1 - 0
1-0
„
dr, 1 - 0 ~
>0
The opportunity to leave the firm in case her outside option is binding changes the
expected payoff of the worker. While for (m,s) e {[m^-, mi], [so.s'v]} she will accept the
wage u'.v, she will ilioose her outside options for other combinations of m and s.
Applying equation (7.33), we now can write the expected additional payoff as
= (1 -0) /'"" [1 - //(s^|e)]G(m|e)dm.7.A. Appendix 187
By equation (7.36), its derivative with respect to the amount of effort allocated in the firm
is
de" ~ 7 y 0c
7.J4.^ 77»e ezprctnf additional payoff tn <A« minimum u»aoc jrrnano
Differentiating equation (7.13), that defines the critical nignal «M at which the minimum
wage is exactly equal to the bargained wage, yields
dm
The expected additional payoff >1 A/ from equation (7.14) is different from the previoiwly
analysed additional payoffs, because the minimum wage is binding for Hignals a € (ou,"^)
and marginal products m € [mo,mj(). Nevertheless, we can use the same integration rules
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Its derivative is •- • •,>>•?>;;•;
^) dm
The nign of I his d<Tivativt> is in general ambiguous. However, by assumptions (7.1) and
(7.2) we get the following signs for extreme effort allocations:CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
8.1 SUMMARY
The aim of this thesis was to provide a better understanding of the factors t hat lead
to the occurrence and persistence of wage gaps. The discussion in part I (chapters 4
and 5) centred around two themes, efficiency wages and bargaining power. If firms
pay efficiency wages, employees or local labour representatives that have some bar-
gaining power vis-a-vis the firm, can try to influence the relation between wage and
effort in different ways. First, they can accept the effort function that results from
their incentive-compatibility constraint. Firm ami employe** will then negotiate
about which point on the effort function to choose. As we have argued in chapter
5, negotiations about the effort level will result in a commitment problem, if effort
cannot be monitored perfectly.' The same problem will arise if points beyond the
effort functions are chosen by simultaneous bargaining about wage and effort levels.
Therefore, the bargaining parties can choose a point on the effort function only by
bargaining about the wage. We have discussed local wage bargaining in chapter 4 of
this thesis. A second way to influence the wage-effort relation is to bargain about the
parameters that determine the shape of the effort function. This type of bargaining
was discussed in chapter 5.
In chapter 4, we focused on bargaining about the division of rents as a reason for
wage gaps. After the contract wage has been determined by collective bargaining
between union and employers' federation, employees (or a local union) can force
another round of bargaining on individual firms. This kind of local wage bargaining is
common in Scandinavian countries, where collective bargaining is highly centralized,
but a similar bargaining situation can also arise in other countries, possibly in an
implicit way. As chapter 3 has shown, the different studies on this kind of bargaining,
Holden (1988, 1989, 1998), Muysken and van Veen (1996) and de Gijsel (1996), deal
with the concept of bargaining power in a very stylized way. Moreover, the studies
make different assumptions about the role of efficiency wages in the determination of
the threat points of firm and workers. While Muysken and van Veen assume a single
effort function to hold in situations of agreement as well as during bargaining, Holden
and de Gijsel argue that workers are able to reduce their effort during bargaining,
in order to make a disagreement costly for the firm. As turns out, the predictions
' And that is just one of the reasons why firms pay efficiency wages.
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about the; occurrence of wage gaps are highly sensitive to the assumptions about the
threat |H>ints.
Chapter 4 dealt with the issue of bargaining power in two ways. First, it modelled
the process of bargaining explicitly, introducing a noncooperative bargaining game in
which bargaining power is expressed by the frequency at which the bargaining parties
can make wage proposals. Second, it considered the choice of the workers' threat
point to be another expression of bargaining power. It was shown that different
constellations of the contract wage, the profit-maximizing (efficiency) wage, and the
worker's disagreement payoff lead to different predictions about the occurrence of
wage ga|>s, and that the above-mentioned studies can all be drawn back to one of
tlurne constellations.
Chapter 5 addressed bargaining about the shape of the effort function. It started
out from the olwtcrvation that in Western European countries, unions and works
councils have a say in the determination of working conditions and in the personnel
policy of employers. They can, for example, use their say in these issues in order
to influence the monitoring technology the firm applies, or in order to influence the
possible sanctions a worker can expect when she is caught shirking. We argued
that workers' representatives cannot protect workers from being laid off who fall
short of IIIIV performance standard, but that it will back workers against the firm,
as loiijif as they put forth at least a certain reference JPVPJ of eiforl. Because llwse
"semi-shirkers" are protected from unemployment, the severest sanction the firm
can impose is to cut their wage back to the contract-wage level.
The model we have analysed in chapter 5 provided some interesting insights in
the behaviour of wage gaps and the effects of works councils (or unions in general) on
productivity. First, by introducing a reference effort level that is tied to the contract
wage, we provided an argument for why the firm's profit-maximizing (efficiency)
wage may depend on the contract wage. We showed that a raise in the contract
wage will lead to an even stronger increase in the effective wage, i.e., that the size
of the wage gap depends positively on the contract wage. Second, we compared the
impact of different types of unions on effort and employment. The result was that,
if unions care about employment, they might induce an effective effort level that is
higher than it would be without unions.
In part II (chapters 6 and 7) of this thesis we discussed possible motives of
workers and firms to settle on wage-setting systems that imply the occurrence of
wage gaps. Both chapters of this part stressed the importance of incentive issues for
this decision. In chapter 6 we focused on the employment relation between a single
employee and her employer. In this chapter, we argued that both parties are typically
interested in a fixed, predetermined wage in order to avoid hold-up of investments.
If a party can undertake specific investments that generate returns which directly
accrue to the investing party, but which are of no value if the employment relation
is abolished, the other party has an interest to change the distribution of surpluses
after the investment is done, in order to acquire a share of the returns. If the
investing party is not protected by a fixed wage from being ripped off in this way,
the investment level will be inefficiently low. However, a fixed wage can also put the8.2. Recommendations for economic policy 191
investment and even the whole employment relation at risk, if it makes the outside
option of one of the parties bind. Therefore, we argued, the parties must on the
one hand determine a fixed (contract) wage, while on the other hand they must
make a provision for renegotiations of their cont ract. if one of t licit outside opt ions
threatens to become binding. In chapter 6, a noncooperative renegotiation game
was proposed, that leads to outcomes that carefully weigh the m..l in Km the
contract wage unchanged against the need for wage flexibility: the w.i;./ is , ii.m^ed
only if an outside option becomes binding, and it is only changed to the extent that
is necessary to prevent the party with the binding outside option from abolishing the
employment relation. In this view, wage gaps, deviations of the renegotiated wage
from the predetermined contract wage, occur due to changes in the outside options,
i.e., they are induced solely by factors from outside the employment relation. In
spite of the underlying incentive mechanism, the chapter provided it similar view on
wage gaps as the Phillips-curve approach.
In the model of chapter 6 wage gaj>s occurred as necessary adjustments of the
wage to exogenous factors, while in principle both the worker and her employer had
an interest in keeping the wage fixed, in order to protect the returns of their specific
investments. Chapter 7, on the other hand, has emphasized the agency aspect of
an employment relation. We assumed another type of investment, which is more
typical of employment relations. The worker has to decide al>out the allocation of
effort over two uses: she can put forth effort in the firm, or she can invest in her
outside option. The chapter addressed the problem of finding an incentive scheme
that leads to efficient investments in the firm, when firm and worker cannot contract
on the effort allocation. We compared the performance of different wage-formation
systems, especially a fixed-wage scheme similar to the one of chapter (i, and u scheme
with local wage bargaining similar to the one of chapter 4. We concluded, that the
latter is the most efficient system, because it combines a fixed base wage rate (the
contract wage) with a performance dependent pay (the wage gap as share in the
firm's revenues). It was argued that the contract wage is necessary to prevent the
worker from investing in her outside option, but that it does not provide an incentive
to invest in a greater work performance. This incentive can only be provided by the
wage gap. The outcome thus supports the basic hypothesis of this thesis, that both
bargaining and incentive pay are important determinants of the wage gap.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
The recommendatioas for economic policy that can be drawn from this study can
only be indirect. Perhaps the most important Ls that wage gaps are nothing policy
makers should be worried about.
Wage gaps, or more precisely, wage drift used to be a public concern in the 1950s
and 1960s, when the drift rates were much higher than nowadays. In those years,
some Western European governments, including the Dutch,^ interfered actively in
the wage-format ion process in order to keep wage increases under control- after the
'Recall the "guided wage policy" (chapter 2).192 Chapter 8. Conclusions
Second World War, most governments were more concerned about economic growth
than about income policies. However, the governments' control mostly applied to
collective agreements on wages only, and so the rapid increases of effective wages due
to a rising demand for labour arotised their suspicion. Another concern, that was
uttered in many contemporary studies on wage drift, was that unions and employer
federations might lose their grip on the development of wages.' This claim, however,
can be rejected, because in all models discussed in this thesis, wage gaps are co-
determined by the contract wage. Hence, it is likely, that unions and employers'
federations will take them into account when negotiating collective agreements.
The discussion about wage drift has faded after the early 1970s, and with it, for
alMMit twenty years, the interest in the topic. This may be due to two reasons. First,
the wage-drift rates were much lower, and even close to zero, after the mid-1970s.*
Second, the Zrityrw* had turned against government intervention, and nowadays,
governments usually respect the autonomy of the parties involved in wage formation.
A closer look, however, reveals that the discussion has not faded but that only
its emphasis lui.s shifted. In view of high and persistent unemployment in European
countries, tin- incut years have seen a vivid discussion about the performance of
different wage-format ion systems, initiated by the seminal contribution of Calmfors
and Driffill (1988) They claimed that the performance of labour markets is l>etter
in countries where wage setting is either highly centralized or highly decentralized.
Countries in between, like Germany and the Netherlands, where collective agree-
ments are bargained at the level of industries, perform worse according to their
study.'' Their reasoning is that if collective bargaining occurs on a centralized, say
nationwide, level, the bargaining parties will have to take the employment effects of
their decisions into account. If, in contrast, wage bargaining is highly decentralized
and takes place at the level of individual firms, the bargaining parties are disciplined
by the market for the firm's output. Only if bargaining occurs at the industry level,
the bargaining parties might attempt to shift the negative employment effects of
wage increases to other industries. But if the bargaining parties in all industries act
this way, a higher unemployment rate will be the result.
However, the results of this study partly qualify this claim. First, wage gaps are
always determined at the level of individual firms. Because wage gaps are common in
countries with collective bargaining at a nationwide and industry-wide level (those
countries "in between"), one could argue that there are actually no countries with
a strictly centralized wage-setting system.® Second, we have shown in chapters
•^See also the discussion of the Phillips-curve theory in chapter 3.
* Recall that the early literature on the topic was always about wage dri/l, not wage
However, a drift rate dose to zero docs riof imply that relative wage gaps are decreasing.
*This discussion is not purely academic. In Germany, for example, there is a public debate
whether firms should be allowed to deviate from collective agreements and pay less than the contract
wa^o when this saves jolw.
''Notice that Calmfors and Driffill (1988) mention the Scandinavian countries as examples for
highly centralized wage setting. Yet. we have seen in the chapters 3 and 4, that just in these
countries explicit /ono/ wage bargaining about wage gaps is institutionalized. Hence, in these
countries wage setting is actually far from being centralized. In view of the results of the mentioned
chapters it could even be argued that those countries should perform much worse: unions could8.3. Suggestions for further research 193
5, 6 and 7, that wage-setting systems that allow for the occurrence of wage gaps,
determined at the level of individual firms, can enhance the efficiency of employment
relations. Especially if there is asymmetric information about the workers' effort, as
was assumed in the models of chapters 5 and 7, these wage-setting systems can even
lead to lower wage cost per effective unit of labour.
8.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
One of the conclusions of the literature survey in chapter 3 was that the outcome
of models of local wage bargaining (or wage renegotiations) between a firm and its
employees is highly sensitive to the assumed bargaining structure. As luis become
clear in chapter 4, which deals explicitly with this problem, and also in < li.ipii i
7, where different wage-setting schemes are evaluated, especially the assumptions
about parties' disagreement payoffs are decisive. Although those chapters analyse
the consequences of different assumptions, the determinants of the disagreement
payoffs are still not fully understood. Probably, the solution will be found at other
stages of the wage-format ion process. The discussion in chapter r> already hinted at
this direction by arguing that collective agreements do not only determine contract
wages but that they also (co-)determine some standards for workers' effort.
Another severe problem is the lack of data on wage gaps. Highly aggregated
data on wage drt/fc is available for Germany and the Netherlands from the statistical
offices, but micro-data that would allow testing the models developed in this thesis
is extremely scarce. The German company panels mentioned in chapter 2 might
help filling the gap. Yet for the Netherlands, such studies are still missing to the
knowledge of the author.
(ab)use the contract wage setona centralized level to rip off firms in a second round of bargaining.
Notice however, that we have shown in chapter 7 that local wage bargaining can enhance the
efficiency of employment relations.•#>
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Statistiek.k^1m/H]hSamenvatting (Dutch summary)
In landen met een stelsel van collectieve ondcrhandelingen tussen vakbonden en
werkgeversorganisaties op landelijk niveau of het aiveau vim bodrijfstakkon, hi'tulcn
werkgevers vaak een toeslag op de CAO-louen. Deze toeslagen, de zogenoenule iiui-
dentele lonen, kuimen een wezenlijk deel uitmaken van hot inkoinen van wei kneinore.
Ondanks hun naani vertonen zij een opmerkelijke persistent ie over de t.ijd.
Dit proefschrift is een theoretisch onderzoek naar het ontstaan on do persist cut ie
van incidentele lonen. Het probleem wordt vanuit verschillende richtingon houadcrd.
Het leidmotief is echter doorgaans de rol die efficientielonen en onderhandolingsmnclii
van werknemers en werkgevers hierin spelen.
Onderhandelingsniacht bei'nvloedt het loonvormingsproces op alle niveaus. Tij-
dens CAO-onderhandelingen is dit duidelijk zichtbaar. Onderhande.lingsinacht is ech-
ter ook belangrijk op het bedrijfsniveau, nanielijk als renten gecreeerd worden, bij-
voorbeeld door transactiekosten of moral Ziazarrf.
Efficientielonen zijn voor dit onderzoek met name belangrijk vanwege hun rao-
tivatieaspect. Volgens de efficientieloontheorie bestaat er een positieve samenhang
tussen de prestatie en het loon van een werknemer. Een onderneming kan van die
samenhang gebruik maken en haar arbeidskosten niinimaliseren door een hoger loon
dan het marktloon te betalen. Werknemers, aan de andere kant, worden hierdoor
deels afgeschermd van ontwikkeling<;n op de arbeidsniarkt, waardoor zij een Hterkere
onderhandelingspositie tegenover de onderneming kunnen opbouwen.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een beknopte inleiding in het onderwerp en een motivatie van het
onderzoek. Verder wordt de opbouw van het boek uitgelegd.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt de empirische achtergrond voor het theoretisch onderzoek
in de volgende hoofdstukken. Het beschrijft de arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland
en Duitsland en de ontwikkeling van de loondrift, de verandering van de incidentele
lonen over de tijd, in de twee landen. Verder worden verscheidene empirinche stu-
dies over de oorzaken van incidentele lonen en loondrift in Nederland en Duitsland
besproken. Deze studies steunen de assumptie dat efficientielonen en onderhande-
lingsmacht een grote rol spelen bij het totstandkomen van incidentele lonen.
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een overzicht van de bestaande theorieen over incidentele lonen
en loondrift. De verscheidene modellen kunnen worden samengevat in drie groepen:
de zogenoemde Phillipscurve-modellen. efficientieloon-modellen f^n modellen met lo-
cale onderhandelingen op bedrijfsniveau. Volgens de Phillipscurve-modellen worden
de effectieve lonen bepaald op een competitieve arbeidsmarkt. In een situatie van
een alsmaar stijgende vraag naar arbeid kunnen de CAO-lonen de effectieve lonen niet
snel genoeg volgen. zodat er een verschil tussen beide ontstaat, het incidentele loon.
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De efficientieloon-modellen verklaren incidentele lonen uit de eerder beschreven po-
sitieve samenhang tussen prestatie en loon. In deze modellen wordt die samenhang
me<le hcpaald door het CAO-loon, waardoor bij een stijging van het CAO-loon ook
het effiictieve Wx>n wordt opgedreven. De modellen met locale onderhandelingen ten
ttlotte geven als oorzaak van incidentele lonen expliciete onderhandelingen tussen
management en werkneiners op bedrijfsniveau, die op CAO-onderhandelingen op een
centraler niveau volgen, aan.
De volgende hoofdstukken zijn ingedeeld in twee delen. In deel I (hoofdstukken
4 en !>) Htaan effiriPntielonen en onderhandelingen tussen werkgevers en werknemers
centraal. Hierbij wordt ingegaan op een aantal problemen die bij de discussie van
tteataande modellen van incidentele lonen, in het bijzonder de modellen van locale
nnderhiindelingen, naar voren zijn gekomen.
llonfdstuk 4 behandelt de invloed van dreigpunten op het onderhandelingsresul-
taat in modellen van locale loononderhandelingen met efficientielonen. In een al-
genieiH' opzet wordt het onderhandelingsproces tvissen werkgever en werknemers op
Iwdrijfwiiveaii onderzocht. Het resultaat Ls dat de eerder besproken modellen kunnen
wonlen Mimfiigrvut onder twee parameterconstellaties van CAO-loon, efficientieloon
en onrlerluuidelingskoston, die afliankelijk van de verdeling van onderhandelings-
macht tot etui incidenteel loon kunnen leiden. Tevens wordt een derde mogelijke
constellatie geidentificeerd, die onder alle omstandigheden tot een incidenteel loon
leidt.
In hoofdst.uk 5 wordt ingegaan op de invloed van vertegenwoordigers van werk-
nemers op de gestalte van de effort-functie, d. w. z. de functionele samenhang tussen
het. loon en de prestatie van werknemers. Het hoofdstuk gaat uit van de observatie
dat vnkbonden en ondernemingsraden veelvuldig invloed uitoefenen op bijvoorbeeld
de arheidsomstandigheden en ontslagprocedures. In het model koppelen vakbonden
het CAO-loon aan een bepaald prestatieniveau. Hierdoor niaken zij het winstmaxi-
maliserende loon, het zogenoemde efficientieloon, afliankelijk van het CAO-loon. Het
resultant is dat werkgevers hierdoor in de nieeste gevallen gedwongen worden een
toeslag op het CAO-loon te betalen. Bovendien wordt aangetoond dat het incidentele
loon positief van het CAO-loon afhangt. Het laatste deel van dit hoofdstuk gaat in
op de consequenties voor het gedrag van vakbonden, afliankelijk van de mate waarin
zij retailing houden met de werkgelegenheid van hun leden.
Deel II behandelt het probleem van incidentele lonen vanuit een ander perspec-
tief. Nu staat de vraag centraal of incidentele lonen een efficient antwoord kunnen
zijn op onvolkomenheden in de arbeidsrelatie tussen een werkgever en een werkne-
mer. Onder eflioientie wordt hierbij verstaan dat de arbeidsrelatie in stand wordt
gehouden zolmig zij een positieve uetto-uitt>etaling boven de outside options ge-
nereert, en dat de twee partijen voor een efficient niveau van investeringen in de
arbeidsrelat ie kiezen.
In hcHtfdst tik (> wordt uitgegaan van een specifiek type investeringen waarvan de
opbrengsten naar de investeerder terugvloeien. Het wordt beargumenteerd dat in
dit geval Ixnde part ijen baat hebben bij een vooraf afgesproken star loon opdat geen
partij zich de opbrengsten van de ander kan toeeigenen hetgeen tot suboptimaleSanienvatting (Dutch summary) 209
investeringen zou leiden. Een te star loon kan echter ook tot de out binding van do
arbeidsrelatie leiden. met name als een partij vaststelt dat haar nut of winst met
een andere partner hoger zou zijn. In dit geval zouden beide partijen juist baat
hebben bij een flexibel loon. In het hoofdstuk wordt een ondcrhandclingsinodel
voorgesteld dat alleen tot loonsveranderingen leidt als de arboidsrelat ie door de
outride options in gevaar komt. Het incidentele loon is golijk aan de afwijking van
het onderhandelde loon en het vooraf afgesproken loon. In het hoofdst.uk wordt ook
aangetoond dat dergelijke veranderingen van het loon alleen tnogelijk zijn in een
situatie van complete informatie. In het geval van asynunctrische infortnatie over
de outside option van de andere partij kan het loon echter niet voldoonde worden
aangepast om een inefficiente ontbinding van de relatie te vennijden.
Hoofdstuk 7 neemt de structutir van het voorafgaande hoofdstuk over nmur ver-
onderstelt een ander type investeringen. Nu moet de werkneiner kiozen t usson inves-
teringen in zijn prestatie in het bedrijf en investeringen in zijn owt.stdr option; ver-
geleken met hoofdstuk 6 is de out.s»de option van de werknemer nu goi'ndogenisoerd.
Bovendien kan de werkgever de investeringen niet direct waarnemen. In dit hoofd-
stuk wordt nagegaan in hoeverre verschillende loonvormingsprocossen. die vaker in
de arbeidseconomische literatuur aangehaald worden, onder deze omstHiidigheilnti
tot efficiente resultaten leiden. Het model toont aan dat door <le endogenisering van
de beslissing van de werknemer in geen van de onderzochte j>r• •< <••••-••n inefiicie'iite
ontbindingen van de arbeidsrelatie dreigen. Efficiente investeriiigt-n worden echter
alleen bereikt in loonvormingsprocessen die in een vooraf vastgcwteld loon (bijvoor-
beeld het CAO-loon) en daarop opbouwende onderhandelingen over ecu loontoeslag
voorzien. Het eerder in dit proefschrift besproken model van locale onderhandclinge.n
leidt dus tot efficiente resultaten.
In hoofdstuk 8 worden de resultaten van dit proefschrift samcngcvat. TevenH
worden enkele suggesties voor economisch beleid en verder onderzoek gedaan.(VIZusammenfassung (German summary)
In Landern, in denen Tarifverhandlungen entweder auf nationaler Ebone odor auf
Branchenebene gefiihrt werden, bezahlen Arheitgeher hiiufig einon Zuschlag auf don
Tariflohn. Diese Zuschlage, die sogenannte Lohnspanno, konnen einon wesentliohon
Teil des Arbeitnehmereinkommens ausmachen. Sic sind dariiber liiiuuis ilbor die Zoit
gesehen auffallend bestandig.
Diese Arbeit ist eine theoretische Studie iiber die Ureaction dor EntNtchuiig und
der Persistenz von Lohnspannen. Das Prot)lem wird aus verschiodenon Bliekwinkclu
betrachtet. Dabei stehen jedoch immer Eflizionzlohnc und dio Vorliandluiutsiuarlit
von Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern als wichtige Faktoren im Mittelpunkt.
Verhandlungsmacht boeinflufit den LohnsetzungsprozoB auf allon Ebonon. In T»-
rifverhandlungen wird dies inuner wieder deullich. Vorhandlungsinaclit ist al>or auch
auf Betriebsebene wichtig, wenn namlich, zum Beispiel durch Tran«aktionnkoHten
oder nioralische Risiken. Renton krciort wordon, die es zu vertoilon gilt.
Effizienzlbhnen win! in diesor Arbeit wegen des Motivationsaspokts eino besonde-
re Bedeutung beigemessen. Laut Effizienzlohn-Theorie besteht zwischen der I^'istung
und dem Lohn eines Arbeitnehmers ein positiver Zusamnienhang. Kin Unternohinen
kann diesen Zusammenhang nutzen und seine Arbeitskosten miiiiiincrcti, iud<*m ««
einen hoheren Lohn als den Marktlohn bezahlt. Arbeitnehmer wiederum werden
hierdurch von den Entwicklungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt teilwriw aljgr'scliirnit. Das
versetzt sie in die Lage, eine Verhandlungsposition gegeniiber dem Untornohiuon
aufzubauen.
Kapitel 1 beinhaltet eine kurze Einleitung in das Thema und eine Motivierung der
Arbeit. AuBerdem wird der Aufbau des Buches erlautert.
Kapitel 2 behandelt den institutionellen und empirischen Hintorgrund dor na<:h-
folgenden theoretischen Modelle. Es beschreibt die wichtigen Arbeitsmarktinstitu-
tionen in den Niederlanden und Deutschland, sowie die Entwicklung fler Ixjhndrift,
der zeitlichen Veranderung der Lohnspannc, in diesen beiden Landern. W«!iterliin
werden verschiedene empirische Studien iiber die Ursachen von Lohnspannen und
Lohndrift in den Niederlanden und in Deutschland besprochen. Diese Studien un-
terstiitzen die These dieser Arbeit, daB Effizienzlohne und Verhandlungsmacht eine
groBe Rolle beim Zustandekommen von Lohnspannen spielen.
Kapitel 3 gibt einen Uberblick iiber die theoretische Literatur UV>er Lohnspannen
und Lohndrift. Die verschiedenen Modelle konnen zu drei Gruppen zusammengefaBt
werden: den sogenannten Phillipskurvenmodellen, Effizienzlohnmo<lellen und Modvl-
len mit lokalen Lohnverhandlungen auf Betriebsebene. Ereteren zufolge werden die
effektiven Lohne auf einem kompetitiven Arbeitsmarkt bestimmt. Bei einer stetig
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Hteigenden Arbeitsnachfrage kdnnen die Tariflohne mit den effektiven Lohnen nicht
mehr Schritt halten, so da8 zwischen beiden eine Differenz entsteht, die Lohnspanne.
Effizienzlohnmodelle erklaren Lohnspannen aiis dem oben beschriebenen positiven
Zwtammcnhang zwischen Arbeitsleistung und Lohn. Dieser Zusammenhang wird in
dienen Modellen unter anderom diirch den Tariflohn bestimmt; bei einer Erhohung
de« Tariflohns wird auch dor effektive Lohn in die Hohe getrieben. Die Modelle loka-
ler lyohnvi-rhandlungen schliefilich sehen die Ursache von Lohnspannen in expliziten
Verhandltingon zwinchen Management und Arbeitnehmern auf Betriebsebene, die
don Tarifverhandlungen auf zentraler Ebene nachgelagert sind.
Dcr Hi-st dor Arbeit glicdort sich in zwei Teile. In Teil I (Kapitel 4 und 5) stehen
Efli/.ienzlohno und die Vorhandlungen zwischen Arlwitgebern und Arbeitnehmern
irn Mittelpunkt. Bride Kapitel gehen nfther auf einige Probleme ein, die bereits bei
<I«T Diskussion lieatehendcr Modelle iibor die Entstehung von Lohnspannen, insbe-
Honderc dor Modelle lokaler Ixjhnverhandlungen, identifizicrt wurden.
Kapitel 4 behandelt den Einflufi von Drohpunkten auf das Verhandlungsergebnis
in Modcllcti loknler Lohnvcrliandlungon, wenn Unternehmen Effizienzlohne l>ezahlen.
In oinem allgemoin gcfafilcn Modcll wird der Verhandlungsprozefi zwischen Arbeit-
gebern und Arbeitnehmern auf Betriebsebene analysiert. Das Ergebnis ist, da8 die
im vorangehenden Kapitel besprochenen Modelle zu zwei Gruppen zusammenge-
fafit werden kounen, die jeweils mit einer Parameterkonstellationen von Tariflohn,
EHizirn/.lolui und Verhandlungskosten korrespondieren. In beiden Konstellationen
knnn, abhangig von dcr Verteilung der Verhandlungsmacht, eine Lohnspanne ent-
Htehen. Zudein wird eine dritte mogliche Konstellation identifiziert, die unter alien
Umstiinden zu einer Lohnspanne fiihrt.
Kapitel 5 untersucht die Konsequenzen des Einflusses, den Arbeitnehmervertre-
ter auf die Form der Effort-Funktion, den funktionalen Zusammenhang zwischen
Arbeitsleistung und Lohn, ausiiben. Ausgangspunkt ist die Beobachtung, dafi Ge-
werkschaften und Betriebsrate vielfaltig EinfluB auf Arbeitsumstande und das Ent-
lassungsverfnhren ausiiben. In dem vorgestellten Modell koppeln Gewerkschaften
den Tariflohn an ein bestimnites Leistungsniveau. Dadurch machen sie den gewinn-
maxiniierenden Lohn, den sogenannten Effizienzlohn, abhangig vom Tariflohn. Das
Ergebnis ist. dafi Arbeitgeber in den moisten Fallen gezwungen sind, einen Zuschlag
auf den Tariflohn zu zahlen. AuBenlein wird gezeigt, dafi die entstehende Lohn-
spanne positiv von der H6he des Tariflohns abhangt. Der letzte Teil dieses Kapitels
beschaftigt sich mit den Konsequenzen dieses Modells fur das Verhalten von Ge-
werkschaften.
Teil II (Kapitel 6 und 7) dieser Arbeit behandelt das Problem der Lohnspannen
mis einoin nnderen Blickwinkel. Nun steht die Frago im Mittelpunkt. ob Lohnspannen
eine elH/iente Liisung fiir die Unvollkommenheiten des Beschaftigungsverhaltnisses
zwischen einem Arbeitgeber und einem Arbeitnehmer sein konnen. Unter Effizienz
wird dabei verstanden. <lafi das Beschaftigiingsverhaltnis aufrechterhalten wird. so-
lange os oine positive Netto-Auszahlung generiert. die die Outside opttorw ubersteigt.
und dafi beide Parteien sich fiir optimale Investitionen in das Beschaftigungsverhalt-
nis enUsoheiden.Zusammenfassung (German summary) 213
Kapitel 6 geht von einer fur Beschaftigungsverhaltnis.se nicht unbedingt. typi-
schen Art von Investionen ans, deren Ertrage an den Investor direkt zuriickfliefien.
In diesem Fall haben beide Parteien Vorteil an eiiiein im vorhinein iibgesproche-
nen festen Lohn, damit keine der Parteien sich die Investitionsertrage der anderen
aneignen kann, was zu suboptinmlen Investitionen filhren wiirde. Ein zu starrer
Lohn kann allerdings anch zur Auflosung des Beschaftigungsverhaltnisses fiihrcn,
besonders dann, wenn eine der Parteien feststellt, dafi ihr Nutzen oder Gewinn mit
einem anderen Partner holier ware. In soldi einein Fall hat ten beide Parteien gerade
einen Vorteil an einem flexiblen Lohn. In dein Kapitel win! ein Verhandlungsiuodel
vorgestellt, das nur dann zu einer Anderung des Lohnes fiihrt, wenn das Beschiil'ti-
gungsverhaltnis durch gestiegene Ouf.sidr opfton.s in Gcfaln koiniut. Die Lohiispaune
ist identisch nrit der Abweichung des nachververhandelten Lohns v<mi vorhrr nbge-
sprochenen Lohn. Dariiber hinaus wird gezeigt, dafi solche Lohn;inp;i.s.sinini"n nur
moglich sind, wenn beide Parteien iiber vollstandige Inforinatiouen verfiigen. Bci
asymmetrischen Informationen iiber die Outside option der jeweils aiuleivn Parlei
kann der Lohn nicht ausreichend angepafit werden, um eine inefliziente Aul'losung
des Beschaftigungsverhaltnisses zu verrneiden.
Kapitel 7 ubernimmt die Struktur des vorangeheuden Kapitels, goht. aber von
einem anderen Typ Investitionen aus. Jetzt muB sich der Arbeitnehmer zwischrn
Investitionen in seine Arbeitsleistimg im Betrieb und Investitionen in Heine On/.su/f!
option entscheiden; im Vergleich zu Kapitel 6 ist die 6>u/..sidr ophon des Arbeitne.h-
mers nun also endogenisiert. AuBerdem wird angenommen, daB der Arl)eitgel)er die
Investitionen nicht direkt beobachten kann. In diesem Kapitel wird der Frugc narhge-
gangen, inwieweit unterschiedliche Lohnsetzungsprozesse, die hiiufiger in der arbeit.H-
marktokonomischen Literatur beschrieben werden, unter den genannten Uinstiinden
zu effizienten Ergebnissen fiihren. Es wird gezeigt, dafi durch die Endogenisierung der
Entscheidung des Arbeitnehmers in keinem der untersuchten Prozcwsc: eine incfiizieu-
te Auflosung des Beschaftigungsverhaltnisses droht. Effiziente Inventitionen werden
allerdings nur in Lohnsetzungsprozessen erreicht, in denen ein leistungsabhangiger
Aufschlag auf einen im vorhinein festgesetzten Lohn (zum Beispiel d<:n Tariflohn)
gezahlt wird. Dieser LohnsetzungsprozeB entspricht weitgehend den an anderer Steri-
le in dieser Arbeit besprochenen Modellen lokaler Lohnv<!rhandlungen. Dies«? ftihren
also zu Ergebnissen, die nach den beschriebenen Kriterien effizient sind.
In Kapitel 8 schliefilich werden die Ergebnisse di(!»er Arbeit zusammengefaflt.
Zudem werden einige wirtschaftspolitLsche Enipfehlungen sowie Anregungen fiir wei-
terfiihrende Forschung gegeben.CURRICULUM VITAE
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This book was written and composed by the author, using Donald Knuth's typeset-
ting programme T£X with Leslie Lamport's macro package I^Tj^X, numerous addi-
tional packages and own modifications.
The typeface used is Computer Modern Roman 10 on 12 pt and 9 on llpt,
designed by Donald Knuth.
The offset-printing and binding work was done by Datawyse in Maastricht.
The cover shows a version of Otto von Guericke's Magdeburg sphere experiment as
shown by Ferrari in P/i»iosop/iia Peripafefica, 1745. In 1654, Guericke first demon-
strated the enormous force of air pressure. He placed two copper bowls together to
form a hollow sphere about 35.5 cm in diameter. After the air had been removed
from the sphere, horses were unable to pull the bowls apart, although only the air
around them held them together.
The Magdeburg sphere is an allegory for employment relatioas. Workers and
employer are pulling in different directions. Yet, both parties prefer their relation
over choosing their outside options. So it is the pressure from the out .side world
which holds them together. (And no, this should not suggest that employment
relations only comprise a vacuum.)' i
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